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More Speech, Less Noise: Amplifying 
Content-Based Speech Regulations 
Through Binding International Lawt 
Viktor Mayer-Schonberger 
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INTRODUCTION 
Words wound. l Checks choke.2 For two hundred years these two 
absolutes have marked the extreme ends of public opinion and 
t This Article benefitted immensely from the thoughtful comments and criticisms offered 
by Gerry Ashdown, Bob Bastress, Alan Chen, Richard Delgado, Bill Eskridge, Jim Friedberg, 
Stanley Ingber, Peter Krug, Toni Massaro, Pat McGinley and Alexander Somek, and we are 
deeply grateful for their assistance. Thanks to Ronald D. Correll, Mary Beth Nash and Lori 
A. Simpson, West Virginia University students, and to Anna Holzner, Austrian Institute for 
Legal Policy, for their diligent research assistance. 
* Research Associate, Austrian Institute for Legal Policy; Mag.lur., University of Salzburg; 
LL.M., Harvard University School of Law; Dr.lur., University of Salzburg; M.Sc. Econ. (IR), 
London School of Economics. 
** Dean and Professor of Law, West Virginia University College of Law. 
I Since the outset of American nationhood, lawmakers have recognized the potential peril 
of words. For example, in 1798, only seven years after the First Amendment was ratified, the 
Adams administration pressed successfully for the adoption of the Sedition Act of 1798. 
Although the Act expired in 1801, it was applied in a number of cases. 
A number of United States Supreme Court cases address language that causes affront. See, 
e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 27 (1971) (Blackmun, j., dissenting) (finding that 
Cohen's words were "absurd and immature" and "fall well within the sphere of ChaPlinsky"); 
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (upholding a conviction for uttering 
insulting or "fighting words" to a marshal). Among the more celebrated cases was Collin v. 
Smith which struck down a Skokie, Illinois ordinance that prohibited Nazis from marching 
through a community of Holocaust survivors. 578 F.2d 1197, cm. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978). 
The Skokie controversy is the subject of much scholarly analysis. See, e.g., JAMES L. GIBSON, 
CIVIL LIBERTIES AND NAZIS: THE SKOKIE FREE SPEECH CONTROVERSY (1985); ARYEH NEIER, 
DEFENDING My ENEMY: AMERICAN NAZIS, THE SKOKIE CASE AND THE RrSKS OF FREEDOM 
(1979); Donald A. Downs, Hate Group Speech, and The First Amendment, 60 NOTRE DAME L. 
REv. 629 (1985). 
Recently, some important voices within the academic community have called for regulations 
on ''words that wound." See generally Richard Delgado, Words that Wound: A Tort Action for 
Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. c.R.-C.L. L. REv. 133 (1982); Charles R. 
Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE LJ. 
431; Catharine A. MacKinnon, Not a Moral Issue, 2 YALE L. & POL'y REv. 321 (1984) [here-
inafter MacKinnon, Not a Moral Issue]; Catharine A. MacKinnon, PornograPhy, Civil Rights, 
and Speech, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1 (1985) [hereinafter MacKinnon, Pornography]; Marl 
Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2320 
(1989); Rodney A. Smolla, Rethinking First Amendment Assumptions about Racist and Sexist 
Speech, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 171 (1990). 
2 See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) ("[T]he only meaning offree speech is 
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academic debate over the First Amendment's protection of free 
speech. 
While the words of the First Amendment are absolute and the 
Supreme Court has, on occasion, endorsed this absolutist cast of the 
Amendment's dictates,3 few Supreme Court Justices and free speech 
enthusiasts insist that all communicative efforts4 are constitutionally 
protected speech. 
Indeed, most persons agree that there must exist a possibility for 
constitutional regulation of some types of utterances or communi-
cative conduct. So far, however, the Supreme Court's First Amend-
ment jurisprudence reflects both an inability and an unwillingness 
to come to terms, directly and plainly, with the regulation of content 
of what a speaker says. With the exception of so-called "low value 
speech," the Court has shied away from pronouncing the substantive 
that [unorthodox ideas] should be given their chance and have their way."); Abrams v. United 
States, 250 U.S. 615, 630 (1919) (Holmes,]., dissenting) ("[T]he ultimate good desired is 
better reached by free trade ideas that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to 
get itself accepted in the competition of the market."); see also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 
276 U.S. 255, 297 (1964) ("I doubt that a country can live in freedom where its people can 
be made to suffer physically or financially for criticizing their government."); Whitney v. 
California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis,]., concurring) ("[T]he remedy to be applied 
is more speech, not enforced silence."). The absolutist cast of the Constitution's free speech 
protection has most often prevailed throughout our history. For example, Thomas Jefferson 
pardoned all who had been convicted under the Sedition Act of 1798 because he viewed the 
Act as an unconstitutional act of repression. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Abigail Adams 
(July 22,1804), in 11 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 1789-1826, at 43 (Andrew A. 
Lipscomb ed., Mem. ed. 1904). 
3 See generally R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 
397 (1989); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 
(1969); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 
298 (1957). 
4 The Court's sole absolutist, Justice Black, persisted in a literal interpretation of the First 
Amendment's prohibitions: 
Of course, the decision to provide a constitutional safeguard for [free speech] 
involves a balancing of conflicting interests. [But] the Framers themselves did this 
balancing when they wrote the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. They appreciated 
the risks involved and they decided that certain rights should be guaranteed regard-
less of these risks. Courts have neither the right nor the power [to] make a different 
evaluation of the importance of the rights granted in the Constitution .... 
Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights , 35 N.Y.U. L. REv. 865, 879 (1960). ButJustice Black remained 
unsympathetic to protection for all communicative efforts, and distinguished between 
"speech" and "conduct" in determining which communications were within the parameters 
of the First Amendment. See, e.g., Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 609-10 (1969) (Black,]., 
dissenting) (state may prohibit flag burning but not derogatory comments about the flag); 
Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 500 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 333 
(1968) (Black,]., dissenting) (picketing is patrolling, not speech, and may be regulated); Cox 
v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 576-79 (1965) (Black,]., dissenting) (states' interests may be 
sufficient to regulate conduct, but not pure speech). 
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ideas expressed by speech to be utterly without merit, and conse-
quently without protection. In the absence of any basis for evaluat-
ing content-based communication, the Court has not even begun 
the difficult and complex process of setting clear standards for 
judging content-based restrictions that legislatures might enact. 
Under current doctrine, only two kinds of regulations restricting 
speech will pass the absolutist test of constitutionality applied by the 
Court. According to this two-level analysis, the Court places in the 
first category ostensibly content-specific speech regulations.5 Speech 
that is of "low value," like obscenity, "fighting words," and, to a lesser 
extent, defamation and commercial speech, possesses, for the Court, 
very limited redeeming social value.6 This speech is seen as clearly 
outside the limits of core protection of any of the dominant free 
speech theories espoused by the Court.7 
Apart from these narrow exceptions, the Supreme Court pre-
sumes that speech is of constitutional value, and will be protected, 
unless it presents a clear and present danger that something sinister 
or illicit will occur. The Court will only uphold regulations restrict-
ing speech in this second category if it deems these regulations to 
be "content-neutral." These collateral restrictions on speech-the 
time, place, and manner in which communication occurs-suppos-
edly affect only the incidental aspects of communication. Courts 
5 Professor Harry Kalven coined this phrase in The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 
SUP. CT. REv. 1, 11. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-2, at 
791-92 (2d ed. 1988). The Court subjects regulations of communicative expression to strin-
gent analysis, unless that expression is of "low value." The Court subjects regulations of 
non-communicative expression to a balancing test. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 
367,376-78 (1968). The Court's two-track analysis has not escaped unscathed at the hands 
of scholarly critics. See generally Stanley Fish, Fraught With Death: Skepticism, Progressivism, and 
the First Amendment, 64 U. COLO. L. REv. 1061 (1993) [hereinafter Fish, Fraught with Death]; 
Stanley Fish,jerry Falwell's Mother, Or, What's the Harm?, in THERE'S No SUCH THING As FREE 
SPEECH AND IT's A GOOD THING Too 130-31 (1994) [hereinafter Fish,jerry Falwell's Mother]; 
Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 189 
(1983); Fred C. Zacharias, Flow-Charting the First Amendment, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 936 (1987). 
6 See generally Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 
(1969); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 
568 (1942). Commercial speech is afforded somewhat less protection under the First Amend-
ment. See, e.g., City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. 1505 (1993); Bolger v. 
Youngs Drug Prods., 463 U.S. 60 (1983); Central Hudson Gas & Elee. Co. v. Public Servo 
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
7 Such speech does not further the marketplace concept. "There is certainly nothing in the 
United States Constitution which requires the Virginia Legislature to hew the teachings of 
Adam Smith in its legislative decisions regulating the pharmacy profession." Virginia State Bd. 
of Pharmacy V. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 784 (1976) (Rehnquist,J., 
dissenting). Nor does it further the process-perfectionist ideal. See infra note 19 and accom-
panying text. Nor will it advance concepts of autonomy, inclusion and citizenship. See infra 
notes 25-26 and accompanying text. 
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have repeatedly upheld collateral regulations under the First Amend-
ment doctrine,8 even if the underlying legislative reasoning for pass-
ing these restrictions was motivated by the desire to restrict some 
speech based not solely on context but on content as well. 
Neither of these two categories, however, addresses the issues 
underlying restrictions on speech content, a problem which is fre-
quently raised, debated, and discussed.9 We maintain that there do 
exist some ideas that simply are too abhorrent to be countenanced. lO 
The Court's First Amendment approach only allows a contextual 
questioning of the intrinsic merit of these notions. The Court, there-
fore, invalidates any restriction of speech based on content, yet is 
occasionally forced to accept thinly veiled time/place/manner regu-
lations which are content-based restrictions in disguise. The more 
this approach is followed, the more absurd the results will be. ll 
A novel jurisprudential basis is needed for determining which 
categories of speech can be regulated. We propose that international 
law, through the well-established doctrine of jus cogens, provides this 
basis. Jus cogens comprises norms and principles recognized and 
accepted by the community of nations as a whole. These jus cog ens 
norms cannot be displaced even by treaties or practices of individual 
nations. 12 Our proposition is that if a legislative body should deter-
8 See, e.g., Los Angeles City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 817 (1984) 
(upholding an ordinance prohibiting posting of signs on public property); Metromedia, Inc. 
v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 512 (1981) (upholding restrictions of billboards displaying 
commercial advertisements as not violative of First Amendment); Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 
418 U.S. 298, 302-04 (1974) (holding that authorities have discretion to make reasonable 
choices concerning type of advertising placed on its vehicles, and to refuse space to political 
advertisements because a city transit system car is not a First Amendment forum). 
9 See infra text accompanying notes 62-82. 
10 See infra text accompanying notes 220-66. 
II It is not difficult to imagine instances in which the Court will be forced by its own line 
of cases to protect speech, which is by many standards outside of the First Amendment, while 
upholding time/place/manner regulations with a most chilling effect on free speech. For 
example, a university ban on distribution of Nazi propaganda through student mailboxes 
would presumably be struck down as an impermissible viewpoint-based content constraint. 
Cf R.A.Y. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992). Yet, a university ban on distribution of 
unstamped, unofficial communications through student mailboxes would likely be upheld. 
See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983); United States Postal 
Servo V. Greenburgh Civic Ass'n, 453 U.S. 114 (1981); see also infra notes 95-96 and accom-
panying text. 
12Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 53, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 
reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969) [hereinafter Vienna Convention]; see Committee of U.S. 
Citizens Living in Nicaragua V. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (courts seeking to 
determine whether a norm of customary international law has attained the status of jus cogens 
must also determine whether the international community recognizes the norm as one "from 
which no derogation is permitted" (quoting Article 53 of the Vienna Convention)); see also 
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mine to regulate speech which can be controlled under jus cogens, 
the Supreme Court should defer to that legislative judgment. 
In this Article, we will first review the Supreme Court's current 
First Amendment doctrine. 13 We will examine the various categories 
of protected and unprotected speech, and by doing so uncover the 
problematic underlying assumptions and often perplexing results of 
the current all-or-nothing approach.14 Viewing these deficiencies 
together, we will then define a set of rigorous requirements any 
comprehensive new doctrine of content-based regulation will have 
to fulfill. 15 Finally, we will describe the formal application and sub-
stance of the jus cog ens concept, and analyze and apply a jus cog ens 
guided comprehensive new doctrine to a variety of actual and hypo-
thetical First Amendment cases. 16 
I. CURRENT FIRST AMENDMENT DOCTRINE 
A. The Sacredness of Speech: Philosophical Infrastructure 
Scholars have advanced varied theories concerning the values and 
philosophical tenets underlying the First Amendment's free speech 
provision. Not surprisingly, their work evinces little consensus. 
Some commentators focus upon systemic political values. Profes-
sor Levy argues that the catalyst for the promulgation of the First 
Amendment was not solicitude for individual liberty, but shielding 
states' rights against national powerP Professor Meiklejohn associ-
ates free speech with political autonomy: popular self-governance 
necessarily entails the right to be informed, which necessitates un-
impeded access to information concerning political and social is-
. sues. IS Dean Ely espouses a process-perfecting rationale, urging that 
Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C]. 14 Oune 27) [hereinafter 
Nicaragua v. United States]. 'Jus cogens therefore functions rather like a natural law that is so 
fundamental that states, at least for the time being, cannot avoid its force." Mark W.Janis, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 53 (1988). For a general discussion of jus cogens 
principles, see infra notes 133-219. 
13 See infra text accompanying notes 17-108. 
14 See infra text accompanying notes 33-132. 
15 See infra text accompanying notes 128-32. 
16 See infra text accompanying notes 277-304. 
17 See generally LEONARD LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN 
EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY (1960). 
18 See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITs RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 
(1948); Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is An Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT. REv. 245; 
see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1993) (advocating 
for James Madison's First Amendment model, which protects speech only when used in the 
cause of civic deliberation); if. Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment 
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the First Amendment, and the Constitution generally, are intended 
to secure "broad participation in the processes and distributions of 
government," necessitating unimpeded, informed popular discussion 
of a broad range of issues.19 Professor Blasi asserts that, insofar as the 
First Amendment sanctions an unimpeded flow of information, some 
of which is critical of government and those who conduct its opera-
tions, any impulse of officials to repress information is restrained.20 
Dean Bollinger argues that the inherent penchant for human beings 
to manifest intolerance for differences in others or in their ideas is 
modulated by the First Amendment's restraint on suppression of 
distasteful or offensive viewpoints. 21 He further states that this en-
couragement of tolerance is instrumental in shaping the intellectual 
character of the nation, and is thus ultimately beneficial to society.22 
English philosophers John Milton and John Stuart Mill first ar-
ticulated the concept which evolved in First Amendment jurispru-
dence as a metaphor for free speech values.23 The metaphor holds 
that the quest for truth is promoted not by government fiat, but by 
free and open exchange. The truth will emerge from this contention 
of conflicting ideas in the "marketplace of ideas. "24 
Other scholars concentrate their free speech justifications on val-
ues stemming from individualism and autonomy. Knowledge and 
Problems, 47 IND. LJ. 1, 26-28 (1971) (First Amendment protection should extend only to 
speech integrally related to political decision-making, not to literary, artistic, social, or com-
mercial speech). 
19JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 74, 82, 93-94,105-66 (1980) [hereinafter 
DEMOCRACY & DISTRUST]. 
20 See Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. REs. 
]. 521. 
21 See generally LEE BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTREM-
IST SPEECH IN AMERICA (1986). 
22 Id. 
23 See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859);]. Milton, Areopagitica (1644), in 2 COM-
PLETE PROSE WORKS OF JOHN MILTON 486 passim (E. Sirluck ed., 1959). "[T]hough all the 
winds of doctrine were let loose to play upon earth, so Truth be in the field, we do injuriously 
by licensing and prohibiting to misdoubt her strength. Let her and Falsehood grapple; who 
ever knew Truth put to the words in a free and open encounter." Milton, supra, at 561 
(footnotes omitted). 
24 See Milton, supra note 23. The marketplace justification for free speech averts the danger 
of the government imposing its own truth. 
[The marketplace] theory assumes that a process of robust debate, if uninhibited by 
governmental interference, will lead to the discovery of truth, or at least the best 
perspectives or solutions for societal problems. A properly functioning marketplace 
of ideas, in Holmes' perspective, ultimately assures the proper evolution of society 
wherever that evolution might lead. 
Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE LJ. 1, 3 (citations 
omitted) [hereinafter Ingber, A Legitimizing Myth]. 
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access to a cornucopia of viewpoints and perspectives are precondi-
tions to attaining self-fulfillment.25 Finally, some commentators ad-
vance communitarianism as the basis for fostering free speech. 26 
The marketplace rationale has engendered severe criticism. It assumes that truth is objec-
tively verifiable and that citizens who control the functioning of the market are informed, 
rational and intelligent, propositions which themselves are not readily verifiable. See C. Edwin 
Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REv. 964, 967 & n.8 (1978); 
Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 119, 131-34 (1989). The 
marketplace basis for protection of communication also disregards the emotive quality that 
might enhance the power of the speaker's message and render it all the more poignant. See, 
e.g., Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 53 (1988); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15,26 
(1971) (expression "conveys not only ideas capable of relatively precise, detached explication, 
but otherwise inexpressible emotions as well"). 
Moreover, even if these assumptions are accurate, the marketplace might not reveal the 
results of its investigation concerning truth for a very long time. Fish, Fraught with Death, 
supra note 5, at 1063-64 ("If the marketplace will render its verdict only at the end of time 
... the resolution of timely matters will be deferred forever."). 
In the long run, true ideas do tend to drive out false ones. The problem is that the 
short run may be very long, that one short run follows hard upon another, and that 
we may become overwhelmed by the inexhaustible supply of freshly minted, often 
very seductive, false ideas .... Genocide is an example. One may well be ambivalent 
as to whether one would want to forbid an attempt to instill a belief in the deliberate 
and systematic extermination of a national or racial group .... Truth may win, and 
in the long run, it may almost always win, but millions of Jews were deliberately and 
systematically murdered in a very short period of time. Moreover, before those 
murders occurred, many individuals must have come "to have false beliefs." 
Harry H. Wellington, On Freedom of Expression, 88 YALE LJ. 1105, 1130 (1979). 
Furthermore, the marketplace formulation assumes equal access to the arena for all com-
peting viewpoints. Modern communication is no longer purveyed by leaflets on street corners 
or at town meetings. Instead, effective access to the marketplace depends upon sophisticated 
and expensive technology, and an entree into the monopoly of the media. Those who are 
without power, influence or resources have scant access to the modern communication 
domain. See Baker, supra, at 965; Fish, Fraught with Death, supra note 5, at 1073-74; Ingber, 
A Legitimizing Myth, supra, at 5. See generally Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press-A New 
First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1641 (1967). 
Finally, even assuming that truth is objectively verifiable, inequality of access causes further 
problems. Perspectives that are heard more often are deemed to be "true"; those that are not 
are assumed to be "false." "Truth in this sense, becomes what the majority hears, leaving little 
reason to attach much value to such truth or to the marketplace which generates it." Stanley 
Ingber, The First Amendment, Intermediate Institutions and a Democratic Personality, 26 VAL. U. 
L. REv. 71, 75 (1991) [hereinafter Ingber, The First Amendment]. 
25 THOMAS EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6 (1970) ("assuring individ-
ual self-fulfillment"). See generally RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); 
STEVE SHIFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE (1990) (dissent, noncon-
formity, and iconoclasm should be encouraged by the First Amendment); Baker, supra note 
24 (individual liberty); Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 591 
(1982) ("individual self-realization"); David A. J. Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: 
Toward A Moral Theory of the First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 45 (1974). 
26 EMERSON, supra note 25, at 7 ("achieving a more adaptable and hence a more stable 
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The United States Supreme Court has recognized several distinct 
rationales for the First Amendment free speech mandate. The Court 
has insisted that the First Amendment fosters dialogue and debate 
on issues of public concern, and thus augments civic speech.27 In 
numerous cases, the Court refers to the marketplace principle es-
poused by Milton and Mill as the motivating force for free speech.28 
The Court has acknowledged promotion of autonomy and self-
definition through self-expression29 and cultivation of community30 
as worthy of free speech goals. The Court has also considered a 
community [and thusJ maintaining the precarious balance between healthy cleavage and 
necessary consensus"). See generally Stanley Ingber, Rediscovering the Communal Worth of 
Individual Rights: The First Amendment in Institutional Contexts, 69 TEx. L. REv. 1 (1990) 
(encouraging cultivation of community values); Kenneth L. Karst, Boundaries and Reasons: 
Freedom of Expression and the Subordination of Groups, 1990 U. ILL. L. REv. 95 (promoting 
constructive communitarianism). Concerning the role of community, see generally THOMAS 
PANGLE, THE SPIRIT OF MODERN REpUBLICANISM (1988);].G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN 
MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REpUBLICAN TRADITION 
(1975); MICHAEL]' SANDEL, LIBl'!'-ALiSM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982); Symposium, The 
Republican Civic Tradition, 97 YALE LJ. 1493 (1988). 
27 See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) ("[TJhe profound national 
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and 
wide-open.") . 
28 E.g., Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 866--67 (1982); Citizens Against Rent Control 
v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 295 (1981); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 n.5 (1981); 
Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Servo Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 537-38 (1980); FCC V. Pacifica 
Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745-46 (1978); Red Lion Broadcasting CO. V. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 
(1969); New York Times CO. V. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-72 (1964). 
29Whitney V. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis & Holmes, lJ., concurring) 
("Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the State [isJ to make men 
free to develop their faculties .... They valued liberty both as an end and as a means. They 
believed liberty to be the secret of happiness and courage to be the secret of liberty."); see also 
Cohen V. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971) (Our political system rests upon a "premise of 
individual dignity and choice."). 
30 See, e.g., Mishkin V. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966); Memoirs V. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 
413 (1966); Roth V. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). Cases supporting constraints upon 
free expression evidence the Court's approach ofjustirying constraints by communitarianism. 
These cases share a common theme: the speech at issue was deemed contra bones mores, in 
denigration of the community's welfare, morals or good order. Thus, in the earliest of the 
obscenity cases, the Court's concern was the preservation of community morality. 
In the post-World War I incitement cases, the Court determined that Congress has a right 
to regulate words that create a "clear and present danger." See Schenck V. United States, 249 
U.S. 47, 52 (1919); see also Gitlowv. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 667 (1925) ("[AJ state may punish 
utterances endangering the foundations of organized government and threatening its over-
throw by unlawful means."). Similarly, defamation was viewed as an outrage against the 
community, insofar as the honor and reputation of a community member was unjustifiably 
impugned. See Rosenblatt V. Baer, 383 U.S. 75,92 (1966) (Stewart,]., concurring) ("The right 
of a man to the protection of his own reputation from unjustified invasion and wrongful hurt 
reflects no more than our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human 
being-a concept at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty."). 
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laissezjaire approach to free speech.31 The majority of the Court has 
not yet settled upon a defining ideology to justifY the veneration it 
accords to free speech.32 
B. Content-Based Restrictions: Contextuality As the Regulatory 
Touchstone 
The Court's ideological chasm in delineating a free speech ration-
ale is replicated in the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence. The 
"most exacting scrutiny" applies to content-based speech restric-
tions.33 Content-based regulations are presumed to be unconstitu-
tional; validity is found only if "necessary to serve a compelling state 
interest and ... narrowly drawn to achieve that end."34 
When evaluating the propriety of content-based restrictions on 
speech, the Court excises some types of utterances from the First 
Amendment's protective umbrella. These forms of expression "are 
no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight 
social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived 
from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and 
morality."35 The Court's approach to content-based regulations is 
ostensibly categorical. 36 
Viewed from this perspective, contra bones mores provides the common denominator that 
links various First Amendment underpinnings. It might be argued that contra bones mores is 
the most potent, if not the only, basis underlying the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence. 
31 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) ("If there is a bedrock principle underlying 
the First Amendment, it is that the Government may not prohibit the expression of an idea 
simply because society finds the idea offensive or disagreeable."); Consolidated Edison Co. v. 
Public Servo Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 537 (1980) (,The First Amendment hostility to content-
based regulation extends not only to restrictions on particular viewpoints, but also to prohi-
bitions of public discourse of an entire topic. [To] allow government the choice of permissible 
subjects for public debate would be to [allow] government control for the search for political 
truth."); Police Dep't of Chicago V. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) ("[A]bove all else, the First 
Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its 
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content."). 
The laissezjaire and marketplace approaches are related, yet distinct. The marketplace 
justification involves connections between the actors in the marketplace. Laissezjaire implies 
no connections between the actors and directs government to leave well enough alone. 
32 EMERSON, supra note 25, at 15; Redish, supra note 25, at 591. "[I]f you don't provide a 
rationale for the toleration of a particular form of speech, but simply declare that the 
Constitution made me do it, you will have characterized the Constitution as an irrational 
document." Fish, Jerry Falwell's Mother, supra note 5, at 123. 
33 Texas v.Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 403 (1988); Widmarv. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 276 (1981). 
See generally TRIBE, supra note 5, § 12-3, at 798-99. 
34 Perry Educ. Ass'n V. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). 
35Chaplinsky V. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942); see also supra note 30 
(asserting that communitarian values largely account for the Court's First Amendment cate-
gorical strategy). 
36 But see infra text accompanying notes 109-18. Professor J.M. Balkin maintains that the 
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These varieties of vulnerable expression, or "low value speech, "37 
include intentional incitement,38 obscenity,39 child pornography,40 
defamation,4! fighting words,42 and commercial speech.43 The Court 
has constructed a series of different standards for each of these less 
worthwhile varieties of speech to determine first, whether a particu-
lar communication is protected or falls into a vulnerable category, 
and second, if vulnerable, whether any First Amendment protection 
is merited. Not only do these standards partake more of balancing 
than of categorical imperatives,44 but they also focus more on the 
context of what is said than upon its content. 
For example, obscenity, perhaps the quintessential example of 
valueless expression, purportedly is bereft of communicative value, 
and can be broadly repressed.45 Laws directed against obscenity 
Chaplinsky Court's strategy of defining categorical exclusions from that which the Court 
recognizes as "speech" was an intellectual requisite to establishing democratic pluralism as 
the basis for the myriad varieties of speech content.J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: 
Legal Realist Approaches to the First Amendment, 1990 DUKE LJ. 375, 396--99. 
37 Stone, supra note 5, at 195. 
38 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 
544-46 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
39 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 18-19 (1973). 
40 New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 758 (1982). 
41 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974). 
42 See Chaplin sky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
43 Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 752 
(1976) (holding that speech that merely proposes a commercial transaction still does not lack 
all First Amendment protection). Commercial speech was once completely vulnerable to 
regulation. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). The Burger and Rehnquist 
Courts have enhanced the respectability afforded to speech that proposes a commercial 
transaction. The Court evaluates the validity of commercial speech by the same balancing test 
used to evaluate incidental regulations on otherwise protected communication. See, e.g., 
Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. ofP.R., 478 U.S. 328, 340 (1986); Central Hudson Gas 
& Elec. Corp. v. Public Servo Comm'n, 447 U.S. 556, 557 (1980). 
44 Any interpretation of the First Amendment that affords less than full protection to all 
forms of discourse, despite its content, involves a process of balancing competing social values 
and considerations. Thus, balancing is an integral part in defining which categories of speech 
merit lesser protection. What is interesting is that "the Court has steadfastly refused to admit 
that it balances or to recognize a comprehensive approach which would weigh all the relevant 
factors." Zacharias, supra note 5, at 951; see also TRIBE, supra note 5, § 12-2, at 792; Redish, 
supra note 25, at 624-25. 
45 In Rnth V. United States, Justice Brennan opined: "The protection given speech and press 
was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political 
and social changes desired by the people .... But implicit in the history of the First Amend-
ment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social importance." 354 U.S. 
476,484 (1957). Another justification for categorizing obscene speech as taboo is offered by 
Professor Schauer, who states that obscenity is specifically designed to evoke an entirely 
physical effect, and thus is a physical, and not a mental, stimulus-"a pornographic item is 
in a real sense a sexual surrogate." Fred C. Schauer, "Speech-Obscenity and Obscenity": An 
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restrict neither content nor ideas as such, but instead limit the 
means of expression, not the underlying attitude expressed.46 Defa-
mation, the dissemination of false information injurious to reputa-
tion, is similarly bereft of communicative value, and can result in 
civil damages to the person defamed. Some defamatory communi-
cations are content-protected when, because of the prominence of 
the person defamed, the Court determines that unintentional false-
hoods contribute to the public debate.47 Fighting words are not 
inherently menacing in a constitutional sense, but become so only 
Exercise in the Interpretation of Constitutional Language, 67 GEO. LJ. 899, 926 (1979). The 
Court's latest formulation distinguishes obscenity from merely distasteful, rough, evocative, 
or erotic speech-the latter is somewhat protected. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 21-22 
(1973). This is applied, however, without consistent standards. See id. The Court requires a 
finding that the matter at issue is patently offensive, appeals to prurient interests and is bereft 
of serious scientific, artistic, literary or political value. See id. 
46 See, e.g., T. M. Scanlon, Jr., Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression, 40 U. PITT. 
L. REv. 519, 547 (1979). That the proscription runs against the mode of expression, and not 
against the underlying communication or attitude, is especially clear in the case of child 
pornography. Government could not punish an orally stated sexual preference for children. 
For example, an organization for pedophiles, the North American Man/Boy Love Association 
(NAMBLA), has achieved notoriety and caused expected controversy. See, e.g., Melinda Hen-
neberger, How Free Can Teachers' Speech Be, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1993, at § 4, p. 6, col. 4; Joyce 
Price, Senators Hold Up u.N. Funding over Ties to Pedophiles, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1994, at 
A3. Mere membership in NAMBLA, however, cannot be the basis for criminal penalties. TRIBE, 
supra note 5, § 12-26, at 1010-15. NAMBLA members' statements concerning their sexual 
preference is protected speech. Yet, materials depicting children in sexual poses or activities 
can be criminalized. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-58 (1982) ("States are entitled 
to greater leeway in the regulation of pornographic depictions of children. "). Moreover, mere 
possession of child pornography, even in the privacy of one's own home, can be criminalized, 
despite the holding of Stanley v. Georgia. 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (concerning possession of adult 
pornography). But see Jacobson v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1535 (1992) (conviction for 
receiving child pornography in the mail overturned where defendant, the target of a govern-
ment "sting" operation, was entrapped into the purchase). The contextual analysis in this 
instance involves "a heightened sensitivity on the Court's part to the harms that pornographic 
activity can inflict upon participants in obscene productions, as well as viewers of the resulting 
materials." TRIBE, supra note 5, § 12-16, at 915. This insight regarding the dual nature of 
harm inflicted by pornography, even if the material itself does not satisty the Court's definition 
of obscenity, is the thrust for proposals that link pornography with degradation of women. 
See infra notes 80-81 and accompanying text. 
The contra bones mores principle is particularly poignant in its application to child pornog-
raphy. See supra note 30. The Court has expanded prohibitions against offensive-yet not 
obscene-materials to protect children from callous exploitation, and it has also pronounced 
societal mortification at the indulgence in this type of activity by some members of society. Id. 
47 Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448,453 (1976); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 
323,342-43,345 (1974); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1963). The Court's 
present accommodations between free speech rights and an individual's interests in the 
integrity of his or her reputation lacks coherence and consistent standards. See generally TRIBE, 
supra note 5, § 12-12, at 12-13. 
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when such words "by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to 
incite a breach of the peace."48 
Intentional incitement, or subversive advocacy, is a special case 
illustrating the Court's context-driven approach to appraising the 
validity of content-based regulations. The Court permits regulation 
of expression that qualifies as incitement if, as a consequence of the 
utterance, there exists a likelihood of imminent unlawful conduct, 
and if the speaker intends this result.49 Brandenburg v. Ohio declares 
as a general First Amendment tenet that advocacy of even the most 
alarming notions is absolutely protected against direct criminal pro-
hibition, regardless of dangerousness and intent.5o Interdiction of 
ideas or perspectives deemed intrinsically dangerous, and perhaps 
justifiably so, by government, is forbidden. Context alone provides 
the gauge for permissible regulation. Proscription is permitted only 
if proclaimed in a particular context, such as one in which the 
speech is intended to ignite, or incite, imminent unlawful or violent 
action, and the probability of success is high.51 In a sense, the Court's 
48 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942). Chaplinsky and its fighting 
words doctrine, similar to obscenity and defamation, raises many more questions than it 
answers. For example, Chaplinsky addressed his epithets-"God damned racketeer" and 
"Fascist"-to a city marshall who had interrupted Chaplinsky's soap box speech. Id. at 569. 
Why should this outburst not be construed as a cry of frustration at the overweening power 
of government, and therefore as protected political or civic speech? Redish, supra note 25, at 
626. What of the emotive content of protected First Amendment speech? See Cohen v. 
California, 403 U.S. 15, 18,25-26 (1971). Could Chaplinsky be convicted for uttering fighting 
words had he written the same phrases on a poster that he carried while walking the public 
streets? The fighting words doctrine's distinction between suppressible rough language and 
protected provocative words-both of which might stir a listener to anger-may operate more 
to repress "low value" speakers than "low value" speech. See Ingber, A Legitimizing Myth, supra 
note 24, at 33-34. 
It is interesting that since Chaplinsky, the Court has not sustained a conviction for uttering 
fighting words. See, e.g., Plummer v. City of Columbus, 414 U.S. 2, 3 (1973); Brown v. 
Oklahoma, 408 U.S. 914, 914 (1972); Lewis v. New Orleans, 408 U.S. 913, 913 (1972); Gooding 
v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 528 (1972). The fighting words doctrine, however, retains technical 
validity. R.A.Y. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2543-44 (1992). A number of commentators 
have criticized the continuing constitutional validity of Chaplinsky and called for its modifica-
tion or elimination. Kent Greenawalt, Insults and Epithets: Are They Protected Speech?, 42 
RUTGERS L. REv. 287 (1990); Toni M. Massaro, Equality and Freedom of Expression: The Hate 
Speech Dilemma, 32 WM. & MARY L. REv. 211 (1991); Note, The Demise of the Chaplinsky 
Fighting Words Doctrine: An Argument for Its Internment, 106 HARV. L. REv. 1129 (1993). 
49Brandenburgv. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1969). 
50Id. at 447 ("The constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a 
state to forbid or prosecute advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such 
advocacy is directed to creating or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to create 
or produce such action."). 
51 See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 933-34 (1982) (conviction 
reversed because emotionally charged rhetoric of speaker did not incite violence); Hess v. 
1995] MORE SPEECH, LESS NOISE 7I 
formulation of the incitement doctrine is the equivalent of Holmes' 
shout of "Fire!" in a crowded theater.52 Here, the false shout is to 
the nation, causing hazards to arise in dangerously incendiary con-
texts. 
The Court's continuing obliviousness to communicative content 
is manifested in R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul. 53 In R.A. v., a cross was set 
afire on the lawn of a black family. 54 A juvenile was prosecuted under 
an ordinance directed at racially motivated criminal acts that in-
volved knowingly placing a sign or symbol on private property that 
arouses "anger, resentment or alarm in others on the basis of race, 
color, creed, religion or gender. "55 The Minnesota Supreme Court, 
in reversing dismissal of the charges, placed a limiting gloss on the 
ordinance by construing it to prohibit only fighting words, within 
the contours of Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,56 or intentional incite-
mentY The Supreme Court invalidated the ordinance unanimously, 
but it split on rationale. Five Justices, in an opinion authored by 
Justice Scalia, found the ordinance fatally flawed in its selection of 
a subcategory of fighting words for condemnation.58 Context, stated 
Justice Scalia, is not determinative; rather, government cannot choose 
to outlaw some fighting words messages without prohibiting all 
messages within that category. 59 Thus, a majority of the Court has 
Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108-09 (1973) (disorderly conduct conviction of a demonstrator 
reversed because statements evidenced no imminence of danger). See generally Ingber, A 
Legitimizing Myth, supra note 24, at 17-22; Hans Linde, "Clear and Present Danger" Reex-
amined: Dissonance in the Brandenburg Concerto, 22 STAN. L. REv. 1163 (1970); Staughton 
Lynd, Comment, Brandenburg v. Ohio: A Speech Test for All Seasons?, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 151 
(1975). 
52 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 
53 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992). 
54Id. at 2541. 
55Id. (quoting St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance, St. Paul, Minn., Legis. Code 
§ 292.02 (1990)). 
56 See supra note 1. 
57 In reWeifare ofR.A.V., 464 NW.2d 507, 510 (Minn. 1991). 
58 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2442-43 (1992). 
59Id. Four Justices found the ordinance over broad in its focus on the "hurt feelings, offense, 
or resentment" caused by expressive activity. Id. Justice Stevens' opinion suggested, however, 
that a narrowly drawn ordinance might pass their scrutiny, and reiterated that prohibited 
speech must be contextually assessed. See id. at 2561 (Stevens,]., concurring) ("The meaning 
of any expression and the legitimacy of its regulation can only be determined in context."). 
An interesting colloquy developed between Justice Scalia and the concurring Justices, who 
charged that the majority's reasoning jeopardized Title VII hostile work environment claims. 
Id. at 2557-58 (White, J., concurring). Justice Scalia's retort was that R.A. V. left these laws 
unaffected because they are "directed at conduct rather than speech." Id. at 2546. The Court, 
however, has recognized the invalidity of the speech/conduct distinction as a basis for assess-
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declared that legislatures cannot look at the content of messages 
that fall within the Court's vulnerable categories, such as fighting 
words and intentional incitement. 
First Amendment jurisprudence concerning content-based con-
straints on speech demonstrates that the Court avoids direct contact 
with content as if it were a hot iron.50 The words themselves, and the 
ideas they communicate, are simply not the determinative factor 
examined by the Court in appraising content-based regulations. 
Instead, the Court cushions the necessity to judge or evaluate con-
tent by focusing on the context in which the communication oc-
curs.51 
C. Content-Neutral Restrictions: Latitude and Balance as the 
Regulatory Standard 
If regulations affect discourse that the Court categorizes as enti-
tled to the full force of First Amendment protection, the restraints 
must be content-neutral, or independent of the nature of the mes-
sage communicated. Non-vulnerable speech can be regulated only 
indirectly; generally, only the collateral effects of speech, or the time, 
place or manner in which speech is purveyed, can be regulated. 52 
This species of viewpoint-neutral regulation might be characterized 
as a regulation of how speech is disseminated. Before discussing 
these time, place and manner speech restrictions, however, two 
ing the validity of speech regulation. See generally Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); 
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); United States v. 
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). Justice Scalia's earlier concurrence in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 
501 U.S. 572 (1991), which stated his position that a public indecency statute regulates 
conduct, not speech, and therefore, is impregnable against a First Amendment assault, 
indicates that perhaps Justice Scalia would return to the speech/conduct distinction, which 
was previously disregarded as a fallacious analytic tool. See infra notes 92-96 and accompany-
ing text. For criticisms of the RA. V. decision, see generally Charles R. Lawrence III, Cross-
Irnrning and the Sound of Silence: Antisubordination Theory and the First Amendment, 37 VILL. 
L. REv. 787 (1992); Thomas H. Moore, RA. V. v. City of St. Paul: A Curious Way to Protect Free 
Speech, 71 N.C. L. REv. 1252 (1993); Philip Weinberg, R.A. V. and Mitchell: Making Hate Crime 
A Trivial Pursuit, 25 CONN. L. REv. 299 (1993); Michael S. Degan, Note, ''Adding the First 
Amendment to the Fire": Cross Burning and Hate Crime Laws, 26 CREIGHTON L. REv. 1109 
(1993). 
60 Commentators are similarly wary of touching the hot iron of content. See, e.g., Sheldon 
L. Leader, Free Speech and the Advocacy of Illegal Action in Law and Political Theory, 82 COLUM. 
L. REv. 412 (1982); Fred Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 
VAND. L. REv. 265 (1981); Pierre]. Schlag, An Attack on Categorical Approaches to Freedom of 
Speech, 30 UCLA L. REv. 671 (1983); Wellington, supra note 24; Zacharias, supra note 5. 
61 See infra text accompanying notes 109-32. 
62 See Stone, supra note 5. See generally TRIBE, supra note 5, §§ 12-23 to 12-25, at 977-1010. 
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other varieties of content-neutral regulation should be considered: 
restrictions premised upon who the speaker is, and restrictions based 
upon the effect of the speaker's message upon the recipient. 
1. Identity of the Speaker 
Within the confines of several narrow principles, the issue of who 
disseminates speech occasionally provides a basis for regulation, 
despite the content of the message disseminated. Who may have a 
voice box and thus speak under the First Amendment? Government 
cannot compel an individual to transmit a message or an ideology 
that is odious to that person.63 Yet, if government provides a medium 
by which some speakers are permitted to purvey their messages, 
government must furnish an equal voicebox to others.64 
2. Effect Upon the Recipient 
Generally, the effect of incendiary speech upon the recipient is 
repudiated as a permissible basis for regulation.55 Audience impact 
63Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714-17 (1977) (government cannot demand that an 
individual's motor vehicle bear a license plate embossed with the state motto, "Live Free or 
Die"); West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (government cannot compel school 
children to participate in a flag salute ceremony); see also Laurence Tribe, The Curvature of 
Constitutional Space: What Lawyers Can Learn From Modern Physics, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1, 22 
(1989) (criticizing Wooley as compelling New Hampshire citizens to publicly declare their 
position by allowing the option to display the state motto). 
64 Board of Educ. of Westside Community Schs. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 246-47 (1990); 
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 270-75 (1981); Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 
92,94-102 (1972); see also Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Servo Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 
537-38 (1980) (corporate speech); First Nat'l Bank of Boston V. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784-86 
(1978) (corporate political speech). See generally Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central 
Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 20 (1975). 
A related principle is that although government cannot oblige the media to broadcast or 
communicate particular messages, broadcast media can be the subject of a variety of regula-
tions in order to foster the First Amendment's goal of informing the public. See, e.g., Turner 
Broadcasting Sys., Inc. V. FCC, 62 U.S.L.w. 4647, 4652-55 (U.S. June 28, 1994); Red Lion 
Broadcasting CO. V. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386-92 (1969); see alsoJeffrey A. Levinson, An Informed 
Electorate: Requiring Broadcasters to Provide Free Airtime to Candidates for Public Office, 72 B.U. 
L. REv. 143 (1992);Jonathan Weinberg, Broadcasting and Speech, 81 CAL. L. REv. 1101 (1993). 
65 The Court has protected several speakers who attempt to communicate diatribes that 
provoked and offended their audiences. E.g., Terminiello V. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949) 
(reversing conviction for inciting breach of peace, where speaker goaded his turbulent 
audience with race-baiting speech and labelled them "slimy scum," "snakes," and "bedbugs"); 
Cantwell V. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (reversing conviction for inciting breach of 
peace, where Jehovah's Witness played phonograph record that venomously attacked Roman 
Catholics). The civil rights struggles of the 1960s gave rise to a number of cases in which 
demonstrators were exonerated for purveying messages unwelcome to their audiences. See, 
e.g., Gregory V. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969); COX V. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); 
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is too ephemeral or subjective as a regulatory basis, provides no 
standards to guide a speaker's communicative efforts, and ultimately 
relies upon the discretion of local officials on the scene as the litmus 
test for regulation. The Court demands that the discretion of law 
enforcement officers in the hostile-audience context must be uny-
ieldingly cabined. Although "silencing the speaker is certainly pref-
erable to a blood bath,"66 it is incumbent upon authorities to make 
all reasonable efforts to curb the crowd and to conserve the speaker's 
right to proceed.67 
In contrast to these "heckler's veto"68 cases, the Court has acknow-
ledged a limited right to peace and respite from the turmoil that 
often accompanies robust exercise of speech rights. The freedom to 
communicate also entails the freedom to decline to listen, or to 
Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963). See generally HARRY KALVEN, THE NEGRO AND 
THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1965); TRIBE, supra note 5, § 12-10, at 849-56; Thomas Scanlon, A 
Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204 (1972); Stone, supra note 5, at 207-17. 
The anomaly is Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951). In Feiner, the Court upheld the 
conviction of a speaker who denounced President Truman as a "bum," referred to the 
American Legion as "a Nazi Gestapo," gave the impression that he intended to instigate the 
black members of the audience against the white members, and ignored an order from police 
to cease. Id. The Court stated: 
It is one thing to say that the police cannot be used as an instrument for the 
suppression of unpopular views, and another to say that, when as here the speaker 
passes the bounds of argument or persuasion and undertakes incitement to riot, they 
are powerless to prevent a breach of the peace. 
Id. at 321. In light of other precedent, however, Feiner may be construed narrowly as a 
deference to police judgments concerning imminent violence. 
The archetypal case is Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 
(1978). In Collin, a representative of the American Nazi Party sought a permit to march 
through the Village of Skokie, a town inhabited largely by Jewish residents, many of whom 
were survivors of the Nazi World War II genocide operations. Id. at 1199. The Nazis won the 
right to march in Skokie, but ultimately declined to do so. See Lee Bollinger, The Skokie Legacy: 
Reflections on an "Easy Case" and Free Speech Theory, 80 MICH. L. REv. 617 (1982); Donald A. 
Downs, Hate Group Speech, and The First Amendment, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 629 (1985); 
David Goldberger, The First Amendment Under Attack l!y its Friends, 29 MERCER L. REv. 761 
(1978). Stanley Ingber argues: "The Nazi's expression is allowed precisely because officials 
anticipate that the marketplace will reject it out of hand. In contrast, if government official 
had perceived the Nazi march as seriously threatening to influence decisions and behavior, 
they might well have forbidden the march." Ingber, A Legitimizing Myth, supra note 24, at 
21-22 (citations omitted). 
66TRIBE, supra note 5, § 12-10, at 853. 
67Id. § 12-10, at 855; see also Owen Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REv. 
1405, 1416-17 (1986). Recall also Justice Harlan's directive in Cohen v. California that those 
affronted by unwelcome messages while in public should simply avert their gaze, and by 
extension, close their ears. 403 U.S. 15,21 (1971). 
68 This phrase was coined by Professor Harry Kalven in his book, THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT. See KALVEN, supra note 65, at 140-45. 
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remain unreceptive to others' messages.6g When a speaker is before 
a captive audience-that is, an audience with no means to escape 
the communication-that is apathetic or antagonistic to the speaker's 
communication, the audience's right to respite outweighs the speaker's 
right to reach the captive audience. 7o Two factors appear essential: 
first, that the audience be captive, divested of any opportunity to 
evade the unwanted communication by averting their eyes or closing 
their ears; and second, that the disagreeable communication in-
trude into the captives' home.71 
A modern analogue to these cases where the speaker's communi-
cation has a substantial impact upon the audience has developed 
over the past decade. Words are not necessarily innocuous; mere 
words can perpetrate grievous harm upon listeners, especially upon 
an audience characterized by a history of oppression and therefore 
acutely vulnerable to racist, ethnic, or sexist attacks.72 In recognition 
69 See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15,21 (1971). 
70 ''To enforce freedom of speech in disregard of others would be harsh and arbitrary in 
itself." Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 88 (1949) (upholding constitutionality of ordinance 
prohibiting use of sound trucks on public streets). 
71 See Rowan v. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970) (upholding post office order requiring 
mailer to remove addressees' name from mailing list upon request). In Rowan, Justice Burger 
declared: 
[T]he right of every person "to be let alone" must be placed in the scales with the 
rights of others to communicate. In today's complex society we are inescapably 
captive audiences for many purposes, but a sufficient measure of individual auton-
omy must survive to permit every householder to exercise control over unwanted 
mail. ... If this prohibition operates to impede the flow of even valid ideas, the 
answer is that no one has a right to press even "good" ideas on an unwilling recipient. 
That we are often "captives" outside the sanctuary of the home and subject to 
objectionable speech and other sound does not mean we must be captives every-
where. 
397 U.S. at 736, 738. The Court has reiterated that speakers' rights to communicate must 
defer to captives' rights to tranquility in several cases. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484-85 
(1988); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-50 (1978); see also Stone, supra note 5, at 
280. See generally Charles L. Black, Jr., He Cannot Choose But Hear: The Plight of the Captive 
Auditor, 53 COLUM. L. REv. 960 (1953); Sean M. Selegue, Note, Campus Anti-Slur Regulations: 
Speakers, Victims, and the First Amendment, 79 CAL. L. REv. 919 (1991) (positing the argument 
that the captive audience doctrine provides the foundation for protection of a personal 
"civility zone"). 
In the context of the R.A. V. case, the captive audience approach might have provided a 
way to resolve the dilemma of protecting the violated family from the ignominy from being 
compelled to endure the odious message thrust upon them. See supra text accompanying 
notes 57-60. So long as narrowly drafted, a statute embodying this approach might provide 
a strategy for dealing with the majority's aversion to content-specific prohibitions. 
72 For a discussion of racist affronts, see generally Delgado, supra note 1. The racial insult 
remains one of the most pervasive channels through which discriminatory attitudes are 
imparted. Such language injures the dignity and self-regard of the person to whom it is 
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of this fact, commentators have promulgated a myriad of regulations 
to repress certain varieties of speech. These proposals take the form 
of regulatory codes that restrict certain speech and expressive activi-
ties. 73 In contrast to the Court's wholly contextual approach, these 
proposals do take account of the content of speech, and conclude 
that words constituting "hate speech"-at least in the context of 
vulnerable audiences-are virtually bereft of intellectual, social or 
communitarian value. 
One type of proposed regulation focuses primarily upon offensive 
or hate speech-that speech which expresses hatred or disdain 
toward members of racial, religious, or other groups-on college 
and university campuses. The objective is to regulate not only be-
cause of the ostensibly inherent uselessness or problematic intellec-
tual quality of the ideas expressed, but also because such speech 
menaces and intimidates those to whom it is addressed.74 Hate speech 
regulations assess the effect of a communication upon the listener; 
addressed, communicating the message that distinctions of race are distinctions of merit, 
dignity, status, and personhood. Not only does the listener learn and internalize the messages 
contained in racial insults, these messages color our society's institutions and are transmitted 
to succeeding generations. Id. at 135 (citations omitted); see also Lawrence, supra note 1; 
Matsuda, supra note 1; Smolla, supra note 1. 
Professors Catharine A. MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin are the most eloquent spokesper-
sons concerning the injury inflicted by sexist slurs. See generally ANDREA DWORKIN, MEN 
POSSESSING WOMEN (1981); CATHARINE A. MACKiNNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES 
ON LIFE AND LAW (1987) 127-213 [hereinafter MACKiNNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED]; 
CATHARINE A. MACKiNNON, ONLY WORDS (1993); Andrea Dworkin, Against the Male Flood: 
Censorship, Pornography, and Equality, 8 HARV. WOMEN'S LJ. 1 (1985); MacKinnon, Not a 
Moral Issue, supra note 1; MacKinnon, Pornography, supra note 1; Catharine A. MacKinnon, 
Reflections on Sex Equality under the Law, 100 YALE LJ. 1281 (1991). 
73 See infra notes 74-78. 
74 Mary E. Becker, Conservative Free Speech and the Uneasy Case for judicial Review, 64 U. 
COLO. L. REv. 975,1038 (1993); Lawrence, supra note 1. Professor Delgado writes poignantly 
of the wounds inflicted upon us all by tolerance of racist insults and epithets. 
[R]acist speech is different because it is the means by which society constructs a 
stigma-picture of disfavored groups. It is tacitly coordinated by its speakers in a broad 
design, each act of which seems harmless, but which, in combination with others, 
crushes the spirits of its victims while creating culture at odds with our national 
values. 
Richard Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules: Constitutional Narratives in Collision, 85 Nw. U. 
L. REv. 343,387 (1991); see also Thomas C. Grey, Civil Rights vs. Civil Liberties: The Case of 
Discriminatory Verbal Harassment, 8 Soc. PHIL. & POL. 81 (1991); Martha Minow, Surviving 
Victim Talk, 40 UCLA L. REv. 1411 (1993). "From a libertarian perspective, any content-based 
regulation of speech is disfavored, but from an egalitarian perspective, the curtailment of 
racist speech may seem as necessary as the desegregation of lunch counters to dismantle the 
social structure of racial hierarchy." Kathleen M. Sullivan, Supreme CourtForeward: Thejustices 
of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REv. 22, 44 (1992). 
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regulation is contingent upon the degree of slight, offense, or terror 
inflicted upon those who hear the hateful message. 
Initially, proponents of campus regulatory codes met with a meas-
ure of success. Impelled by an escalating number of reported racial 
incidents on campuses across the country,75 a number of colleges 
and universities enacted varying forms of regulations that restrain 
hate speech.76 Not surprisingly, these campus codes have met with 
resistance from both courts77 and commentators.78 
There is yet another remedy for speech that vilifies persons based 
on race: an independent tort action for damages accruing from 
racial insults. Professor Delgado has constructed a cause of action 
for racial denigration that would permit recovery of damages upon 
demonstration of intentional debasement of a plaintiff on the basis 
of race. 79 
75 See Delgado, supra note 1; Lawrence, supra note 1; Matsuda, supra note 1; see also sources 
cited supra note 71. 
76 For example, Wisconsin, Michigan and Stanford have enacted regulations that restrain 
harassment and other forms of hate speech. Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on 
Campus: A Modest Proposal, 1990 DUKE LJ. 484, 624-29 (outlining regulations); see also Lauri 
A. Ebel, University Anti-Discrimination Codes v. Free Speech, 23 N.M. L. REv. 169, 171-85 (1993) 
(describing campus provisions); Ann Marie Ruegsegger Highsmith, 'When He Hollers, Do We 
Have to Let Him Go?, 27 BEVERLY HILLS B. AsS'N J. 1,6 (Winter 1993) (discussing various 
forms of hateful conduct including: face-to-face verbal confrontations, shouts, publicly dis-
played messages, telephone calls, letters, E-mail messages, cartoons, jokes, parodies, graffiti, 
symbols, themes for social functions, and defacement of posters and displays); Moore, supra 
note 59, at 1255 nn.12-18 (indicating that many colleges and universities have hate speech 
codes). 
77 Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (invalidating University of 
Michigan prohibition against hate speech and stigmatization on grounds of overbreadth and 
vagueness). Although the university averred that its policy did not apply in the classroom 
context, the court stressed that it might encompass, or inhibit, classroom discussions. Id. at 
864-66; see also UWM Post, Inc. v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 774 F. Supp. 1163 
(E.D. Wis. 1991). 
78 Many commentators oppose the trend towards regulatory prohibitions against campus 
speech or expressive activities. See Gerald Gunther and Charles Lawrence, Good Speech, Bad 
Speech-Should Universities Restrict Expression That is Racist or Otherwise Denigrating? No, 24 
STAN. LAw. 7,41 (Spring 1990); Strossen, supra note 76 (criticizing broad antiracist campus 
speech codes); see also Joseph W. Bellacosa, The Regulation of Hate Speech by Academe vs. The 
Idea of a University: A Classic Oxymoron?, 67 ST.JOHN'S L. REv. 1 (1993); Peter Byrne, Racial 
Insults and Free Speech Within the University, 79 GEO. LJ. 399 (1991); Karst, supra note 26; 
Donald E. Lively, Reformist Myopia and the Imperative of Progress: Lessons for the Post-Brown 
Era, 46 VAND. L. REv. 865 (1993); David F. McGowan & Ragesh K. Tangri, A Libertarian 
Critique of Offensive Speech, 79 CAL. L. REv. 825 (1991); Robert Post, Racist Speech, Democracy, 
and the First Amendment, 32 WM. & MARY L. REv. 267 (1991). 
79 Delgado, supra note 1. The ultimate fate of the racial affront cause of action has become 
doubtful in the wake of the Court's decision in Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, in which the Court 
rejected "outrageousness" as a standard for tort liability in the context of public debate about 
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A distinct type of regulatory proposal assails pornography as gen-
der-based discrimination because of its utterly devastating effect 
upon women. Professors MacKinnon and Dworkin contend that 
pornography denigrates women, fosters aggressive acts against women, 
perpetuates unacceptable stereotypes concerning women and their 
societal roles, and contributes to women's social inequality and linger-
ing subordination.so To combat these injuries, Professors MacKinnon 
and Dworkin promote model municipal ordinances which would 
furnish civil remedies against the production and dissemination of 
pornographic material.S! 
Although well-intentioned, these hate speech and anti-pornogra-
phy proposals mimic the Court's contextual methodology concern-
ing content-based constraints. These proposals do glimpse at the 
content of the speech itself. It is, however, largely context-the 
speaker's intended effect of the speech upon the listener-that is 
the regulatory touchstone. s2 
public figures. 485 U.S. 46, 55-57 (1988). The case involved a caricature of Reverend Jerry 
Falwell, portraying him as having committed incest with his mother in an outhouse. Id. at 48. 
The case is powerfully criticized by Professor Fish. See Fish, Jerry Falwell's Mother, supra note 
5. 
80 Catharine A. MacKinnon, Francis Biddle's Sister: Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, in 
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 72, at 163, 180-81. A number of commentators have 
analyzed studies that link pornography with violence or oppression against women. Frederick 
Schauer, Causation Theory and the Causes of Sexual Violence, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 737; 
Cass Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986 DUKE LJ. 589. But see Karst, supra 
note 26, at 136-42; Nadine Strossen, The Convergences of Feminist and Civil Liberties Principles 
in the Pornography Debate, 62 N.YU. L. Rev. 201 (1987) (reviewing WOMEN AGAINST CENSOR-
SHIP (Y. Burstyn ed., 1985». 
81 An anti-pornography ordinance drafted by Professors MacKinnon and Dworkin was 
passed by the Minneapolis City Council on December 30, 1983, but was vetoed as over broad 
by Mayor Donald Fraser within a week. See Michael Gershel, Evaluating a Proposed Civil Rights 
Approach to Pornography: Legal Analysis As If Women Mattered, 11 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 39, 
43-44, 119-25 (1985) (reprinting the text of the proposed Minneapolis ordinance as an 
appendix). A similar ordinance was enacted in Indianapolis, but was promptly struck down 
on First Amendment grounds. American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 
1985), aJJ'd mem., 475 U.S. 1001 (1986). Massachusetts is considering a similar statute, the 
proposed Act to Protect the Civil Rights of Women and Children. See John F. Wirenius, Giving 
the Devil the Benefit of Law: Pornographers, the Feminist Attack on Free Speech, and the First 
Amendment, 20 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 27, 41 n.46 (1992) (discussing the proposed act H.B. 5194, 
Mass. 177th General Court, 1992 Sess. 2). In a recent criminal case, the Supreme Court of 
Canada relied upon arguments similar to those promulgated by Professors MacKinnon and 
Dworkin to hold that pornography denigrates and harms women, and thus violates the 
principle of equality. Butler v. The Queen, 1 S.C.R. 452 (1992). See generally Jeanne L. 
Schroeder, The Taming of the Shrew: The Liberal Attempt to Mainstream Radical Feminist Theory, 
5 YALEJ.L. & FEMINISM 123 (1992). 
82 These audience-protective endeavors are problematic. See infra note 118 and accompa-
nying text. Audience-protective measures were imperilled by the Court's recent opinion in 
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3. Time/Place/Manner Restrictions 
The most significant content-neutral restrictions are those which 
purport to regulate only the non-communicative aspects of speech. 
These incidental regulations focus entirely upon the collateral as-
pects of speech: the time, place, or manner in which communication 
occurs.83 This regulatory category encompasses a broad range of 
communicative expression, such as parades, marches, and demon-
strations,84 sound amplification,85 picketing,86 disseminating leaflets,87 
in-person or postal distribution of literature,88 solicitation,89 posting 
of signs,90 and symbolic activity.91 The Court has adopted a balancing 
R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul, insofar as each regulatory proposal relies on content-based viewpoint 
discrimination in order to eradicate the perceived evil. See supra text accompanying notes 
57-60. 
83 The nature of the forum-public, limited public, or non-public-in which speech occurs 
significantly affects the permissible degree of regulation. See, e.g., United States v. Kokinda, 
497 U.S. 720 (1990); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788 (1985); 
United States Postal Servo V. Greenburgh Civil Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114 (1981); Greer V. Spock, 
424 U.S. 828 (1976). In Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, the Court articulated 
a tripartite test for analyzing speech restrictions on government property, and held that in a 
traditional public forum, such as a street or a park, government cannot close the forum to 
expressive activities, but can regulate only minimally to ensure order. 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 
(1983). In a limited public forum such as a university student center or a state fairground, 
however, government can close the place to expressive activities. Id. at 47. In a private forum, 
such as a hospital or a military post, government can impose any reasonable restriction on 
expressive activities that is not tantamount to viewpoint discrimination. See id. at 46-50. Most 
commentators criticize the Court's forum analysis. See, e.g., Lee Bollinger, The Tolerant Society: 
A Response to Critics, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 979 (1990); C. Thomas Dienes, The Trashing of the 
Public Forum: Problems in First Amendment Analysis, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 109 (1986); Daniel 
A. Farber & John E. Nowak, The Misleading Nature of Public Forum Analysis: Content and 
Context in First Amendment Adjudication, 70 VA. L. REv. 1219 (1984); Barbara S. Gaal, A 
Unitary Approach to Claims of First Amendment Access to Publicly Owned Property, 35 STAN. L. 
REv. 121 (1982); Harry Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: COX V. Louisiana, 1965 SuP. 
CT. REv. 1; Richard B. Saphire, Reconsidering the Public Forum Doctrine, 59 U. CIN. L. REv. 739 
(1991). 
84 Greer V. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (political campaigning on federal military reserve); 
Bachellar V. Maryland, 397 U.S. 564 (1970) (demonstration protesting Viemam War); Adderly 
V. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (demonstration on non-public jail driveway). 
85 Ward V. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989); Kovacsv. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949). 
86 Carey V. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980); Grayned V. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972); Police 
Dep't of Chicago V. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); Cox V. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965). 
87 Schneider V. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939). 
88United States Postal Servo V. Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114 (1981); Talley V. 
California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960); Martin V. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943). 
89 Schaumburg V. Citizens for Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620 (1980); Breard V. Alexandria, 341 
U.S. 622 (1951). 
90 City Council of Los Angeles V. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984). 
91 Clark V. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984); Tinker V. Des Moines 
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test to measure the propriety of time/place/ manner restrictions; the 
extent to which communicative activity is actually constrained is 
weighed against the significance of the ''values, interests or rights 
served" by enforcing the constraint.92 Thus, striking the balance, the 
Court decreed that because litter does not pose an overwhelming 
societal problem, government cannot ban all leafletting in order to 
safeguard against it.93 But because peace and quiet enjoyment are 
significant societal interests that government can choose to safe-
guard, the Court authorized government to outlaw sound enhance-
ment in order to avoid intrusion into public and residential areas.94 
By balancing factors that purport to disregard the substance of 
the regulated speaker's message, these time/place/manner restric-
tions obviate the necessity to examine content. But, although sup-
posedly content-neutral, time/place/manner regulations are not 
necessarily conducive to robust communication and broad dissemi-
nation of ideas. Government intervention into the time, location 
and mode of communication through incidental regulations can 
harbor severe implications for the speaker who is regulated.95 More-
over, a survey of the Court's time/place/manner cases suggests that 
the Court finds it easier to uphold a collateral speech regulation if 
the Court is in disagreement with, or is unappreciative of, the speaker's 
communicative content.96 
Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968); see also 
infra text accompanying notes 97-108. 
92TRIBE, supra note 5, § 12-23, at 979. 
93 Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 162 (1939). 
94 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791-92 (1989); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 
77,89 (1949). 
95 For example, a statute that forbids all billboard displays in deference to community 
aesthetics has markedly more severe consequences for potential billboard communicators 
than a statute that bans display of Nazi propaganda on billboards. Stone, supra note 5, at 197. 
A school regulation that abolishes a student publication restrains student speech rights 
unequivocally; a school regulation prohibiting publication of hate speech leaves many avenues 
for interchange. Altering the time for the communication can significantly diminish the 
audience available to hear the message. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 750 (1978). 
Curtailing access to a place for distribution or solicitation can curtail the ability of a speaker 
to disseminate a message or solicit for a cause. See generally International Soc'y for Krishna 
Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2701 (1992); Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna 
Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981). Prohibiting use of a particular mode of communication 
is justifiable even if it might diminish the speaker's ability to contact an audience. See Ward 
v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781,802 (1989); Kovacsv. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77,88-89 (1949); 
see also DEMOCRACY & DISTRUST, supra note 19, at 110-11. 
96 Many collateral speech constraints, although premised upon content neutrality, manage 
to, in fact, silence opponents, outsiders, and iconoclasts. See, e.g., Selective Servo Sys. V. 
Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. 841 (1984) (holding that federal statute 
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4. The Anomaly of Symbolic Speech 
Speech can be disseminated by the use of symbols.97 Symbolic 
speech is distinct from verbal speech only insofar as the actor uses 
physical action to communicate the message, rather than utterances 
or written words. The Court has repeatedly recognized that symbolic 
speech is speech, not action that falls outside the ambit of the First 
Amendment's protection, and that its import is as communicative 
as that of orallanguage.98 As Dean Ely properly observed: 
denying financial aid to male students not registered for draft applied to draft protestor); 
Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984) (holding that anti-camp-
ing rule applied to protestors seeking to highlight plight of homeless by sleeping in symbolic 
tents erected in a park across street from White House); Heffron v. International Soc'y for 
Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981) (holding that restriction of distribution and sale 
of literature and solicitation of donations at state fair to assigned booths within fairgrounds 
applied to Krishnas); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (holding that FCC "chan-
nelling" of broadcast message to wee morning hours applied to George Carlin's "Seven Dirty 
Words" monologue); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (holding that federal 
regulation requiring non-destruction of draft cards applied to Vietnam War protestor). Pro-
fessor Ingber asserts that both the present conception of the marketplace and the tenor of 
the Court's decisions are skewed towards maintenance and support of entrenched societal 
interests. See generally Ingber, A Legitimizing Myth, supra note 24. 
The Court has supplemented its traditional two-track analysis in cases involving commercial 
speech and cases involving non-obscene, offensive speech. The latter class of cases involve 
government restrictions on the time, place, or manner in which communicative activities 
occur because the activities implicate an offensive or sexually explicit message. This regulatory 
departure from content-neutrality is justified by the Court on two grounds. The Court may 
justify regulations that serve a non-discriminatory objective. See, e.g., Renton v. Playtime 
Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47-50 (1986) (preserving quality of community life); FCC v. 
Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-50 (1978) (protecting children from vulgar language); 
Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 68-70 (1976) (protecting against tran-
sients, prostitutes, or increased crime). The Court may also regulate sexually-explicit expres-
sion on the grounds that it has less value than other forms of protected speech. See, e.g., 
American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976) ("Few of us would march our sons and 
daughters off to war to preserve the citizen's right to see 'Specified Sexual Activities' exhibited 
in the theaters of our choice."). See generally TRIBE, supra note 5, § 12-18, at 934-44. The 
Court does not deal directly with content and permits oblique regulation under the guise of 
collateral regulations that curtail offensive speech. 
97 Symbolic speech derives its poignancy as a communicative mode through tacit recogni-
tion of emblems; the "right brain" characteristic of "seeing" them intuitively and all at once: 
textures, shapes, patterns, spatial relationships, metaphors. Karst, supra note 26, at 102; see 
also Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (American flag burned to protest federal govern-
mental policies); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (draft card burned to protest 
the war in Vietnam); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966) (silent vigil held in a segregated 
library). 
98 See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community 
Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
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But burning a draft card to express opposition to the draft 
is an undifferentiated whole, 100% action and 100% ex-
pression. It involves no conduct that is not at the same time 
communication, and no communication that does not re-
sult from conduct. Attempts to determine which element 
"predominates" will therefore inevitably degenerate into 
question-begging judgments about whether the activity 
should be protected.99 
Analysis of restrictions on symbolic speech tracks the two-tier 
regulatory scheme that the Court has promulgated. Permissibility of 
symbolic speech regulation is dependent upon whether the regula-
tion aims at the communicative impact of the speech, or at the 
incidental effects of the speech. A protestor can burn a flag to 
communicate a belief or a strongly-held conviction, but cannot burn 
that flag on an airplane, in a hospital, or in violation of a fire safety 
law. 
The distinctive analysis that characterizes the two-level methodol-
ogy is most often confused when symbols are used to communicate, 
so that both rationale and results are often problematic. The deci-
sive factor is the Court's perception of the governmental objective 
underlying the challenged regulation. lOo For example, United States 
v. Q'BrienlO1 is characterized as a time/place/manner case, as is Clark 
v. Community for Creative Non-violence,102 thus validating the chal-
lenged regulations. Preserving the physical integrity of a draft card 
99 John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Rnles of Categorization and Balancing 
in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1482, 1495; see also Fish, Jerry Falwell's Mother, 
supra note 5, at 122-23. Professor Harry Kalven observed that: 
[all] speech is necessarily 'speech plus.' If it is oral, it is noise and may interrupt 
someone else; if it is written, it may be litter. Indeed this is why the leaflet cases were 
an appropriate model; they involved speech with collateral consequences that invited 
regulation. But the leaflets were not simply litter; they were litter with ideas. 
Kalven, supra note 83, at 23. 
100 TRIBE, supra note 5, § 12-23, at 983. 
101 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
102 468 U.S. 288 (1984). In this case, the Court sustained refusal of permission for homeless 
persons to sleep in tents in LaFayette Park as part of a protest against homelessness, holding 
that the Park Service's anti-camping regulations were reasonable collateral restrictions. [d. at 
295. The majority rejected the Court of Appeals view that the interests of the demonstrators 
in powerfully depicting the circumstances of the homeless and of the Park Service in preser-
vation of parks could be accommodated by containing the size, duration, or frequency of the 
demonstration. [d. at 299. Instead, the Court held that so long as the challenged regulations 
were reasonable, government is under no compulsion to consider or adopt less restrictive 
rules. [d. at 297. 
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and affirming anti-camping regulations allegedly affect only the 
noncommunicative aspects of symbolic speech, and are legitimate 
inciden tal regulations. Johnson v. TexaslO3 and Tinker v. Des Moines, 104 
however, are depicted as content cases. Quelling a symbolic speaker 
whose message is disfavored implicates communicative impact, and 
constitutes an invalid intervention into content. 
The Court's approach to symbolic speech cases appears to partake 
in sleight-of-hand analysis. What is "content" regulation, and what is 
peripheral regulation of the use of symbols, and by what means does 
the Court discern the underlying governmental purpose?105 Is it so 
clear that the government was not intent upon stifling the mounting 
wave of protest against the Vietnam War in O'Brien,I°6 or removing 
the sole effective communicative means available to the disadvan-
taged who sought to "speak" through their symbolic protest in Clark?107 
Finally, and most significantly, whether assessing purportedly neutral 
or supposedly content-based regulations, the Court does not evalu-
ate, or even consider, the substance of the symbolic speaker's mes-
sage. IOS 
II. PROBLEMS WITH CURRENT DOCTRINE 
This curt overview of current First Amendment jurisprudence 
demonstrates that the Court's free speech doctrine concerning pur-
As Justice Marshall pointed out in [his dissent in] Clark v. Committee for Creative 
Non-Violence, most regulators, although not opposed to free speech as an abstract 
proposition, nevertheless like a quiet life. For this reason, they have no incentives to 
increase access any more than is constitutionally required. And if the Constitution 
requires less and less, then access will diminish accordingly. The result is that the 
groups who most need inexpensive or free access (usually the groups most on the 
outs) are the ones who end up bearing the brunt of content-neutral regulation. 
Balkin, supra note 36, at 397 (citations omitted). See generally C. Edwin Baker, Unreasoned 
Reasonableness: Mandatory Parade Permits and Time, Place and Manner Regulations, 78 Nw. 
U. L. REv. 937 (1983); David Goldberger, Judicial Scrutiny in Public Forum Cases: Misplaced 
Trust in theJudgment of Public Officials, 32 BUFF. L. REv. 175 (1983); Redish, supra note 25; 
Stone, supra note 5. 
103 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
104 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
105 As Professor Gunther asks, "Should the central question be what was aimed at or what 
was hit?" GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1225 (12th ed. 1992). 
106 See generally United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (affirming district court 
decision that burning draft card violated 50 U.S.C. § 462(b». 
107 468 U.S. 288, 313-14 (1984) (Marshall, j., dissenting). These are generally difficult 
questions, not amenable to answers that are easy or obvious. See id. at n.14; see also Stone, 
supra note 5. 
108 Suppose, for example, that Johnson had burned a Palestine Liberation Flag in order to 
communicate a message derogatory of Arab peoples, or an Israeli flag in order to trumpet 
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ported "content-based" regulation is constitutionally problematic. 
Utterances deemed to be inherently "low value"-obscenity, child 
pornography, defamation, fighting words and commercial speech-
are so classified without ascertainable standards.109 
Moreover, the Court's categorization of intentional incitement as 
"dangerous" speech is also problematic. The Court's opinions osten-
sibly espouse vertical regulation, with the permissibility of restric-
tions dependent upon the Court's assessment of the intrinsic wor-
thiness of particular types of utterances. But, in fact, the Court 
evaluates the merits, and therefore the permissibility, of speech 
more by its context than by its content. The Court does not hone 
in on what the speaker tries to express, but, rather, on the context 
in which the speaker tries to communicate.110 Appropriateness of 
geography, not of ideas, is the deciding factor. 
The Court's reliance upon intentional incitement as the regula-
tory talisman is flawed in at least two respects. llJ On the one hand, 
it is over-inclusive. All speech intends to incite.1l2 Why permit the 
Damoclean sword ofinterdiction to fall upon the speaker at the very 
juncture of the message's forcefulness, the moment when its persua-
sive potency is at its zenith?1l3 On the other hand, it is under-inclu-
sive. Why permit the provocative speech at all, if that which it 
champions is unthinkable and unacceptable?1l4 The Court rejects an 
examination of the intrinsic worthiness or hideousness of the ideas 
expressed. Forms of expression that justifiably might be classified as 
inherently dangerous cannot be regulated, despite contrary reason-
able legislative judgments, unless uttered in an ignitable context. 
the superiority of the Aryan Brotherhood. Given a context similar to that which obtained in 
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989), would the Court's result be different? 
109 See supra text accompanying notes 37-60. 
lloThe Court's Brandenbu7gformulation places great emphasis on context, and on surmises 
about future harm. See Kent Greenawalt, Speech and Crime, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. REs.]. 645; 
Ingber, A Legitimizing Myth, supra note 24, at 17-22; Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept 
of Public Discourse: Outrageous opinion, Democratic Deliberation and Hustler Magazine v. Fal-
well, 103 HARv. L. REv. 603, 637-41 (1990); see also William Cohen, A Look Back at Cohen v. 
California, 34 UCLA L. REv. 1595, 1602--03 (1987) (arguing that Cohen settled the principle 
that permissibility of profane or offensive speech is wholly dependent upon context in which 
it is uttered). 
111 See generally Ingber, A Legitimizing Myth, supra note 24, at 17-18; Leader, supra note 60. 
112 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes,]., dissenting) ("[An idea] offers 
itself for belief and if believed it is acted on unless some other belief outweighs it or some 
failure of energy stifles the movement at its birth."). 
113 Or, injustice Holmes' incomparable language, at the very point where "[e]loquence may 
set fire to reason." Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes,]., dissenting); see 
also Thomas Emerson, First Amendment Doctrine and the BU7ger Court, 68 CAL. L. REv. 422, 
437 (1980); Fish, Fraught with Death, supra note 5, at 1075-80. 
114 See Leader, supra note 60, at 418; see also infra text accompanying notes 119-32. 
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In terms of purportedly content-neutral restrictions on communi-
cation, focusing on the identity of persons who disseminate speech 
provides no solution because this approach does not address the 
core issue of whether the disseminator's ideas are in some way 
impermissible or intolerable. A legislature is powerless to suppress 
messages that advocate genocide, for example, unless the speaker 
uses a bullhorn,115 pickets on a military post,1I6 broadcasts over the 
airwaves during prime time,117 or is otherwise subject to incidental 
regulations. 
Similarly, focusing on the effect of speech on the recipient is both 
problematic and overly repressive, and thus affords no solution to 
the essential difficulty of what speech can permissibly be regulated. 
The impact is difficult to measure with any degree of objectivity or 
accuracy. Moreover, this form of attempted regulation reflects both 
overbreadth and vagueness. It is over broad because it necessitates 
the suppression of-and robust debate concerning-religious, eth-
nic or race-based ideas or non-obscene pornography generally, ideas 
that are albeit unpopular or offensive to some, but not without 
intellectual or social value in other instances. It is vague because no 
codes can be drawn so precisely that a speaker will be relatively 
assured in distinguishing forbidden from permitted speech in these 
areas. The difficulty of ascertaining and measuring the repercus-
sions of communication upon the audience, even if intentional, is 
formidable, as is the problem of stifling dialogue, even where words 
intentionally uttered wound, offend or denigrate. 
Regulating only the collateral effects of speech likewise does not 
address the core issue. The Court's incidental, or time/place/man-
ner regulations, determinedly evade the problem of looking at the 
content of speech and deciding whether it could legitimately be 
regulated. Collateral constraints might provide a more draconian 
impediment to speech than content-based regulations. liB 
III. THE CORE FIRST AMENDMENT DILEMMA 
The Court's formulation of permissible grounds for First Amend-
ment regulation-both purportedly content-based and incidental-
begs the critical, central questions underlying First Amendment 
li5 See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 u.s. 781 (1989); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 
(1949). 
li6 See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976). 
117 See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
118 See sources cited supra notes 95 and 96. 
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jurisprudence of permissible regulation: sometimes speech regula-
tion simply must take account of content. Some ideas-such as 
genocide, slavery, and aggressive warfare-are so menacing and 
intolerable that a free society might resolve, within the confines of 
the First Amendment, that it can endure neither their propagation 
nor their advocacy. "There is no such thing as a false idea," opined 
Justice Powell in Gertz v. Rnbert Welch, Inc. 1l9 But false ideas do exist, 
and have existed throughout the history of humanity, and these false 
ideas-genocide, slavery, aggressive warfare-inflict grievous, ago-
nizing destruction upon real people.120 As Professor Bickel asserted 
so eloquently, the First Amendment is premised upon a conviction 
that speech does have consequences.121 Were it true in a real world 
sense that ''words don't matter, that they make nothing happen and 
are too trivial to bother with," then impediments could be dictated 
at will by those in power or those in the majority, for the constraints 
would similarly be bereft of significance.122 Yet, if speech is of some 
moment, and must be tolerated at any cost, then some speech 
retains a terrifying capacity for brutal harm. If the mere advocacy of 
ideas as hideous as genocide, slavery, or aggressive warfare is incon-
sequential, then proscribing them inflicts no loss. But, "[iJf in the 
long run the belief, let us say, in genocide is destined to be accepted 
by the dominant forces in the community, the only meaning of free 
speech is that it should be given its chance and have its way. Do we 
believe that? Do we accept it?"123 If we do, can we, as a society, 
maintain any pretense of discriminating judgment or morality? 
The mere utterance of speech as offensive as genocide, slavery, or 
aggressive warfare is a public injury, and unleashes a societal harm 
far beyond that inflicted by trespass, malicious mischief, or some 
119 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974). 
120 
This is where the idea that there is no such thing as a false idea (and therefore no 
such thing as a true idea, like the idea that women are full-fledged human beings 
or the idea that Jews shouldn't be killed) gets you; it prevents you, as a matter of 
principle, from inquiring into the real world of consequences of allowing certain 
forms of so-called speech to flourish. Behind the principle (that there is no such 
thing as a false idea) lies a vision of human life as something lived largely in the 
head .... First Amendment jurisprudence works only if you assume that mental 
activities, even when they emerge into speech, remain safely quarantined in the 
cortex and do not spill over into the real world, where they can inflict harm. 
Fish, Jerry Falwell's Mother, supra note 5, at 125. 
121 ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 70-71 (1975). 
122 fd. at 71. 
123 fd. at 72. 
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analogous crime. 124 Does the First Amendment really empower the 
most malevolent among us to spew offensive aspersions against in-
nocent others, who have no power to respond but in kind? 
The market model as a foundational principle for First Amend-
ment jurisprudence disregards the overpowering influence of emo-
tional or irrational appeals. 125 The revered marketplace of ideas 
metaphor simply disregards the fact that, although truth might 
prevail in the long run, many persons might suffer terrible i~ury, 
or even death, in the interim.126 "Should not the reasons which lead 
us to permit the advocacy also lead us to permit the result? Or, if we 
are not willing to accept the result, why should we permit its advo-
cacy?"127 
On rare occasions, the palliative for harmful communications is 
not more speech.128 Instead, the only salve is provided by absolute 
prohibition. 
124 See sources cited supra notes 72 and 74; see also sources cited infra note 128. These 
affrontive messages are also a private terror to the person against whom it is addressed: 
When a cross is burned in the yard of an African American family, it is not enough 
simply to charge a perpetrator with criminal damage to property or with terroristic 
threats, as these charges do not address the actual harm caused by biased hatred. 
Tom Foley, Hate Crimes: An Analysis of the View from Above, 18 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 903, 
921 (1992); see also Moore, supra note 59. 
125 Baker, supra note 24, at 976. 
126 See supra note 24 (discussing marketplace's flaws as a defining rationale). 
127 Leader, supra note 60, at 420. 
128 See Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1206 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978) 
(acknowledging that unredressed emotional and mental harm would result to Jewish residents 
from Nazi march through their neighborhood); American Bookseller Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 
F.2d 323, 330 (7th Cir. 1975), aff'd, 475 U.S. 1001 (1976) (conceding that some forms of 
verbal assaults that influence cultural development, such as racial bigotry and anti-semitism, 
cannot be "answerable by more speech"; however, finding no power under present First 
Amendment jurisprudence to condemn even the most offensively noxious of messages); see 
also Delgado, supra note 1, at 146-47; Kenneth Lasson, Racial Defamation and Free Speech: 
Abusing the First Amendment, 17 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 11, 46-47 (1985). 
An unyielding First Amendment doctrine, devoid of morals, produces a populace bereft 
and incapable of moral judgment. Fish, Fraught with Death, supra note 5, at 1082-83. The 
argument that affrontive speech should be combatted only with more words does not com-
mand credence in other countries. Instead, most countries, excepting a few nations such as 
Israel and South Africa, view regulation of hate speech as a useful adjunct to measures 
designed to eradicate discrimination. See Jean Stefancic and Richard Delgado, A Shifting 
Bawnce: Freedom of Expression and Hate-Speech Restriction, 78 IOWA L. REv. 737, 742 (1993) 
(analyzing collection of conference papers from the first international conference on hate 
speech and freedom of expression); Colloquium, The James McCormick Mitchell Lecture: 
Language as Violence v. Freedom of Expression: Canadian and American Perspectives on Group 
Defamation, 37 BUFF. L. REv. 337 (1988-89). 
Restrictions on racist speech enacted in other countries serve as constraints against the very 
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We refuse to flinch from content-based regulation, and instead 
tackle the crux of this First Amendment issue. Some speech is 
dangerous because it articulates ideas that are intolerable in a free 
and tolerant society. The question then becomes: on what basis 
could permissible standards for legislative regulation be designed? 
Of course, the regulation of speech based upon content presages 
the perils of narrowing societal debate, silencing minorities, and 
eliminating unwanted opposition. It is imperative that any speech 
constraint premised upon content shield opponents, outsiders, and 
iconoclasts from de facto silencing.129 Also, intolerable or dangerous 
speech must be differentiated cautiously from speech which is merely 
offensive or not accepted. We acknowledge these provisos, and thus 
restrict our proposal to its narrowest boundaries. In fact, our ap-
proach might ultimately be more protective of speech. It encom-
passes only messages confined within narrowly-defined categories, 
and suggests that other messages be afforded the highest degree of 
protection. Given the First Amendment goal of promoting the broad-
est possible exchange of views, while taking into account that speech, 
like actions, can be dangerous or harmful to society's well-being, we 
draw the permissible legislative regulatory lines most circumspectly. 
We propose neither a balancing test, typical of the Supreme Court's 
First Amendment jurisprudence, nor a sliding scale that calibrates 
the intersection of several factors. Instead, we propose an absolutist 
approach. Speech that falls within certain specified, albeit narrow, 
confines can be regulated because of its content, regardless of its 
context. But whether such speech is actually prohibited by legisla-
tion remains within legislative prerogative. 
We propose several essential requirements for content regulation: 
(1) There must be an overwhelmingly broad consensus concern-
ing which categories of substantive messages entail ideas that are 
wholly intolerable, and thus, could be regulated. 
minority groups they were intended to protect. Stefancic and Delgado, supra at 742; Strossen, 
supra note 76, at 556. This experience is not universal, and is not borne out in more 
progressive societies. Stefancic and Delgado, supra at 742. Moreover, the messages we seek to 
restrict-advocacy of genocide, slavery, aggressive warfare-remain intolerably malevolent, 
regardless of the identity of the disseminator. Cf Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993) 
(upholding statute enhancing penalty for crime committed upon a victim intentionally se-
lected by the perpetrator on grounds of race, religion, color, disability, sexual orientation, 
national origin, or ancestry). 
129 See generally Ingber, A Legitimizing Myth, supra note 24; Karst, supra note 26 (recognizing 
that First Amendment jurisprudence often operates to exclude those not in mainstream of 
American life, and to quell their communication). 
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(2) This consensus must be multi-national in its reach, broader 
than the perspective of anyone nation. It must avoid embodiment 
of chauvinistic national interests or sentiments, so that changing 
attitudes in one nation will not alter the definitional landscape 
concerning what is offensive. 
(3) This consensus must also be multi-cultural in scope, to circum-
vent problems of exchange of ideas across cultures, and to avoid any 
designation of cultural imperialism. Multi-culturalism is an impor-
tant consideration within cultures as well. Drawing these lines na-
tionally by majority reflex is unacceptable, because unwanted speech 
is usually counter-majoritarian by its nature. Regulation of speech 
by insular, unpopular, or disaffected minority groups can be neither 
the objective nor the consequence. 
(4) This consensus, broadly and overwhelmingly, is behavioral in 
character. In other words, people must feel bound by the dictates of 
this consensus, and adhere their conduct to it. Thus, it is from 
verifiable behavior of persons across the community of nations that 
the jus cogens principle is gleaned. 
These qualifications should mollify the objection that even the 
smallest step on the road toward speech regulation or restriction 
begins an inevitable landslide that ends only in full-blown tyranny. 
This "slippery slope" objection to any proposed First Amendment 
regulatory categorization disregards two essential facts. First, the 
Court has delineated a number of categories within which regula-
tion of communicative behavior is sanctioned.130 Second, the "slip-
pery slope" protest presumes that once the regulatory road is trav-
ersed, "there is nothing in place, no underbrush to stop the slide; 
but in any complexly organized society there will always be counter-
values to invoke and invested persons to invoke them. "131 The anti-
dote to trepidations expressed by slippery slope proponents is cau-
tious categorization and principled line-drawing. The clarity and 
constriction of the categorization provides a principled stopping 
place. 132 
130 See supra notes 33-61 and accompanying text. 
131 Fish, jerry Falwell's Mother, supra note 5, at 130. 
132 See Daniel A. Farber, Civilizing Public Discourse: An Essay on Professor Bickel, justice 
Harlan, and the Enduring Significance of Cohen v. California, 1980 DUKE LJ. 283, 300-01. Dean 
Ely has declared: 
One doesn't have to be much of a lawyer to recognize that even the clearest verbal 
formula can be manipulated. But it's a very bad lawyer who supposes that manipu-
lability and infinite manipulability are the same thing. An "unprotected messages" 
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IV. JUS COGENS AS A SUBSTANTIVE DOCTRINE 
We propose the international law principle of jus cogens as a 
potential basis for regulating speech content. Our claim is not that 
jus cogens is directly applicable, and peremptory, in courts of the 
United States.133 Instead, our submission is more modest: that jus 
cog ens be adopted as a constitutional interpretive device. Should a 
legislature choose to enact an otherwise properly drawn content-
based regulation of speech that is consistent with jus cogens, the 
Court should defer to that legislative judgment.134 
Jus cogens incorporates the multi-cultural and multi-national con-
sensus that we assert is essential. Referred to as "peremptory norms 
of in ternationallaw," jus cogens contains in ternationallaw rules that 
are binding upon every nation. 
The concept of jus cogens is linked to the conception of interna-
tional law as envisioned by its founding father, Dutch jurist Hugo 
Grotius, in 1625.135 Grotius theorized that nations were not conduct-
ing their affairs in chaos, devoid of any underlying universal princi-
ples. 136 Grotius was convinced that without such binding rules of 
international conduct-a "common law among nations that binds 
them"-interactions between nations would be impossible.137 Grotius 
approach cannot guarantee liberty-nothing can-but it's the surest hedge against 
judicial capitulation that humans have available. 
DEMOCRACY & DISTRUST, supra note 19, at 112; see also Ely, supra note 99, at 1500-5l. 
Stefancic and Delgado discuss the experience of progressive Western nations like Germany, 
Denmark, Canada, France, and the Netherlands, where limited content-based restrictions on 
speech have eroded neither fundamental protections of free expression nor public confidence 
in the importance of free speech. See Stefancic and Delgado, supra note 128, at 742. 
133U.S. CON ST. art. VI. Article VI grants to treaties, but not customary international law, a 
status equivalent to federal statutes. Id. For a discussion of the force of a treaty as binding law 
when it conflicts with a federal statute see Eric G. Reeves, Note, United States v. Javino: 
Reconsidering the Relationship of Customary International Law to Domestic Law, 50 WASH. & LEE 
L. REv. 877, 880-82 (1993). But customary international law is considered federal common 
law, which is viewed as supreme over laws of the states. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) ON FOREIGN 
RELATIONS § III cmt. d, nn. 2, 3 [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)]. 
134 It is immaterial which jurisprudential basis for speech protection is adopted. See supra 
text accompanying notes 17-32. A narrowly-drawn statute that reaches only advocacy of 
conduct condemned by the community of nations should satisfY any premise for speech 
protection. 
135 Cf Richard Falk, The Orotian Q;test, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: A CONTEMPORARY PERSPEC-
TIVE 36 (Richard Falk, et. al. eds, 1985); H. Lauterpacht, The Orotian Tradition in International 
Law, 1946 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, reprinted in id. at 10; Cornelius F. Murphy, The Orotian Vision 
of World Order, 76 AJ.I.L. 477 (1982). 
136Murphy, supra note 135, at 480-81. 
137 Manfred Lachs, The Orotian Heritage, the International Community and Changing Dimen-
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traced these norms to natural law principles, and envisioned these 
principles functioning as a "set of mutual links," tying nations to-
gether.13s 
Since Grotius, many jurists and writers have accepted and reaffir-
med the principle of such binding international law norms, giving 
various reasons for the necessity of jus cogens. 139 Vattel and Wolff 
extended Grotius' application of natural law to international prin-
ciples. 140 Others based jus cogens on the private law principle prohib-
iting contracts contra bones more. l41 Scheuner, Lachs, and later Ver-
dross advanced a theory of jus cogens based on "a set of principles 
which exist in the interest of the international community as a 
whole."142 
In 1935, Verdross was the first to advance a coherent view of the 
relationship between jus cogens and other sources of international 
law. 143 Verdross suggested that the concept of jus cogens would be 
consistent only if international treaties violating jus cogens norms 
sions in International Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE GROTIAN HERITAGE 198, 200 
(T.M.C. Asser Instituut ed., 1985). 
138Murphy, supra note 135, at 480. 
139DR.jOSEPHjURT, ZWINGENDES VOLKERRECHT (1933); Aziza M. Fahmi, Peremptory Norms 
as General Rules of International Law, 22 aZoR 383 (1971); Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, The 
General Principle of International Law Considered from the Standpoint of the Rule of Law, 2 
R.C.A.D.1. 92 (1957); Dr. Hermann Mosler, Ius Cogens und VOlkerrecht, 9 SCHWEIZERISCHES 
jAHRBUCH FUR INTERNATIONALES RECHT 25 (1968); Miaia de la Muela, 'Jus Cogens" y 'Jus 
Dispositivum" en derecho international publico, HOMENAJE A LEGAZ y LCAMBRA I. II (1960); 
Takeshi Minagawa,Jus Cogens in Public International Law, 6 HITOTSUBASHIj. OF LAW & POL., 
16 (1968); Hanspeter Neuhold, The 1968 Session of the United Nations Conference of the Law 
of Treaties, 19 aZoR 59 (1969); Vladimir Paul, The Legal Consequences of Conflict between a 
Treaty and an Imperative Norm of General International Law (jus cogens), 21 aZoR (1971); 
Ulrich Scheuner, Conflict of Treaty Provisions with a Peremptory Norm of General International 
Law, ZAoRV 28, 29 (1969); Dr. Michael Schweitzer, Ius cogens im VOlkerrecht, ARcHIV FUR 
VOLKERRECHT 15 (1971); L.M. Sinclair, Vienna Conference on the Law of Treaties, 19 INT'L & 
COMPo L. Q. 47 (1970). 
140 Emer De Vattel, Le droit Des Gens, Ou PRINCIPES DE LA LOI NATURELLE APPLIQUES A LA 
CONDUIT ET AUX AFFAIRES DES NATIONS ET DES SOUVERAINS, introduction, §§ 8-9 (1758); 
Christian Wolff,Jus gentium methodo scientifica pertractatum, PROLEGOMENA §§ 4-5 (1764). 
141 See, e.g., DR. HEFFTER, DAS EUROPAISCHE VOLKERRECHT DER GEGENWART AUF DEN 
BISHERIGEN GRUNDLAGEN 188 (6th ed. 1873); DR. HERMANN MOSLER, DIE FRAGE DES 
VERHALTNISSES VON SOUVERANITAT UND VOLKERGEMEINSCHAFT 66 (1937); DR. ERNST SAUER, 
GRUNDLEHRE DES VOLKERRECHTS 172 (3d ed. 1955); DR. LEO STRISOWER, DER KRIEG UND DIE 
VOLKERRECHTSORDNUNG 114 (1919); ALFRED VON VERDROSS, ANFECHTBARE UND NICHTIGE 
STAATSVERTRAGE, ZEITSCHRIFT FUR OFFENTLICHES RECHT 15, 289 (1935). 
142 Manfred Lachs, The Law of Treaties, in RECEUEIL D'ETUDES DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 
EN HOMMAGE A PAUL GUGGENHEIM 391, 399 (1968); see also Scheuner, supra note 139, at 520; 
Alfred Von Verdross, Forbidden Treaties in International Law, 31 AJ.I.L. 571, 572-73 (1937). 
143Verdross, supra note 142, at 571 n.3. 
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would be void.144 Thus, Verdross' conception of jus cog ens creates in 
essence yet another layer of international law above and beyond 
treaty law and customary international law. 
Based on this theory, Marek, Fauchille, Scelle, Menzel, and Quadri, 
among others, defined systems of hierarchy in international law. 145 
Jus cogens could then be characterized as having the effect of an 
international "constitution. "146 International law violating such per-
emptory norms is void, as are national laws that violate the national 
constitution. 
In 1945, the concept of jus cogens was applied and extended in 
the Nuremberg trial of war criminals.147 The Allied Court not only 
concluded that Germany had violated peremptory norms of inter-
national law, but also extended the concept of jus cogens from the 
realm of states to the level of the individual. 148 Since Nuremberg, jus 
cogens prohibits not only states from engaging in certain conduct, 
but also holds individuals accountable for conduct that violates jus 
cogens. 149 This acceptance of peremptory norms of international law 
is the significant legacy of the Nuremberg trials, and since Nurem-
berg, jus cogens has become a widely accepted principle. 150 
In 1969, jus cogens was incorporated into the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties. 151 According to experts from a variety of 
144Id. at 574. 
145 Paul Fauchille, Traite de Droit International Public, TOME I, TROISIEME PARTIE 300 (1926); 
Krystyan Marek, Contributes Ii l'Etudes du Jus Cogens en Droit International, RECUEIL D'ETUDES 
DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL EN HOMMAGES A PAUL GUGENHEIM 445 (1968); Georges Scelle, 
Precis de Droit des Gens, PRINCIPES ET SYSTHEMATIQUE 1312 (1932); cf. DR. HERMANN MOSLER, 
Ius COGENS 1M VOLKERRECHT 38 (disputing a strict hierarchy and calls for jus cogens to be 
seen as an "overriding" principle within the same level of international law). 
146Some have used precisely this expression. See DR. GEORG DAHM, VOLKERRECHT 13 
(1958); A. Von der Heydte, Die Erscheinungsformen des zwischenstaatlichen Rechts; jus cogens 
and jus dispositivum, ZEITSCHRIFr FUR VOLKERRECHT 16,462 (1932). 
147 Steven Fogelson, Note, The Nuremberg Legacy: An Unfilled Promise, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 
833,868 (1990). 
148 See Charter of the International Military Tribunal, in 1 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMI-
NALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL (1946) at 11 [hereinafter Charter of 
the International Military Tribunal]. See generally Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law: 
Protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather than States, 32 AM. U. L. REv. 1 (1982). 
149Fogelson, supra note 147, at 868-870; see also Charter of the International Military Tribu-
nal, supra note 148, arts. 7, 8. 
150Fogelson, supra note 147, at 883. 
151 Vienna Convention, supra note 12, art. 53. The Vienna Convention was signed and 
ratified by 48 nations. During the drafting process, 43 out of 44 nations commented positively 
on the proposed Ius Cogens regulation. Comments l7y Governments, ILC Reports on 2nd part 
of its 17th Session and on its 18th Session, General Assembly, 21st Sess., Official Records, Supp. 
No.9 (A/6309/Rev.l), Annex. 
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legal, political and cultural backgrounds, the Issue of whether jus 
cogens is accepted is now settled,1.52 
The Vienna Convention defines jus cog ens as follows: "[AJ norm 
accepted and recognized by the international community of States 
as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and 
which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general inter-
national law having the same character. "153 In Article 53, paying 
tribute to Verdross, the Vienna Convention declares treaties that 
contradict jus cogens to be void. 154 Pursuant to Article 64, a contra-
dictory jus cogens norm can retroactively invalidate an existing inter-
national treaty.155 
The definition in the Vienna Convention can be seen both as 
merely a declaratory statement and as a normative instance. Thus, 
by writing a definition of jus cogens into black letter treaty law, the 
Vienna Convention resolved the discussion of whether jus cogens is 
a natural law concept, or whether it first must be positively defined 
to exist. 156 Whether the origin of jus cog ens is natural law or a treaty, 
the result is the same: jus cogens is accepted, established, and bind-
ing. 157 
For several decades now, the official United States position has 
remained consistent with this conclusion. Although not a Member 
State of the Vienna Convention, the United States has based its 
argument on the validity of jus cogens in both nationaP58 and inter-
152For the Socialist view, see generally John N. Hazard, Peremptory Norms: Jus Cogens, 78 
AJI.L. 248 (1984) (reviewing L.A. ALEKSIDZE, SOME THEORETICAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAw (1982)). For the view from a non-aligned country, see generally Alfred P. Rubin, 
Book Review, 81 AJI.L. 254 (1987) (reviewing RECUEIL DES COURS DE L'AcADEMIE DE DROIT 
INTERNATIONAL DE LA HAYE (1981)). For a western view, see W. Paul Gormley, The Right to 
Life and the Rule of Non-Derogability: Peremptory Norms of Jus Cogens, in THE RIGHT TO Lm: 
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 120 (B.G. Ramcharan ed., 1985). For a general treatise of jus cogens, 
see Stanislaw E. Helsinki, Book Review, 84 AJ.I.L. 779 (1990) (reviewing LAURI HANNIKAINEN, 
PEREMPTORY NORMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (jus COGENS) IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: HISTORI-
CAL DEVELOPMENT, CRITERIA, PRESENT STATUS (1988)). 
153 Vienna Convention, supra note 12, art. 53. For the U.S. view, see infra text accompanying 
notes 158-60. 
154 "A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of 
general international law." Vienna Convention, supra note 12, art. 53. 
155Id. Article 64 provides: "If a new peremptory norm of general international law emerges, 
any existing treaty which is in conflict with that norm becomes void and terminates." Id. 
156 But, even the guardian of legal positivism, Hans Kelsen, has agreed that treaties violating 
peremptory norms of international law are void. HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 322-23 (1st ed. 1952). 
157 For further references, see Gordon A. Christenson, The World Court and Jus Cogens, in 
Appraisals of Nicaragua v. United States, 81 AJI.L. 93, 95 & n.8 (1987). 
158Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that deliberate torture 
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national court proceedings.159 That the Restatement (Third) of Foreign 
Relations Law includes a reference to jus cogens similar to that con-
tained in the Vienna Convention reinforces the United States' en-
dorsement of this principle. 160 
Although the concept jus cog ens is well-established, some issues 
concerning its creation and content are complex, and its precise 
parameters might not be easy to discern. To begin with, the creation 
of jus cogens evolves slowly over time.161 The initial impetus might 
derive from a multilateral treaty or a rule of international customary 
law. If such a rule has over time become recognized as binding by 
"the international community of States as a whole," it is considered 
to be jus cogens. 162 Once a rule is considered to be a peremptory 
norm of international law, it is binding for all states regardless of 
whether they were original parties to the treaty from which the new 
peremptory norms had been taken, or whether they adhered to this 
rule as part of international customary law. Once established, even 
nations which originally objected to the creation of such a peremp-
tory norm are bound by it. From peremptory norms of international 
law, no derogation, explicit or implicit, is possible. 163 
perpetrated under color of official authority violates universally accepted norms of interna-
tionallaw, regardless of nationality of parties); cJ. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 517 F. 
Supp. 542 (D.D.C. 1981) (holding that terrorist act by P.L.O., a non-state actor, was not 
violation of universally accepted norms of international law), aff'd, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 
1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985). The Supreme Court has so far not stated its position 
on jus cogens. For some indications of the importance of international law, see Banco Nacional 
de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 453 (1964) (White,]., dissenting). 
159 See Nicaragua v. United States, supra note 12 at § 190. "The United States, in its Counter-
Memorial on the questions of jurisdiction and admissibility, found it material to quote the 
views of scholars that this principle is a 'universal norm,' a 'universal international law,' a 
'universally recognized principle of international law,' and a 'principle of jus cogens.'" Id. 
160 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 133, § 331(2) cmt. e. 
161 Cf North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.IF.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C]. 3, 42 § 73 
(Feb. 20) (holding that norms can be created "even without the passage of any considerable 
period of time"); see also id. at 244 (Sorensen,]., dissenting). 
162Vienna Convention, supra note 12, art. 53. 
163 See Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Arg., 965 F.2d 699, 717,718 (9th Cir. 1992); 
Committee of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1988); 
Filartiga v. Peiia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880-81 (2d Cir. 1980). 
The German Constitutional Court has specifically invoked and affirmed the principle of 
jus cogens. BVerGE 441, 448 (1965). Only a few elementary legal mandates may be considered 
to be rules of customary international law which cannot be stipulated away by treaty. The 
quality of such peremptory norms may be attributed only to legal rules firmly rooted in the 
legal conviction of the community of nations and indispensable to the existence of the law of 
nations as an international legal order, and the observance of which can be required by all 
members of the international community. 
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The degree of universal acceptance by states required to create a 
peremptory norm of international law is not entirely clear. Certainly, 
the phrase "the international community of States as a whole"l64 
envisions endorsement by an overwhelming majority of states. On 
the other hand, the standard for acceptance cannot demand una-
nimity; to do so would relegate the concept of jus cogens to a set of 
tautologies. It is probably accurate to state that a handful of objec-
tors cannot obstruct the establishment of a jus cogens rule. 
Given the distinctive nature of jus cogens as a dynamic concept, 
no absolutely exact, concise list of jus cogens rules can exist. In order 
to determine what does, or does not, constitute a rule of jus cogens, 
a number of different kinds of indicators must be examined. 
One such indicator is the existence of multi-lateral international 
treaties and agreements regulating certain conduct. More than 160 
nations have agreed to bind themselves to international norms by 
signing and ratifying the United Nations Charter. Even the handful 
of non-Member States have pledged, at least in part, to abide by the 
Charter's terms.165 The core purpose and goal of the United Nations 
Charter, the prohibition of the use of force, has consequently been 
seen as a peremptory norm of international law. 166 
Other indicators are decisions of the International Court of Jus-
tice (lCJ) and other international adjudicative bodies. In the case 
of Barcelona Traction,167 the ICJ delineated a category of absolute and 
unqualified rights. 168 The ICJ affirmed this stance in the case of 
Nicaragua v. United States,169 addressing the Charter's prohibition 
against the use of force. 170 The ICJ ruled that Article I's declaration 
against the use of force-the primary purpose and essential goal of 
the UN Charter-is part of jus cogens. 171 The ICJ further stated that 
164Vienna Convention, supra note 12, art. 53. 
165 Note, for example, the willingness of neutral Switzerland, not a UN member, to partici-
pate in international peace-keeping missions, sponsored, administered and commanded by 
the United Nations. See Swiss Soldiers to Join UN Peacekeepers, DETROIT FREE PRESS, June 11, 
1993, at 4A (Switzerland's decision to muster a battalion for use as UN peacekeepers); see also 
Christopher J. Sabec, Note, The Security Council Comes of Age: An Analysis of the International 
Legal Response to the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait, 21 GA. J. INT'L & COMPo L. 63, 66 n.1O (1991). 
166 See Barcelona Traction (Belg. V. Spain), 1970 I.Cl 4, 33-34, §§ 33-35 (Feb. 5) [herein-
after Barcelona Traction]. 
167Id. at 4. 
168Id. 
169 Nicaragua V. United States, supra note 12. 
170Id. 
171Id. 
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Article 2 (4),172 which concretely defines and prohibits the use of 
force, has also become a rule of customary international law. 173 
Other jus cogens indicators include repeated unanimous UN Gen-
eral Assembly declarations, declared state practices, and the opin-
ions of leading international jurists. These varied indicators share a 
common purpose: to discern whether, and to what extent, a rule of 
international law has become peremptory. 
This approach of factoring in numerous indicators in order to 
determine the content of jus cogens seems complex, difficult and 
trying.174 The evolution of jus cogens rights is, undoubtedly, cautious 
and protracted.175 But if jus cogensis seen as a global consensus about 
inter- and intra-societal rules, such awkwardness is necessary. The 
global social fabric cannot be altered abruptly. Overwhelming ac-
ceptance requires widespread consensus, but different nations and 
cultures, each unique in history and character, have little in common. 
Consensus among them can be the smallest common denominator. 
Consequently, it is not surprising that a definitive list of jus cogens 
prohibitions is difficult to construct.176 It is probably best to catego-
rize jus cogens rules on the basis of whether their peremptory char-
acter is overwhelmingly accepted, substantially undisputed, or some-
what controversial. To be sure, the uncertainty of whether some 
rules are subsumed within jus cogens does not affect the validity of 
the concept of peremptory norms itself. Disputes focus only upon 
the extent that a particular rule holds jus cog ens stature.177 
172 "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4), 'I 4. 
173Id. See generally Christenson, supra note 157. "[Tlhey are obligations erga omnes. Such 
obligations derive, for example, in contemporary international law from the outlawing of acts 
of aggression .... " Barcelona Traction, supra note 166, §§ 33-35, at 33-34. 
174 Accord Richard B. Lillich, Invoking International Human Rights Law in Domestic Courts, 
54 U. CIN. L. REv. 367 (1985). 
175 
We must conclude (and we should do so without hesitation) that there exists an 
international jus cogens, that its identification may not always be easy and will 
certainly be a slow process, but that where it is infringed the treaty [sic], or the 
provision in question, is null and void .... 
F. A. Mann, The Doctrine of Jus Cogens in International Law, in FESTSCHRIFT FUR ULRICH 
SCHEUNER 398,402 (1973). 
176 See, e.g., Marjorie M. Whiteman, Jus Cogens in International Law, With Projected List, 7 
GA. J. INT'L & COMPo L. 609 (1977). 
177 Our position is that only those practices or conduct that are clearly recognized and 
accepted as within jus cogens can be a basis for content-based regulations. 
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A. "Core" Areas of Jus Cogensl78 
Very little of the substance of these jus cogens rules is controver-
sial,l79 Core rules of peremptory character are overwhelmingly ac-
cepted and undisputed throughout the world. They form the back-
bone of what is a global, multi-cultural, multi-national consensus of 
prohibitive conduct. 
1. Piracy 
The centuries-old interdiction of piracy falls into this category. 
The prohibition of piracy includes the right of every nation to 
apprehend, detain and try a pirate. ISO When the Framers of the U.S. 
Constitution decided to include the prohibition of piracy, they were 
paying tribute to this universally accepted peremptory rule of inter-
national law. lSI 
2. Slavery 
The prohibition against slavery remained on the agenda of inter-
national bodies for most of this century. In the 1920's, the League 
of Nations initiated a convention prohibiting slavery.182 Together 
with its subsequent protocols and amendments,183 the convention 
formed a basis for an overwhelming consensus among nations that 
slavery is a prohibited act under jus cogens. The interdiction of 
slavery was cited as one of the prime examples of peremptory norms 
of international law by the nations partaking in the drafting process 
of the Vienna Convention, second only to genocide. 184 This unanim-
178 Richard B. Lillich, The Constitution and International Human Rights, 83 AJ.I.L. 851, 858 
(1989). 
179The RESTATEMENT (THIRD) lists, in addition to genocide, the following crimes as jus 
cogens: slavery and slave trade, murder or the disappearance of individuals, torture or other 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, punishment, prolonged arbitrary detention, and 
systematic racial discrimination. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 133, §§ 702(a)-(f). 
180 This rule can be seen as the antecedent of an international criminal law. See generally 
jERZY SZTUCKI,jUS COGENS AND THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 118-20 
(1974); Essays on Piracy: Symposium on Piracy in Contemporary National and International Law, 
21 CAL. W. INT'L. LJ. 104 (1990); Fahmi, supra note 139, at 392; Georg Schwarzenberger, 
InternationalJus Cogens?, 43 TEx. L. REv. 455, 476 (1965). 
lSI See U.S. CaNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. Article I § 8 relegates to Congress the power to "define 
and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law 
of Nations." Id. 
IS2 See sources cited infra notes 231-32. 
IS3 See infra note 232. 
IS4 See SZTUCKI, supra note 180, at 120. 
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ity is reflected in the writings of international legal experts,185 as well 
as in the decisions of the ICJ.186 
3. Genocide 
A more recently-acknowledged jus cogens rule is the prohibition 
of genocide. The mass extermination of a people on grounds of 
race, religion, or ethnic origin was first held violative of binding 
norms of international law by the Nuremberg tribunal. German Nazi 
leaders were tried and convicted not because they transgressed na-
tional precepts, but because they violated mandatory international 
law. 187 The Genocide Convention of 1948188 was the first decisive step 
by the nations of the world to condemn and outlaw this abhorrent 
crime on a global scale. Over one hundred nations have since signed 
and ratified the Convention.189 Unquestionably, the prohibition of 
genocide has become a universally accepted peremptory norm. 190 
The IC] has explicitly reiterated the peremptory character of the 
prohibition of genocide. In its Advisory Opinion on Reservations to 
the Genocide Convention, the IC] stated that the principles forming 
the basis of the Convention are principles recognized by civilized 
nations as binding on nations even without any conventional obli-
gation. l9l Reaffirming that stance in its Barcelona Traction decision, 
the IC] declared that the prohibition of genocide is an obligation 
185 See HEINRICH BERNHARD REIMANN, Ius COGENS 1M VOLKERRECHT 102 (1971); SZTUCKI, 
supra note 180, at 114-16; Mann, supra note 175, at 405; Scheuner, supra note 139, at 526-27. 
186 See Barcelona Traction, supra note 166, §§ 33-35, at 33-34. 
187 The Charter oj the International Military Tribunal, supra note 148, defined three groups 
of charges to be brought against the Nazi leaders: Crimes Against Peace, War Crimes and 
Crimes Against Humanity. Id.; see also Fogelson, supra note 147, at 845-848. 
188 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, jan. 12, 1951, 
78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention]. 
189 One might argue that genocide does not violate jus cogens, because if it did, then the 
Convention would be superfluous. But this argument overlooks the fact that the creation of 
jus cogens is a process and does not happen abruptly. By 1948 a large majority of nations 
viewed genocide as violative of international law. This was the reason for the Convention. 
Since that time, the number of countries renouncing genocide, acceding to the Convention 
and constitutionally prohibiting such practice has dramatically grown from being a large 
majority to representing the international community as a whole. The Convention, then, was 
both an important stepping stone and an indicator for the later emerging jus cogens rule. 
190 See generally Louis R. Beres, Genocide, Law and Power Politics, 10 WHITTIER L. REv. 329 
(1988); Yoram Dinstein, International Criminal Law, 20 ISRAEL L. REv. 206 (1985); Fogelson, 
supra note 147; Comment, The United States and the 1948 Genocide Convention, 16 HARV. INT'L 
LJ. 683 (1975). 
191 Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, 1951 I.Cj. 15,23 (May 28); see also Paul, supra note 139, at 25. 
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erga omnes. 192 When in the course of drafting the Vienna Conven tion 
on the Law of Treaties, nations listed possible jus cogens prohibitions, 
the prohibition of genocide was ranked by more nations as the 
prime example of a peremptory norm than any other jus cogens 
principle.193 
4. Systematic Racial Discrimination 
"Systematic racial discrimination" is apartheid by another name. 194 
The United Nations has repeatedly condemned apartheid. Various 
United Nations Conventions have outlawed it. 195 The United Nations 
General Assembly has targeted nations which racially discriminate 
on a structural basis. 196 For decades, the Republic of South Mrica 
has subsumed under this definition. The economic, political, and 
cultural sanctions imposed on South Mrica by overwhelming votes 
of the United Nations General Assembly and the United Nations 
Security Councip97-a consequence of South Mrica's blatant disre-
gard for peremptory norms of international law-are characteristic 
examples of how violations of jus cogens can have substantial inter-
national repercussions. 198 
192 Barcelona Traction, supra note 166, §§ 33-35, at 33-34; see also Siderman de Blake v. 
Republic of Arg., 965 F.2d 699, 714-17 (9th Cir. 1992). 
193 See REIMANN, supra note 185, at 102; SZTUCKI, supra note 180, at 120; Paul, supra note 
139, at 25. 
194For leading experts enumerating racial discrimination as a core jus cogens prohibition, 
see REIMANN, supra note 185, at 102; SZTUCKI, supra note 180, at 120; Fahmi, supra note 139, 
at 392; Mann, supra note 175, at 405; see also Barcelona Traction, supra note 166, §§ 33-35, 
at 33-34. 
195 See, e.g., International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of 
Apartheid, Nov. 30, 1973, 13 I.L.M. 50 (1974); International Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Dec. 21, 1965, art. 3, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, reprinted in 5 
I.L.M. 352, 355, (1966) [hereinafter Convention on Racial Discrimination]. 
196GA Res. 89, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., 68th plen. mtg., at 1, U.N. Doc. A/Res/45/89 
(1991) (status of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination); GA Res. 90, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., 68th plen. mtg., at 1, U.N. Doc. 
A/Res/45/90 (1991) (status of the International Convention on the Suppression and Pun-
ishment of the Crime of Apartheid); GA Res. 248, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., 72nd plen. mtg., 
at 8, ~14-15, U.N. Doc. A/Res/45/248 (1991) ("Given the priority attached to activities 
against apartheid," the committee decides to establish posts in the Center Against Apartheid); 
GA Res. 176, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., 70th plen. mtg., at 1-7, U.N. Doc. A/Res/45/176 
(1991) (policies of apartheid and international efforts to eradicate it). 
197 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 418, U.N. SCOR, 32nd Sess., 2046th mtg., at 1, U.N. Doc. S/Res/418 
(1977); S.C. Res. 417, U.N. SCOR, 32nd Sess., 2045th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/Res/417 (1977); 
S.C. Res. 282, U.N. SCOR, 25th Sess., 1549th mtg., at 1, U.N. Doc. S/Res/282 (1970); S.c. 
Res. 191, U.N. SCOR, 19th Sess., 1135th mtg., at 1, U.N. Doc. S/5773 (1964); S.C. Res. 182, 
U.N. SCOR, 18th Sess., 1078th mtg., at 1, U.N. Doc. S/5471 (1963). 
198 For a United States reaction, see generally American Bar Association Report to the House 
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5. Aggressive Warfare 
Virtually all nations around the world have signed the United 
Nations Charter. In Article 53 of the Charter, the United Nations is 
explicitly empowered to ensure peace,199 even among non-Member 
States.200 
Consequently, commentators suggested early on that the central 
aim of the United Nations, the prohibition of the use of force, most 
bluntly and potently exemplified by aggressive warfare,201 is prohib-
ited not only by the Charter itself, but also by a peremptory norm 
of international law. As such, it is binding even upon non-Member 
States.202 The ICJ has explicitly affirmed this view in its Barcelona 
Traction decision,203 and implicitly in its Nicaragua v. United States 
decision.204 
B. Largely Undisputed Jus Cogens Rules 
1. Terrorism 
The prohibition of terrorism is repeatedly referred to as another 
jus cogens principle.205 Some commentators, however, take the posi-
tion that terrorism is implied within existing jus cogens prohibitions. 
For example, Judge De Arechaga has characterized the hijacking of 
of Delegates Section of Individual Rights and Responsibilities Standing Committee on World Order 
Under Law, 28 How. LJ. 653 (1985) (including remarks and declarations made by President 
Ronald Reagan and Undersecretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger). The American Law 
Institute adhered to this definition of systematic racial discrimination, but also extended it to 
include systematic discriminations based on religion. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 133, 
§ 702 cmt. j, n.8. 
199 U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4), 'l[ 4 provides: "All Members shall refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity of political inde-
pendence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United 
Nations." 
200 U.N. CHARTER art. 2(6) provides: "The Organization shall insure that states which are 
not Members of the United Nations act in accordance with these Principles so far as may be 
necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security." 
201 The prohibition of the use of force is the abiding principle underlying the United 
Nations enunciated in Article 1 of its Charter. See U.N. CHARTER art. 1. For the text of Article 
1 (l), see infra note 242. 
202 See, e.g., REIMANN, supra note 185, at 102; SCHEUNER, supra note 139, at 527; Mann, 
supra note 175, at 405. 
203 Barcelona Traction, supra note 166, §§ 33-35. 
204 1986 I. CJ. 14. 
205 Richard B. Lillich & John M. Paxman, State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens Caused l7y 
Terrorist Activity, 26 AM. U. L. REv. 217, 306-07 (1977); see also sources cited infra note 229. 
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airplanes by terrorists as a form of piracy.206 But certainly, many 
varieties of terrorist activities cannot be subsumed under other ex-
isting jus cogens norms, and terrorism comprises a jus cogens princi-
ple of consequence.207 
2. Torture 
Bodily integrity and human dignity are at the core of jus cogens 
norms.20B Multilateral treaties have outlawed the practice of torture 
regionally as well as globally.209 There seems to be a well-established 
consensus among the scores of nations that feel bound by these 
conventions, ICJ rulings, and academic commentaries, that the pro-
hibition of torture has attained the stature of jus cogens.210 
C. Disputed Jus Cogens Rules 
A growing number of commentators have argued that the scope 
of the prohibition of racial discrimination should be broadened to 
entail not only structural systemic discrimination, but non-systemic 
incidents of discrimination based on race, as well as structural sys-
temic discrimination based upon religion211 or sex.212 Indeed, the 
United Nations Charter, binding upon more than 160 nations, ex-
plicitly includes in its statement of purpose "promoting and encour-
aging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for 
all without distinctions as to race, sex, language or religion."213 There 
have not yet emerged sufficient structural indicators, however, to sug-
gest that these forms of discrimination have become jus cogens norms. 
The list of jus cog ens norms is not static. It is growing steadily to 
embody more of the basic and fundamental human rights. While 
206 Eduardo Jimenez de Arechaga, International Law in the Past Third of a Century, 159 
R.C.A.D.I. 1,9,64-67 (1978). 
207 For example, bombing, kidnapping, and random shooting of hostages are terroristic acts 
not characterizable by other jus cogens rules. 
208 See Scheuner, supra note 139, at 526-27. 
209 See sources cited infra at notes 251-52. 
21OFor the ICJ view, see Barcelona Traction, supra note 166, §§ 33-35. For commentators 
supporting this view, see, e.g., SZTUCKI, supra note 180, at 118-20; Scheuner, supra note 139, 
at 526. 
211 See generally Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimi-
nation Based on Religion or Belief, G.A. Res. 36/55, 36 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 51, at 171, 
U.N. Doc. A/36/684 (1981). 
212 See Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, G.A. 
Res. 34/180, 34 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 46, at 194, U.N. Doc. A/34/830. 
213 U.N. CHARTER art. 1 (3); see also id. arts. 55-56. 
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for some nascent rights, the necessary overwhelming global consen-
sus is not yet attainable, some regional adjudicative bodies have 
expanded on the idea of a regional jus cogens. 214 We, however, have 
deliberately restricted our focus to globally and unequivocally ac-
cepted norms of peremptory character. 
Regardless of the scope of established peremptory norms, four 
essential principles are apparent. First, jus cogens exists and is a 
globally accepted and acknowledged concept of binding interna-
tionallaw. Second, jus cogens norms are superior to all other norms 
of international law and may not be subrogated. Third, the list of 
jus cogens norms is not, and may never be, finite or complete: jus 
cogens is constantly, but slowly, growing in depth and scope. Fourth, 
and most significant, a considerable set of undisputed jus cog ens 
norms-which are, by definition, a representation of a global, multi-
cultural, multi-national consensus of rights and duties-are readily 
iden tifiable. 
V. Jus COGENS AS A REGULATORY TOUCHSTONE 
Jus cogens norms represent a global consensus that certain forms 
of behavior are unequivocally intolerable. This global consensus 
commends jus cogens norms as the touchstone for identifying types 
of speech that are amenable to content-based regulation. When a 
speaker advocates behavior so horrifying that its dubious value is 
undeniably outweighed by the peril to social structure and order, a 
legislature should be entitled to prohibit the communication. 
The types of conduct that jus cogens prohibits are not broad-rang-
ing. Thus, jus cogens-based content regulation does not stifle mean-
ingful debate. By narrowing the parameters for restrictions to that 
which is the common denominator among the community of na-
tions, regulation avoids the creeping, ever-present danger of cultural 
imperialism, as well as the impulsive, ultimately devastating reflexes 
that characterize national majoritarianism. 
As international law cannot force a sovereign nation to change or 
adapt its domestic legal regime, a jus cogens-based interpretation of 
214 Another contested jus cogens principle is the prohibition against executing minors. See 
1986-1987 Annual Report of The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 
OAS/Ser.L/VII.71, Doc.9 (1987) (execution of a minor violates regional jus cogens); Viktor 
Mayer-Schonberger, Crossing the River of No Return: International Restrictions on the Death 
Penalty and the Execution of Charles Coleman, 43 OKLA. L. REv. 677, 679 (1990); cf. Donald T. 
Fox, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Finds United States in Violation, 82 AJ.I.L. 
601 (1988). 
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the First Amendment would not obligate our legislatures to enact 
content-restricted laws. Instead, this system would demarcate the 
area in which legislatures are permitted to do so. It is not incumbent 
upon a legislature to enact any interdicting statutes. Jus cogens does 
not alter or supplant the First Amendment, but instead functions as 
an interpretive tool. 
A. Structure for Constitutional Analysis 
We advance a First Amendment interpretation that would permit 
a legislature to prohibit and punish speech that intentionally advo-
cates perpetration of actions or behaviors forbidden by governing 
jus cog ens norms.215 In order to pass constitutional scrutiny, jus co-
gens-based legislative enactments that purport to regulate the con-
tent of messages must be clear and precisely drawn.216 In proposing 
that advocacy itself may be regulated, we are cognizant that language 
is often ambiguous, and that intent is often difficult to discern. Thus, 
the framework we submit for constructing jus cog ens-based regula-
tory statutes takes account of ambiguity, and relentlessly applies the 
principle of in dubio pro reo-any doubts must be resolved in favor 
of permitting the questioned speech. 
A regulatory statute should include three elements: (1) the con-
tent of the message must fall under a jus cog ens prohibited category; 
(2) the message must advocate conduct; and (3) the speaker must 
intend to provoke the conduct advocated. 
Attempts to regulate speech and speech-related activities will sur-
vive constitutional scrutiny only if satisfaction of each of these ele-
ments is not ambiguous. If any requirement is ambiguous, the clarity 
of the message as an intentional advocacy of jus cog ens prohibited 
conduct must be assessed from the viewpoint of a reasonable person 
who has observed the communicative instance.217 If a reasonable 
215 In proposing jus cogens as a tool that might be useful in interpreting the permissibility 
of content-based restrictions on speech, we do not address the regulatory forms that legisla-
tures might consider. We assume that legislatures would adopt regulatory means such as the 
types of damages available in tort law or the fines and imprisonment available in criminal law. 
216 See generally Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974); Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 
(1972). 
217It is commonplace for legal norms to incorporate a reasonable person standard. See 
generally Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993) (reasonable person standard in Title 
VII "hostile work environment" cases); Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567 (1988) (reason-
able person standard concerning scope of Fourth Amendment protection). Application of 
constitutional norms occasionally incorporate community standards. See, e.g., Paris Adult 
Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
104 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAw REVIEW [Vol. XVIII, No.1 
person would view the communicative endeavor as intentionally 
advocating jus cogens prohibited conduct, a prima facie case that the 
communication is amenable to regulation is established. The speaker 
would be permitted, but not required, to refute the prima facie 
proof.218 If the reasonable person assessment, however, yields an 
ambiguous answer concerning any of the requisite elements, the 
communication does not clearly enough fulfill the necessary consti-
tutional requirements to permit regulation. Thus, when coupled 
with the advocacy and intent requirements, this necessity for scruti-
nizing the content of ambiguous messages from the perspective of 
a reasonable observer provides a standard that satisfies the constitu-
tional requisites of notice, precision and clarity. 219 We now apply this 
requisite of unambiguousness to an analysis of proposed elements 
of a regulatory statute. 
B. Proposed Requisite Statutory Elements 
1. Does Jus Cog ens Prohibit the Communication? 
The content of the message must be deciphered. Only if the 
message bespeaks conduct encompassed by a jus cogens prohibited 
category is restriction permissible. Jus cog ens norms are of two dis-
cernible varieties. Some outlawed activities require the importuning 
of government; others are forbidden regardless of whether the speaker 
urges structural change of governmental policy or entreats individu-
als to accomplish the prohibited end. We first discuss the latter 
category of jus cogens prohibited conduct. 
a. Advocacy of Action Regardless of Systemic Involvement. 
i. Genocide 
Perhaps the quintessential example of a governing jus cogens norm 
is the universally recognized interdiction of genocide, defined as the 
218 See County Court of Ulster Countyv. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 (1979). The speaker can counter 
the prima facie case by demonstrating that an element is not satisfied. The speaker could show 
that a reasonable person would not construe the communication as entailing conduct that is 
prohibited by jus cogens. See infra text accompanying notes 220-66. The speaker could also 
show that the communication was not advocacy because it is an opinion or belief, or because 
a reasonable observer would not construe it as advocacy. See infra text accompanying notes 
267-71. The speaker might also show a lack of intent to bring about jus cogens prohibited 
conduct because the message is an historical, scientific or artistic expression, or for some other 
reason. See infra text accompanying notes 272-75. 
219 See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974); see also TRIBE, supra note 5, § 12-31, at 1033-35. 
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systematic destruction of a people on grounds of national, ethnic, 
racial or religious identification.22°When undertaken with an "intent 
to destroy, in whole or in part," an identified group,221 genocidal acts 
encompass a variety of outlawed behaviors-killing, causing serious 
physical or mental harm, and inflicting destructive conditions upon 
members of the targeted group, as well as forcible transfer of chil-
dren and preventing births.222 Culpability extends to individuals as 
well as government officials.223 
Genocide is the archetypal false idea.224 In modern times, geno-
cidal spasms have ruthlessly and meaninglessly exterminated tens of 
millions of innocent persons.225 Legislatures must be entitled to 
220 The Nuremberg Tribunal was the first court to hold that genocide violated binding 
norms of international law. See 22 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTER· 
NATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL (1946) 411,465-66. Over one hundred nations, including the 
United States, have signed and ratified the Genocide Convention, supra note 188. 
The community of nations has repeatedly affirmed an absolute interdiction of genocide. 
Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights professes a conviction in the 
existence and identity of nationalities. G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810, at art. 15 (1948) 
[hereinafter Declaration of Human Rights]; see also The Principles of International Coopera-
tion in the Detection, Arrest, Extradition, and Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes 
and Crimes Against Humanity, G.A. Res. 3074, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 78, 
U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973); The Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations 
to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, entered into force Nov. 11, 1970, 754 U.N.T.S. 
73; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st 
Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316, art. 6(3) (1967) [hereinafter Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights]. See generally Jeffrey M. Blum & Ralph G. Steinhardt, FederalJurisdiction 
over International Human Rights Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act after Filartiga v. Peiia Irala, 
22 HARV. INT'L. LJ. 53, 91-92 (1981). 
221 Genocide Convention, supra note 188, art. 2. 
222Id. Article III of the Genocide Convention proscribes not only conduct that constitutes 
intentional extermination of a targeted group, but also conspiracy, direct and public incite-
ment, attempt, and complicity. Id., art. 3. 
223 A nation violates customary international law if it practices, encourages or condones 
genocide, if it fails to criminalize such acts, if it fails to punish those guilty of these acts, and 
if it fails to extradite persons accused of such acts. Genocide Convention, supra note 188, arts. 
3-5; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 133, § 702 cmt. d. 
The 1948 Genocide Convention was the first human rights agreement concluded under 
the auspices of the United Nations. Almost 40 years later, the United States ratified the 
Genocide Convention and enacted implementing legislation. The federal statute includes a 
provision that criminalizes incitement to commit genocide. In Brandenlmrg v. Ohio, the 
Supreme Court declared advocacy, even advocacy of monstrous activity, to be constitutionally 
protected speech unless it "is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and 
is likely to produce such action." 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1968). In discussing the statutory crime 
of incitement, the legislative history directs that this provision should be construed as consis-
tent with the Brandenlmrg incitement formulation. Our proposal differs from this statutory 
incitement provision, and from Brandenlmrg, in several respects. See infra notes 268-71 and 
accompanying text. 
224 See supra text accompanying notes 119-23. 
225 See, e.g., Pub. L. 95-435 § 5(a), 92 Stat. 1052 (1978), reprinted in 22 U.S.C. § 2151 (notes) 
(1982) (1978 tribunal massacres in Uganda); Bosnia & Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and 
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prohibit and punish those who advocate recurrence of this abhor-
rent crime. 
But even the monstrous potential for societal injury inherent in 
genocide cannot be a basis for unduly restraining speech. Only 
messages whose content is identified as unambiguously advocating 
a genocidal act can be statutorily proscribed, such as calling for the 
death, decimation or massive deportation of members of a national, 
ethnic, racial or religious group. Patently ethnic or racial slurs, 
without more, do not constitute a genocidal act, nor do ethnic, racist 
or religious-based epithets or insults. Where the content of the 
message is ambiguous,226 its significance as an exhortation of geno-
cidal acts must be scrutinized from the perspective of a reasonable 
person viewing or hearing the communication. 
11. Piracy 
The centuries-old interdiction of piracy is a jus cogens rule of 
peremptory character that is undisputed among the community of 
Montenegro), 1993 ICJ Rep. 470, reprinted in 87 AJI.L. 505 (1993) (systematic ravaging of 
Muslim inhabitants of Bosnia-Herzegovina by Serbians); Judgment of the International Mili-
tary Tribunal, supra note 220 (decimation of European Jewry and Gypsies by Nazis); 134 Congo 
Rec. S15,425 (1988) [§ 102(a)(I)-(3) 1 (destruction of Kurds by Iraqis); R. WRIGHT, HISTORY 
OF THE UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION 35 (1948)(1915 massacre of Armenians 
by Turks); Roger S. Clark, Does the Genocide Convention Go Far Enough? Some Thoughts on the 
Nature of Criminal Genocide in the Context of Indonesia's Invasion of East Timor, 8 OHIO N.U. 
L. REv. 321 (1981) (murder of people of East Timor); Hurst Hannum, International Law and 
Cambodian Genocide: The Sounds of Silence, 11 HUM. RTS. Q. 82 (1989) (autogenocide dem-
onstrated by the slaughter of Cambodians by fellow Cambodians); Michelle Leighton 
Schwartz, Symposium, Earth Rights and Responsibilities: Human Rights and Environmental 
Protection: International Legal Protection for Victims of Environmental Abuse, 18 YALE J. INT'L L. 
355 (1993) (extermination of the Yanomani Indians by Brazilians); Craig Scott & Patrick 
Macklem, Constitutional Ropes of Sand or justiciable Guarantees? Social Rights in a New South 
African Constitution, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1992); Rennard Strickland, Genocide at Law: An 
Historic and Contemporary View of the Native American Experience, 34 KAN. L. REv. 713 (1986) 
(systematic decimation of Native Americans); Raidza Torres, The Rights of Indigenous Popula-
tions: The Emerging International Norm, 16 YALE]. INT'L L. 127 (1991) (extermination of native 
people of Indios Tribe by Guatemalans); Laurence S. Eastwood, Jr., Note, Secession: State 
Practice and International Law After the Dissolution of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, 3 DUKE 
]. COMPo & INT'L L. 299,309-13 (1993) (murder of East Pakistani people by Pakistanis in the 
Bangladesh War). 
226 See discussion infra text accompanying note 300. Unfortunately, incidents communicat-
ing unambiguous messages, especially on college campuses are all too common. See Delgado, 
supra note 1, at 135 n.12; Lawrence, supra note 1, at 431; Darryl Brown, Note, Racism and 
Race Relations in the University, 76 VA. L. REv. 295 (1990); Wrong Message from Academe, TIME, 
Apr. 6, 1987, at 57 (Mrican-American academic counselor finds message urging death to 
members of her race scratched on an office door). 
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nations. The traditional parameters of the crime of piracy encom-
pass depredation on the high seas, which involve murder, kidnap-
ping and robbery.227 Although piracy in this confined formulation 
still exists in some parts of the world,228 this classic form of piracy 
provides scant basis for concern in contemporary American society. 
Whether the substantive delineation of piracy should be expanded 
to include attacks by terrorists or insurgents upon passenger ships, 
airplanes, buses, automobiles, or other transportation modes is a 
subject of vigorous debate and disagreement. 229 The jus cogens piracy 
prohibition may be evolving from its classic, narrow application to 
a broader ban that includes terrorism levelled at passenger ships 
and other vehicles. Until the outcome of this evolution yields clearly 
expanded parameters of the jus cogens prohibition against piracy, 
only those communications that unambiguously and intentionally 
advocate piracy, as traditionally and narrowly defined, could be the 
subject of legislative prohibition. 
111. Slavery 
The practice of slavery is emblematic of the evolving character of 
international law. The slave trade, once protected by the law of 
nations, 230 was eventually enveloped by jus cogens prohibitions.231 The 
227 Dr. Barry Hart Dubner, Piracy in Contemporary National and International Law, 21 CAL. 
W. INT'L LJ 139 (1990-91). See generally Patricia W. Birnie, Piracy, Past, Present and Future, 
11 MARINE POL'y 163 (1987); Stanley Morrison, A Collection of Piracy Laws of Various Countries, 
26 AJI.L. 887 (1932). 
228 Attacks on vessels persist in many parts of the world: in the Philip Strait between 
Indonesia and Singapore, off the coast of West Africa, and in Southeast Asian waters. Eric 
Ellen, Contemporary Piracy, 21 CAL. W. INT'L. LJ 123 (1991). 
229 Malvina Halberstam, Terrorism on the High Seas: The Achille Lauro, Piracy and the IMO 
Convention on Maritime Safety, 82 AJI.L. 269 (1988); Samuel P. Menefee, The New jamaica 
Discipline:" Problems with Piracy, Maritime Terrorism and the 1982 Convention on the Law of the 
Sea, 6 CONN.]. INT'L L. 127 (1990); John E. Noyes, An Introduction to the International Law 
of Piracy, 21 CAL. W. INT'L LJ 105 (1990); Alfred P. Rubin, Revising the Law of "Piracy, "21 
CAL. W. INT'L LJ 129 (1990); George R. Constantinople, Note, Towards a New Definition of 
Piracy: The Achille Lauro Incident, 26 VA.]. INT'L L. 723 (1986). 
Piracy is outlawed by federal statute, 18 U.S.c. §§ 1651-61, as is aircraft piracy, 49 U.S.C. 
§ 1472(z). See also 18 U.S.C. §§ 1991 et seq. (boarding train to commit crime); 18 U.S.c. 
§ 2271 (conspiracy to destroy sea vessels); 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (carjacking). 
230 See Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D. S.C. 1795). For an account of the interplay between 
the slave trade, the expansion of federal power, and the role of the judiciary, see Barbara 
Holden-Smith, Lords of Lash, Loom and Law: justice Story, Slavery and Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 
78 CORNELL L. REv. 1086 (1993). 
231 Slavery is proscribed by the Constitution, U.S. Const. amend. XIII, § 1. The vestiges of 
servitude can be statutorily condemned by Congress. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883). 
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crux of slavery is expressed in the Slavery Convention of 1926, which 
refers to "the status or condition of a person over whom any or all 
of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised. "232 
At present, involuntary servitude might be considered subsumed by 
jus cogens interdictions against systemic race discrimination, where 
government sanctioning of maltreatment of individuals on racial 
grounds occurs,233 or against genocide, where persons are subjected 
to destructive conditions on grounds of national origin, race or 
religion, regardless of the involvement of government.234 
The initial emphasis upon chattel slavery, however, is in the proc-
ess of being enlarged to include debt bondage.235 Development of 
this prohibition against slavery might someday encompass extreme 
forms of economic exploitation, coupled with domination over the 
abused person.236 As with piracy, the ambit of involuntary servitude 
Under the auspices of federal statutory law, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Congress has continued to 
expand the scope of civil rights legislation. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 
(1968). 
A number of conventions prohibit slavery and slave-trading on an international scale. 
Supplementary Convention of the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and 
Practices Similar to Slavery, Sept. 7, 1956, 3 U.S.T. 3201, 266 U.N.T.S. 3; Protocol Amending 
the Slavery Convention, Dec. 7, 1953, 1 U.S.T. 479, 182 U.N.T.S. 51; Convention to Suppress 
the Slave Trade and Slavery, Sept. 25, 1926, 46 Stat. 2183, 60 L.N.T.S. 253 [hereinafter Slavery 
Convention]; see also Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 220, art. 8; Declaration 
of Human Rights, supra note 220, art. 4. 
232 Slavery Convention, supra note 231, art. 1. In addition to the ignoble American experi-
ence of slavery, see Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), slavery has existed 
in other places in recent times. See, e.g.,Joao Marcello De Araujo, Symposium on the Teaching 
of International Criminal Law, International Crimes in Brazilian Domestic Law, 1 TOURO J. 
TRANSNAT'L L. 353 (1990) (Brazilian slavery prior to 1826, and current Brazilian law prohib-
iting white slavery); Carol Weisbrod, Symposium, Human Rights in Theory and Practice: A Time 
of Change and Development in Central and Eastern Europe, Minorities and Diversities: The 
"Remarkable Experiment" of the League of Nations, 8 CONN. J. INT'L L. 359, 393 n.134 (1993) 
(Rumanians enslaved gypsies until 1848) . See generally CARL. N. DEGLER, NEITHER BLACK NOR 
WHITE: SLAVERY AND RACE RELATIONS IN BRAZIL AND THE UNITED STATES (1971); PETER 
KOLCHIN, UNFREE LABOR: AMERICAN SLAVERY AND RUSSIAN SERFDOM (1987). In modern 
times, white slavery has affected immigration policy and federal statutory policy. See, e.g., 18 
U.S.C. § 2421; Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917); Hoke v. United States, 227 
U.S. 308 (1913); MARK THOMAS CONNELLY, THE RESPONSE TO PROSTITUTION IN THE PRO-
GRESSIVE ERA, 47-66 (1980); Lan Cao, Illegal Traffic in Women, 96 YALE LJ. 1297 (1987). 
233 See infra text accompanying notes 257-66. 
234 See supra text accompanying notes 220-26. 
235 See Protocol Amending the Slavery Convention, supra note 231. 
236 Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350. Commentators have long urged that the defini-
tion of involuntary servitude be expanded to encompass extreme economic or psychological 
coercion. See, e.g., Sydney Brodie, The Federally-Secured Right To Be Free from Bondage, 40 GEO. 
LJ. 367 (1952); Harry H. Shapiro, Involuntary Servitude: The Need for a More Flexible Approach, 
19 RUTGERS L. REv. 65 (1964); John M. Cook, Note, Involuntary Servitude: Modern Conditions 
Addressed in United States v. Musry, 34 CATH. U.L. REv. 153 (1984). The Supreme Court 
recently restricted this expansion, holding that involuntary servitude entails use or threat of 
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prohibitions, and of statutes banning intentional advocacy of such 
conduct, is restricted to the traditional, narrow definition of bond-
age. 
IV. Terrorism 
Terrorism, the scourge of the post-modern world, entails an over-
arching purpose to intimidate a population or a government into 
acceding to the terrorists' demands.237 Although the transgression 
of terrorism does not necessitate systemic governmental involve-
ment, a distinct political objective or purpose, albeit long-range, 
must impel the terroristic acts.238 Thus, under our proposal, a legis-
lature could outlaw advocacy of lawlessness or violence that is aimed 
at coercing a government to capitulate to demands for political 
changes.239 
physical injury or restraint, or of law or legal process. United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 
931 (1988), criticized in Kenneth T. Koonce Jr., Note, United States v. Kozminski: On the 
Threshold of Involuntary Servitude, 16 PEPP. L. REv. 689 (1989). 
237 European Convention on Suppression of Terrorism, Jan. 27, 1977, Europ. T.S. No. 90, 
15 I.L.M. 1272 (1976); Convention to Prevent and Punish the Acts of Terrorism Taking the 
Form of Crimes Against Persons and Related Extortion that Are of International Significance, 
Feb. 2, 1971, 27 U.S.T. 3949, T.I.A.S No. 8413. Professor L.C. Green offers the following 
definition for international terrorism: 
[A]n act of violence, or the threat thereof, exercised by an actor in order to bring 
pressure upon or secure concessions from a state or an institution or other estab-
lishment through the medium of some victim, and this need not be an individual, 
who is completely disassociated by nationality from the quarrel between the actor 
and the entity from whom the concession is being sought. There must, in fact, be 
some cross frontier aspect to the incident. 
L.C. Green, Terrarism and the Law, 30 CHITTY'S LJ. 107, 198 (1982); see also Orrin G. Hatch, 
Fighting Back Against Terrorism: When, Where, and How?, 13 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 5 (1986) 
(,Terrorism is war upon the rule oflaw and upon pluralistic democratic society .... Terrorism 
is barbarism pure and simple. It is wanton and willful criminal violence aimed primarily at 
innocent civilians or internationally protected persons (such as diplomats or high, govern-
ment officials)."). 
238 "Bluntly put, the target of the modern terrorist is the Western legal system and its human 
rights underpinnings." David F. Forte, Terror and Terrarism: There Is a Difference, 13 OHIO N. U. 
L. REv. 39, 42 (1986); see also John Tagliabue, Ship Carrying 400 Siezed, Hijackers Demand 
Release of 50 Palestinians in Israe~ NY TIMES, Oct. 8, 1985, at AI, col. 6 (attack by gunmen 
purportedly with Palestine Liberation Organization connections upon the Achille Lauro 
cruise liner in international waters); Nora Boustany, Guerillas in Lebanon Kill 9 Israeli Soldiers 
in Retaliatory Raids, THE WASH. POST, Aug. 20, 1993, at A25 (Hezbollah acknowledges 
responsibility for attacks on Israeli troops); Ray Moseley, IRA Bombing Shakes Faith in London 
Police, CHI. TRIB., April 26, 1993, at News-2 (IRA bombing of London's financial district). See 
generally Kerry Ann Gurovitsch, Legal Obstacles to Combatting International State-Sponsored 
Terrarism, 10 HODs.]. INT'L L. 159 (1987); Loiuse Rene Beres, Note, Terrorism and Interna-
tional Law, 3 FLA.]. INT'L L. 291 (1988). 
239The case of Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 739 F. Supp. 854 (S.D.N.Y 1990) 
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Terrorism, as a discrete jus cogens prohibited crime, necessarily 
excludes undifferentiated urban violence. 24o Generally, urban rioting 
is more accurately characterized as an unleashing of pent-up rage 
or a directionless destruction, as opposed to exhortation with a view 
towards attainment of a distinct political objective.241 
b. Advocacy of Systemic Action or Involvement 
i. Aggressive Warfare 
Extinguishment of aggressive warfare was one of the essential 
goals that impelled the community of nations to join together to 
create the United Nations.242 The United Nations Charter obligates 
prompted the United States to adopt the Antiterrorism Act of 1990 (ATA). 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331, 
2333-38 (1991). The ATA defines international terrorism as any criminal act occurring 
outside the United States with apparent intent to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, 
to influence governmental policy, or to affect governmental conduct by assassination or 
kidnapping. Id. Victims and their families are afforded a civil cause of action, with treble 
damages available. Id. See generally Jennifer A. Rosenfeld, Note, The Antiterrorism Act of 1990: 
Bringing International Terrorists to Justice the American Way, 15 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L LJ. 726 
(1992). 
240 Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973) (per curiam) presents an easy case. In Hess, the 
defendant stated during a demonstration, 'We'll take the f.--- street later [or again]." Id. 
at 107. The defendant's conviction for disorderly conduct was reversed because the statement 
was directed to no person in particular, and no imminence of violence was demonstrated. Id. 
at 108. Under our proposal, the same result would be obtained. No restriction of this 
statement would be permissible because the statement does not qualifY as terrorism, or under 
any other form of behavior prohibited by jus cogens. 
241 The politically-motivated, ongoing terroristic activities of the Irish Republican Army or 
the Palestine Liberation Organization are easily characterized as the jus cogens variety of 
terrorism. See Scott Anderson, Making A Killing: The High Cost of Peace in Northern Ireland, 
HARPER'S, Feb. 1994, at 45; David Hoffman, Israelis Kill Fugitive, Wound Gazan Boy, 13 Soldiers 
Fire From Moving Army Truck, WASH. POST, Feb. 4, 1994, at A25 (PLO terrorism). Compare 
the undifferentiated violence that occurred in the aftermath of the initial Rodney King verdict 
in Los Angeles. See Janice Castro, A Jarring Verdict, an Angry Spasm; Acquittals in the King-
Beating Trial Spark Disbelief, Rage and Rioting, TIME, May II, 1992, at 10; David Haldane, King 
Case Aftermath: A City in Crisis, LA TIMES, May 2,1992, atA33; Mark Lucey & Shawn Hubler, 
Rioters Set Fires, Loot Stores; 4 Reported Dead, L.A. TIMES, April 30, 1992, at AI. Although 
arguably motivated by government actions perceived by the urban rioters to be discriminatory 
or indifferent, such violence is not so much focused upon attainment of a distinct political 
objective, as it is a venting of accumulated rage with no other perceivable goal. 
If, in specific cases, urban violence could be characterized as terrorism-as where the rioters 
seek repeal or enactment of particular legislation, as opposed to perpetrating indiscriminate 
violence-permissibility of regulation depends upon the exhortative quality of the expression 
advocating it, and the speaker's intent in communicating it. See infra text accompanying notes 
274-81. 
242U.N. CHARTER art. 1 (1) states the purposes of the United Nations. First among these is: 
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nations to resolve their differences peacefully,243 and to forego either 
the aggressive use of force or its threat "against the territorial integ-
rity or political independence of any state."244 This commitment, as 
indicated by the Ie], has assumed the status of a jus cogens peremp-
tory norm.245 
As a jus cogens concept, however, this undertaking of nations to 
repress the aggressive use of force does not include the right of 
nations, acting both collectively and individually, to exercise self-de-
fense. 246 Self-defense might legitimately entail an anticipatory strike.247 
To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective 
collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for 
the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring 
about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and 
international law, adjustment of settlement of international disputes or situations 
which might lead to a breach of the peace .... 
U.N. CHARTER art. 1 (1); see also Nicholas Rostow, The International Use of Force after the Cold 
War, 32 HARV. INT'L LJ. 411 (1991) ("[P]revention of war is the first goal of the United 
Nations."). 
243 "All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner 
that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered." U.N. CHARTER art. 
2(3). 
244 Id., art. 2(4). The United Nations adopted a definition of aggression as "the use of armed 
force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of 
another State." Definition of Aggression Resolution, G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. 
(No. 31), U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974). 
245 Committee of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 940 (D.C. Cir. 
1988); see also supra text accompanying notes 170-72. 
246 
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United 
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain inter-
national peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right 
of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not 
in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the 
present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to 
main tain or restore international peace and security. 
U.N. CHARTER art. 51. According to the traditional reading of Article 51, self-defense is an 
inherent right that can be exercised at the option of each nation without prior consultation 
with the Security Council. "[Clustomary international law of necessity and proportionality 
would dictate the degree of permissible force." Rostow, supra note 242, at 416; see also James 
F. Gravelle, The Falklands (Malvinas) Islands: An International Law Analysis of the Dispute 
Between Argentina and Great Britain, 107 MIL. L. REv. 5, 68 (1985). Critics maintain, however, 
that while Article 51 does not preclude the exercise of the inherent right to self-defense, the 
Security Council should ultimately decide whether a particular act of aggression or threat to 
peace is a defensive response, and what measures, if any, should be taken. Rostow, supra note 
242, at 417-18. 
247 There is no consensus concerning requisite conditions in order for a preemptive attack 
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Jus cogens also does not inhibit some kinds of intervention by one 
nation into the internal affairs of another.248 In order to fall under 
claimed to be anticipatory self-defense to be lawful under the U.N. Charter. Early writings 
emphasized the condition precedent of an "armed attack" required by Article 51 to justifY the 
use offorce in self-defense. P.JESSUP, A MODERN LAw OF NATIONS 165-66 (1948); Robert W. 
Tucker, The Interpretation of War Under Present International Law, 4 INT'L L.Q. 11,29 (1951). 
Recently, however, commentators note that weapons of mass destruction are possessed by 
many nations, and assert a broader reading of Article 51, one that would permit appropriate 
uses of anticipatory self-defense. Jeffrey Allen McCredie, The April 14, 1986 Bommng of Lilrya: 
Act of Self Defense or Reprisal?, 19 CASE W. REs.]. INT'L L. 215 (1987); Don Wallace, Jr., 
International Law and the Use of Force: Reflections on the Need for Reform, 19 INT'L LAW. 259 
(1985); Beth M. Polebaum, Note, National Self Defense in International Law: An Emerging 
Standard for a Nuclear Age, 59 N.Y.U. L. REv. 187 (1984). W. Thomas Mallison and Sally V. 
Mallison state that "international law requires a state invoking anticipatory self-defense to go 
through a process of deliberation resulting in the choice oflawful, that is, proportional means 
of responding" to a looming coercion or imminent threat thereof. W. Thomas Mallison & 
Sally V. Mallison, The Israeli Aerial Attack of June 7, 1981, Upon the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor: 
Aggression or Self Defense?, 15 VAND.]. TRANSNAT'L L. 417, 422 (1982). They provide several 
examples, including the October 22, 1962 decision of President John F. Kennedy to establish 
a limited naval blockade or quarantine-interdiction as the method to prevent the introduction 
of additional missiles in Cuba and to induce removal of those present. Id. at 423. 
248 Although a doctrine of questionable legitimacy, intervention might be permissible, at 
least under certain limited circumstances. For example, where the intervenor's intent clearly 
is not to exert "dictatorial interference," but instead to implement "an indispensable correc-
tive to gross violations of human rights" occurring against their own or foreign nationals in 
a foreign country, intervention might be legitimate. H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AND HUMAN RIGHTS 167 (1950), quoted in Louis R. Beres, Ignoring International Law: U.S. 
Policy on Insurgency and Intervention in Central America, 14 DENV.]. INT'L L. & POL'y 76, 78, 
81 (1985). On the other hand, invitation of the government of the state into which the 
intervention occurs might validate the incursion. Id. at 81. 
Favorable commentators include Richard B. Lillich, Humanitarian Intervention, in Law and 
Civil War in the Modern World 229, 230 (}. Moore ed., 1974}; I. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL 
LAw 312 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955). The majority of commentators, however, take 
the position that no right of intervention on "humanitarian" grounds exists. Ian Brownlie, 
Humanitarian Intervention, in Law and Civil War in the Modern World 217, 218-19 (}. Moore 
ed., 1974}; H. Scott Fairley, State Actors, Humanitarian Intervention and International Law: 
Reopening Pandora's Box, 10 GA.]. INT'L & COMPo L. 29, 63 (1980};Jean-Pierre L. Fonteyne, 
Forcible Self Help Iry States to Protect Human Rights: Recent Views from the United Nations, in 
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 139, 144-45 (R. Lillich ed., 1973); 
Jean-Pierre Fonteyne, The Customary International Law Doctrine of Humanitarian Interven-
tions: Its Customary Validity Under the u.N. Charter, 17 COMP.JURID. REv. 27 (1980); Michael 
]. Levitin, The Law of Force and the Force of Law: Grenada, the Falklands, and Humanitarian 
Intervention, 27 HARV. INT'L LJ. 621 (1986). 
An important General Assembly resolution, the Declaration on Principles of International 
Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. 
Doc. A/8028 (1970) states an irrevocable opposition to intervention. "No State or group of 
States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal 
or external affairs of any other State." Id. at 123. 
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a jus cogens prohibition, aggressive warfare must involve systematic 
state policy, whether articulate or inarticulate. The existence of a 
systematic policy must be objectively verifiable.249 Advocacy of system-
atic governmental policy of aggressive warfare can be legislatively 
prohibited.250 Again, where doubt intrudes into the determination 
of whether the content of a message falls within a jus cog ens prohi-
bition, no restriction of the message is permissible. 
11. Torture 
Torture, like genocide and slavery, mocks the dignity, distinctive-
ness and humanity of an individual. But unlike genocide and slavery, 
torture violates customary international law only when perpetrated 
by or at the behest of government officials. Torture, the intentional 
infliction of severe physical or emotional suffering "by or at the 
249Despite the existence of the estimable goals articulated in the United Nations Charter, 
however, states' use of transboundary force remains a reality. See W. Michael Reisman, Old 
Wine in New Bottles: The Reagan and Brezhnev Doctrines in Contemporary International Law 
and Practice, 13 YALE]. INT'L L. 171, 198 (1988). There are situations, such as self-defense 
and intervention, where national use of force might be legitimate. Professor Schachter 
articulates five circumstances justifYing a nation's use of unilateral force outside its own 
territory: 
(I) When it has been subjected to an armed attack on its territory, vessels or military 
forces; 
(2) When the imminence of an attack is so clear and the danger so great that the 
necessity of self-defense is "instant and overwhelming;" 
(3) When another state that has been subjected to an unlawful armed attack by a 
third state requests armed assistance in repelling that attack; 
(4) When a third state has unlawfully intervened with armed force on one side of 
an internal conflict and the other side has requested counter intervention in re-
sponse to the illegal intervention; or 
(5) When its nationals in a foreign country are in imminent peril of death or grave 
injury and the territorial sovereign is unable or unwilling to protect them. 
Oscar Schachter, The Lawful Resort to Unilateral Use of Force, 10 YALE]. INT'L L. 291 (1985). 
Limitations upon nations' exercise of force is a derogation of sovereignty, and in all 
likelihood, will be narrowly construed. Eugene V. Rostow, The Legality of the International Use 
of Force lr; and from States, 10 YALE]. INT'L L. 286, 289 (1985). 
250 A recent example of unjustifiable aggression in violation of Article 2(4) is the Argentine 
invasion of the Falklands (Malvinas) Islands. "While states had used force in their interna-
tional relations between 1945 and 1982, rarely had a state forcibly attempted to extend its 
national frontiers by incorporating a territory whose inhabitants bore so little ethnic relation 
to the expanding state and who so fervently opposed annexation." Levitin, supra note 248, at 
639; see also Gravelle, supra note 246, at 66-69. Levitin concedes, however, that "international 
law often weighs least in situations where international society most wants it to weigh heav-
ily-the situations involving use of force." Levitin, supra note 248, at 622. 
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instigation of a government official,"251 is denounced in a number 
of international agreements.252 
Torture is also condemned in a number of Federal Court Appeals 
opinions. In Filartiga v. Peiia lrala, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit held that "an act of torture committed 
by a state official against one held in detention violates established 
norms of the international law of human rights, and hence the law 
of nations. "253 The court in Filartiga implicitly acknowledged the 
validity of jus cogens doctrine.254 In Siderman de Blake v. Republic of 
Argentina, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit explicitly 
acknowledged that a readily identifiable body of binding interna-
tional human rights law exists, and that it conclusively censures 
torture.255 
251 
[TJorture means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or 
mental, is intentionally inflicted upon a person for such purposes as obtaining from 
him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or 
a third person has committed or is suspected if having committed, or intimidating 
or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any 
kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by, or at the instigation of or with the 
consent or acquiescence of, a public official or other person acting in an official 
capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in, or 
incidental to, lawful sanctions. 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punish-
ment, 39 U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/46 (1984), art. 1(1) 
[hereinafter Convention Against Torture J. 
252 Convention Against Torture, supra note 251; American Convention on Human Rights, 
Nov. 22, 1969, OAS Treaty Series No. 36, OAS OFF. REC. OEA/Ser.I/XVI/ 1.1, DOC. 65, 
REV. 1 , CORR.1, art. 5; International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 220, 
art. 7; European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
Nov. 4, 1950, art. 3, 213 U.N.T.S. 221; Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 220, art. 5. 
See generally John Kidd, Torture and International Law: A Note on Recent Developments, 15 U. 
OF QUEENSLAND LJ. 228 (1989); Barry M. Klayman, The Definition of Torture in International 
Law, 51 TEMP. L.Q. 449 (1978); Eric Lane, Demanding Human Rights: A Change in the World 
Legal Order, 6 HOFSTRA L. REv. 269 (1978). 
253 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980). In Filartiga, two Paraguayan citizens living in the United 
States, a father and sister of a young man tortured to death by a Paraguayan police chief, who 
was also temporarily living in the United States, brought a wrongful death suit in federal court 
under the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) , 28 U.S.C. § 1350. Id. The trial judge dismissed for 
lack of federal jurisdiction, but the Court of Appeals held that the ATCA allowed a cause of 
action for violation of peremptory norms of international law, and recognized that "deliberate 
torture perpetrated under color of official authority violates universally accepted norms of 
the international law of human rights, regardless of the nationality of the parties." Id. at 878; 
see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 133, § 702 cmt. g. 
254 See generally 630 F.2d at 880. 
255 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992). The Siderman court surveyed judicial authorities, such as 
Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 
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Jus cogens condemns officially perpetrated or sanctioned behavior 
only when two behavioral components are present: imposition of 
physical or emotional pain to a degree that is harsh, extreme and 
brutal; and an official or officially condoned purpose to coerce, 
intimidate, punish or discriminate. Advocacy that urges the institu-
tion of corporal punishment in public schools clearly does not fulfill 
the first element, whereas advocacy that cattle prods or whips be 
adopted as the instruments of academic corporal punishment might 
do SO.256 
lll. Systemic Race Discrimination 
A government's official, systematic denigration of certain of its 
citizens solely on grounds of their race or ethnic origin inflicts an 
intolerable indignity upon the human rights and fundamental free-
726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring), cert. denied, 470 u.s. 1003 (1985); 
Filartiga v. Pena Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). The court also looked to the RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) § 702(d), supra note 133, and the Convention Against Torture, supra note 251, and 
declared: 
In light of the unanimous view of these authoritative voices, it would be unthinkable 
to conclude other than that acts of official torture violate customary international 
law. And while not all customary international law carries with it the force of a jus 
cogens norm, the prohibition against official torture has attained that status .... 
Id. at 717. 
The crack of the whip, the clamp of the thumb screw, the crush of the iron maiden, 
and, in these more efficient modern times, the shock of the electric cattle prod are 
forms of torture that the international order will not tolerate. To subject a person 
to such horrors is to commit one of the most egregious violations of the personal 
security and dignity of a human being. That states engage in official torture cannot 
be doubted, but all states believe it is wrong, all that engage in torture deny it, and 
no state claims a sovereign right to torture its own citizens .... Under international 
law, any state that engages in official torture violates jus cogens. 
965 F.2d at 715, 717 (citations omitted); see also In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Litig., 
978 F.2d 493, 500 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that court had jurisdiction under ATCA because 
official torture violated jus cogens); Committee of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 
859 F.2d 929, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1988). See generally The Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350; 
Fogelson, supra note 147, at 886-88; T.M., Comment, The Alien Tort Statute: United States 
Jurisdiction Over Acts of Torture Committed Abroad, 23 WM. & MARY L. REv. 103 (1981); Lisa 
A. Rickard, Note, Filartiga v. Peiia Irala: A New Forum for Violations of International Human 
Rights, 30 AM. U. L. REv. 807 (1981). 
256The European Court of Human Rights has held that as a disciplinary measure used 
against school children, corporal punishment does constitute "inhuman or degrading treat-
ment or punishment," and is thus prohibited by the European Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 252, art. 3. Campbell & Cosans v. 
United Kingdom, 4 UHRR 293 (1982). 
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doms of those so oppressed. That race discrimination 257 is also cen-
sured by jus cogens principles is evidenced by adoption of numerous 
international conventions and United Nations resolutions, such as 
the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination,258 the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights,259 and the International Convention on the Suppres-
sion and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid.260 Thus, under our 
proposal, advocacy of a systemic governmental policy of race dis-
crimination can be legislatively prohibited, where the challenged 
acts or practices are systemic, coherent, invidious, and instrumental. 
(a). Systemic Acts or Practices 
International law only forbids discrimination that is systemic. Like 
advocacy of aggressive warfare, discrimination must involve an ar-
ticulated or non-articulated, systemic state policy. The existence of 
a discriminatory policy must be objectively verifiable. 
(b) . Coherent Policy or Practice 
Prohibited discrimination must be coherent, meaning that dis-
criminatory instances must be marked by a policy or consistent 
practice of discrimination on the basis of race or other similarly 
forbidden grounds.261 Random or isolated occurrences are not in-
257 We use the phrase "race discrimination" as inclusive of all forms of discrimination based 
on "race, color, descent, or national or ethnic origin." Convention on Racial Discrimination, 
supra note 195, art. 1 (1). Anti-Semitism considered "racial discrimination" within the meaning 
of the Convention. Egon Schwelb, International Convention on The Elimination of all Forms of 
Racial Discrimination, 15 INT'L & COMPo L. Q. 996, 1014-15 (1966). Article 1(1) forbids 
conduct "which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoy-
ment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the 
political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life." Id., art. 1(1). 
258Convention on Racial Discrimination, supra note 195, art. 2,1 1. See generally Thomas 
Buergenthal, Implementing the UN Racial Convention, 12 TEx. INT'L LJ. 187 (1977); Theodor 
Meron, The Meaning and Reach of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Racial Discrimination, 79 A].I.L. 283 (1985); Karl]. Partsch, Elimination of Racial Discrimi-
nation in the Enjoyment of Civil and Political Rights, 14 TEx. INT'L LJ. 191 (1979). 
259Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 220, art. 20(2). The United States 
recently ratified this Covenant. 1993 U.S. Dept. of State, Treaties in Force 343 (entered into 
force, Sept. 8, 1992). The United States Senate, however, expressly stated a reservation to 
Article 20(2), which prohibits advocacy of racism and war propaganda, on First Amendment 
grounds. S.Res. 103-35, 103th Cong., 2d Sess. (1993) (enacted). 
260G.A. Res. 3068, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30 U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1974) [here-
inafter Apartheid Convention]; see also Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 220, art. 2. 
261 The Convention on Racial Discrimination obligates states to refrain from engaging in 
racially discriminatory acts or practices, and from sponsoring, defending or supporting racial 
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cluded. "Racial discrimination is a violation of customary law when 
it is practiced systematically as a matter of state policy, e.g., apartheid 
in the Republic of South Mrica." Occasional practices of racial 
discrimination by officials would not violate jus cogens, but might 
violate "numerous provisions in international covenants or conven-
tions to which the state might be a party."262 
(c). Invidiousness oj Purpose 
Discrimination must be invidious, or characterized by a purpose 
to inflict harm to violate jus cogens.263 This requirement of govern-
mental willfulness in engaging in discriminatory practices is the 
essence of systemic race discrimination. Jus cogens clearly outlaws 
practices such as segregation of schools, parks, or other public places 
to exclude minorities. Mfirmative action provisions, however, are 
not invidious.264 Thus, the jus cogens prohibition should be inter-
preted to permit narrow affirmative action provisions. 
discrimination. Convention on Racial Discrimination, supra note 195, art. 2(1). States are also 
obliged to review governmental, national and local policies, and to amend, rescind or nullifY 
any laws and regulations which have the effect of creating or perpetuating race discrimination. 
[d. 
262REsTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 133, § 702 cmt. i. 
263 See, e.g., Convention on Racial Discrimination, supra note 195, art. 1, ~ I; Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, supra note 220, art. 20(2); Apartheid Convention, supra note 260, 
at 75. This construction of the jus cogens prohibition is consonant with Supreme Court 
precedent interpreting the Equal Protection provision, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, cl. I, which 
requires proof of purpose or intent. See generally McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987); 
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); 
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
The consequences of governmental acts and practices can be used to reveal intent. Ar-
lington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265-68. But the appropriate interpretation of the jus cog ens 
prohibition is to require a showing of purpose in governmental practice. 
264 Convention on Racial Discrimination exempts affirmative action measures. Convention 
on Racial Discrimination, supra note 195, art. I (4). Article 1 (4) provides: 
Special measures taken for the sole purpose of securing adequate advancement of 
certain racial or ethnic groups or individuals requiring such protection as may be 
necessary in order to ensure such groups or individuals equal enjoyment or exercise 
of human rights and fundamental freedoms shall not be deemed racial discrimina-
tion, provided, however, that such measures do not, as a consequence, lead to the 
maintenance of separate rights for different racial groups and that they shall not be 
continued after the objectives for which they were taken have been achieved. 
[d. According to American constitutional law, affirmative action provisions are within the 
parameters of the Equal Protection Clause so long as they are required to satisfY the compel-
ling governmental goal of remedying past discrimination and are not broader than necessary 
to meet this objective. See City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 498-506 (1989). 
U8 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW (Vol. XVIII, No.1 
A difficulty arises when members of traditionally oppressed mi-
nority groups advocate segregation: is this still invidious?265 Arguably, 
any government act or practice that is motivated by the remedial 
concerns that characterize affirmative action is not invidious. A 
governmental measure is not invidious if it is not enacted with an 
intent to inflict harm upon an identifiable group. To be sure, the 
parameters of affirmative action remain somewhat unclear. The 
principle of in dubio pro reo provides guidance concerning permis-
sible regulation: if there is doubt concerning the presence of will-
fulness underlying a government enactment that discriminates based 
on race, international law norms cannot regulate advocacy concern-
ing that enactment. 
(d). Instrumentality of Acts or Practices 
Discrimination must be instrumental, insofar as it compels both 
systemic and systematic action that operates to segregate the races, 
for international law to forbid it. Opinions, epithets and scapegoat-
ing are excluded.266 
265 For example, does advocacy by persons such as W.E.B. DuBois, Paul Robeson, Martin 
Luther King, Jr. and Malcolm X towards organizing the Mrican-American community, to the 
exclusion of whites, for the benefit, protection and solidarity of the minority group members 
constitute invidiousness? See DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED 222 n.9 (1987). Is 
advocacy on behalf of Mrican-American nationalism or Mrican-American mass exodus from 
America, in the vein of Bishop Henry McNeil Turner, Martin Delaney, Henry Bibb, or Marcus 
Garvey, a manifestation of invidiousness? Id. at 181. Does advocating for institution of single-
race and gender public schools in the Mrican-American community in order to nurture racial 
pride and identity in young Mrican-American men partake of purposeful discrimination? 
In Garrett v. Board of Educ. of the School Dist. of Detroit, the judge enjoined the creation of 
gender-based schools and held that a Detroit plan to create such schools violated both federal 
and state Equal Protection provisions that outlaw gender-based discrimination. 775 F. 
Supp. 1004 (E.D. Mich., 1991). Commentators have criticized this decision. See generally, e.g., 
Miriam Paula Gladden, The Constitutionality of African-American Male Schools and Programs, 
24 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 239 (1993); Sonia R. Jarvis, Brown and the Afrocentric Curricu-
lum, 101 YALE LJ. 1285 (1992); Christopher Steskal, Note, Creating Space for Racial Difference: 
The Case for African-American Schools, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 187 (1992). 
The Supreme Court has declared that all official race-based classifications will be strictly 
scrutinized, and will be upheld only if essential to fulfill a compelling governmental objective 
and if carefully confined to that end. City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 passim 
(1989). Thus, the legitimacy of minority advocacy for official differentiation among racial 
groups is dependent upon the existence of a compelling governmental objective underlying 
the proposed course of action. As decisions rendered by a national judicial body, however, 
United States Supreme Court pronouncements are not authoritative in construing the scope 
of jus cogens. For purposes of our proposal, any doubts concerning the validity of the cause 
for which the speaker advocates are resolved by disallowing regulation. 
266 For example, opinions that members of one race are inferior, or that members of another 
race are taking all available jobs, are excluded as opinionated remarks. 
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2. Is the Communication Advocative? 
The second integral inquiry is an assessment of the tenor and 
intensity with which the speaker delivers the message. This element 
is fulfilled only if the message is advocative. We define "to advocate" 
as: to urge in favor of or to maintain the rectitude of pursuing a 
cause or proposal. 
Advocacy entails two separate elements: the speaker must harbor 
the intent to advocate, meaning that the speaker must urge or 
exhort with the purpose of persuading those who observe the com-
munication; and a reasonable person must perceive the communi-
cation as advocative, as communicated with a purpose to urge, 
exhort or persuade. The advocacy need not be addressed to specific 
persons. Thus, the publication and circulation of a newspaper article 
or a radio broadcast might be an encouragement or endeavor to 
persuade to murder or to terrorize, although not addressed to any 
person in particular. 
Advocacy must be delimited to communications that entreat or 
exhort. Messages that merely state the speaker's opinion or belief 
are excluded.267 What we propose to prohibit is language advocating, 
urging or exhorting the accomplishment of consequences forbid-
den under jus cogens norms. We recognize that our construction of 
this element is antithetical to the Supreme Court's Brandenburg 
doctrine,268 in which the Court opined that advocacy, without more-
even advocacy of heinous, potentially destructive activity-is consti-
tutionally protected speech unless it "is directed to inciting or pro-
ducing imminent lawless action and is likely to produce such action. "269 
Our proposal departs from Brandenburg in two respects. First, 
although the speaker must advocate with the intent to bring about 
the prohibited conduct,270 namely those actions proscribed by jus 
cogens, we eliminate the factor of imminence. So long as the speaker's 
aim is ultimately to provoke conduct prohibited by jus cogens, the 
public damage inflicted by the advocacy is tangible, regardless of 
whether the i~ury is immediately experienced, or takes the form of 
an incendiary time bomb.271 Second, for similar reasons, we elimi-
267 See, e.g., STRAFGESETZBUCH [StGBj § 86 (F.R.G.). "Advocacy" will be difficult to distin-
guish from opinion or belief in some contexts, especially when the message is uttered in the 
heat of debate or argument. If the resolution of this inquiry remains ambiguous, then this 
element is not satisfied and no restriction is permissible. 
268 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
269Id. at 447. 
270 See supra text accompanying notes 224-26. 
271 See supra text accompanying notes 120-28. 
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nate the factor of likelihood of occurrence. A public address, radio 
broadcast, or newspaper editorial that intentionally advocates deci-
mation or enslavement of a people on grounds of identification with 
national, ethnic, racial or religious characteristics, or deadly terrorist 
attacks on innocent persons, or torture of dissidents, is an unendur-
able affront to the individual rights of liberty, equality, dignity, and 
life that are the constitutional due of each individual. This form of 
advocacy signals a threatened abandonment of values that accord 
these characteristics to each person, and is a perilous, cataclysmic 
threat to the very essence of society. 
3. Is There an Intent to Provoke the Conduct Advocated? 
In the criminal law, both actus reus and a culpable mens rea are 
essential elements.272 We propose that the requisite intent element 
be specific intent to provoke, albeit over the long run, the behavior 
advocated.273 The required scienter, if ambiguous, can be inferred 
from surrounding circumstances.274 
Expressions fairly characterized as artistic or scientific endeavors, 
as historical accounts, as research or education in an academic 
context, as reporting about incidents or current events, or as discus-
272United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115 (1980). It must be demonstrated that the 
speaker performed the actus reus, or actually communicated the message. As a defense, the 
speaker may raise a lack of capability to perform this physical act voluntarily, such as uncon-
sciousness or severe intoxication. Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402 (1987); Powell v. Texas, 
392 U.S. 514 (1968); Fulcher v. State, 633 P.2d 142 (Wyo. 1981); see also Michael Corrado, 
Automatism and the Theory of Action, 39 EMORY LJ. 1191 (1990). 
273 
A person acts purposely with respect to a material element of an offense when: 
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or a result thereof, it is his 
conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result .... 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (a). 
274 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT,JR., CRIMINAL LAw § 3.5, at 317-18 (2d ed. 1986). 
See generally Ronald]. Allen & Lee Ann DeGrazia, The Constitutional Requirement of Proof 
Beyond a Reasonable Doubt in Criminal cases: A Comment Upon Incipient Chaos in the Lower 
Courts, 20 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1 (1982). 
The prior speech of the perpetrator can be considered in determining intent. Wisconsin 
v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194, 2201-02 (1993). In Mitchel4 the Court upheld an enhancement 
of defendant's sentence for an aggravated battery and theft conviction under a state statute 
that increased the severity of the penalty when the victim was chosen on grounds of race, 
religion, color, disability, sexual orientation, national origin or ancestry. Id. The Court rejected 
defendant's argument that the statute was overbroad, stating that "the prospect of a citizen 
suppressing his bigoted beliefs for fear that evidence of such beliefs will be introduced against 
him at trial if he commits a more serious offense against person or property" is "simply too 
speculative a hypothesis to support" an overbreadth claim. Id. 
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sion or debate of abstract philosophy or doctrine, generally cannot 
be construed as intentional. Even ifadvocative, these communicative 
forms ordinarily evince no intent to bring about the conduct dis-
cussed.275 
VI. AJus COGENS GUIDE TO CONTENT-BASED RESTRICTIONS 
In order to demonstrate the actual results of our suggested ap-
proach, we posit the existence of a hypothetical content-based stat-
ute that restricts speech within the permissible limits of jus cogens-
based regulation. Further, we assume that the Supreme Court has 
stamped its imprimatur upon our suggested jus cogens-based ap-
proach. Under our proposal, the Supreme Court would test the 
hypothetical statutory regulation against a jus cogens-guided First 
Amendment interpretation. 
We consider various examples-some "easy" and some "hard" 
cases. We have selected both actual and hypothetical examples to 
explore the substance and scope of each of the three elements of 
the approach we propose. In addition, we will take a case and slightly 
alter the facts to expose the relationship between concrete facts and 
outcome under the proposed statute. 
The first case we pose is a variation of events that ensued in May, 
1977 in the small village of Skokie, Illinois. 276 Assume that a Nazi 
party contingent marches through the Village of Skokie, in which 
several thousands of Holocaust survivors live. They march in full 
Nazi regalia and, most significantly, carry signs proclaiming the 
leitmotif of the march: the extermination of all Jewish people. Mter-
wards the city council is informed of the Nazi march and takes action 
under its new city ordinance. The council bases its decision on a set 
of rules which regulates free speech within narrow jus cogens limits 
and permits the council to prohibit marches if the objective of the 
march is contrary to a jus cog ens rule. 
The first question a reviewing court asks in such a case is whether 
the anticipated communications fall within one of the narrowly 
construed jus cog ens categories of speech that can be regulated. In 
this case, the sole purpose for the march, and the core of the 
communication, is to call for the intentional massacre of an entire 
275 If any doubt exists concerning the characterization of a communication as an artistic, 
scientific or historical message, or as research or education in an academic context, as 
reporting about incidents or current events, or as discussion or debate of abstract philosophy 
or doctrine, then the intent requirement is not fulfilled, and regulation is not permissible. 
276 See supra notes 65, 128; see also infra note 284. 
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people. Unambiguously, this case represents an instance of geno-
cide, a jus cog ens category of prohibited conduct. 
The next question is whether calling for genocide is a form of 
advocacy. Advocacy is exhortation to pursue a cause, and requires 
fulfillment of two separate components: (a) the intent to advocate; 
and (b) the presence of a communicative act that is unambiguously 
advocative in nature. Clearly, the march was intended by the Nazis 
to communicate their goals and to advocate actively for pursuit of 
these goals. No other conclusion comports with common sense. 
Thus, the advocacy was intentional. Moreover, the communicative 
act-carrying the banners depicting the motto, marching in full 
regalia-was one of an advocative nature. Anyone watching the 
Nazis and reading their signs, without question, would have per-
ceived this behavior as exhortative. Consequently, the Nazi march 
fulfills the requirement of advocacy. 
The third question focuses upon the intent of the actor to ulti-
mately bring about the objective for which the actor advocates. 
Certainly, the Nazi party, conceiving itself as the true heir to Hitler's 
legacy, also intends the advocated action to take place. The require-
ment of intent is fulfilled. 
Because all three questions are answered in the affirmative, the 
Nazi march constitutes an act of communication which-according 
to our proposal-can be regulated. A reviewing court will uphold 
the city council's decision.277 
In another, assume that a fundamentalist Arab leader, domiciled 
in New York, advocates that Muslims rise up and bomb United States 
government offices in order to coerce the United States government 
into changing its policy vis-a-vis Israel. This is terrorism, the attempt 
to intimidate a government into granting demands. The advocacy 
of terrorism can be regulated.278 Similarly, an animal rights activist's 
advocacy for the bombing of medical research institutes around the 
country until Congress outlaws animal testing can be restricted. 
277 A city council may also outlaw advocacy for genocide and systematic racism by a self-styled 
American Nazi group in the city's park. See, e.g., Rockwell v. Morris, 10 N.Y.2d 721 (1961). 
278 The example of British author Salman Rushdie comes to mind, but this case is somewhat 
complicated, and does not fall within any recognized jus cogens category. Rushdie published 
an artistically acclaimed novel, THE SATANIC VERSES (1988), which was deemed blasphemous 
by some Muslim sects. The spiritual ruler of Iran, the Ayatollah Khomeini, issued a decree 
declaring that Muslims were obliged to put Rushdie to death. Although government-initiated, 
no attempt to extract concessions from a government is involved in this case. The Ayatollah's 
edict, although reprehensible, is not terroristic. See Daniel Pipe, Whodunit? Conspiracy Theories 
and Middle Eastern Politics, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, May 1989, at 18; Michael Walzer, The Sins 
of Salman: The Do's and Don't of Blasphemy, THE NEW REpUBLIC, Apr. 10, 1989, at 13. 
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Not all jus cogens categories, however, focus on private action. 
Some require that the action be systemic, government-enforced, or 
at least government-condoned. Let us assume, for example, that a 
movement in California advocates that all Hispanic Americans be 
confined in special fenced-in camps.279 Advocacy and intent, we 
stipulate, are clear and unambiguous in this case. This plan smacks 
of a summons to racial discrimination. The message urging seques-
tration of an entire group of people based on race or ethnicity in 
the equivalent of concentration camps is, without any doubt, advo-
cacy for systemic, state-administered, coherent and invidious racial 
discrimination.280 Consequently, the communicative actions of the 
movement can be regulated. Similarly, a United States branch of the 
South Mrican white supremacist "Mrikaaner National Bewegung," 
with its advocacy of apartheid and strict government-enforced racial 
segregation, could be regulated. 
Advocacy of conduct or practices outlawed by jus cogens recurs 
with some regularity, and legislatures have attempted repeatedly to 
restrict this speech by using the only tool available to them: the 
enactment of rigid time, place, and manner regulations. Superficially, 
such regulations are content-neutral. Supposedly, these neutral re-
strictions place an equivalent burden on all putative speakers. But 
courts have had little difficulty in many cases unearthing not only a 
content-based rationale, but also a blatant tendency toward uneven 
application of the regulation. 281 
In Ku Klux Klan v. Martin Luther King, Jr. Worshippers,282 a city 
ordinance required permits for marches on public property. For a 
number of years, the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) had staged a "Homecom-
ing" parade in the City of Pulaski, Tennessee on or around January 
13, the holiday commemorating Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. In 1989, 
the director of the county Chamber of Commerce secured parade 
permits for January 12, 13, 14, and 15. On October 23, the national 
director of the KKK informed the city council that his organization 
279 See also Koremastu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (sustaining an order compelling 
Americans of Japanese descent to be confined in special camps, surrounded by barbed wire 
and watch towers). 
28oFor a definition of systematic race discrimination, see supra text accompanying notes 
257-66. This type of advocacy, it could be argued, is also a form of genocide, the definition 
of which includes actions that inflict destructive conditions upon a people on grounds of 
national, ethnic, racial or religious identification. See supra sources cited at note 225. 
281 For a discussion of veiled time, place and manner regulations, see supra notes 95-96 and 
accompanying text. 
282 735 F. Supp. 745 (M.D. Tenn. 1990). 
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intended to hold its traditional "Homecoming" event on January 13, 
1990. 
The city council, within two weeks, passed an amendment to the 
city ordinance that regulated parades. The amendment restricted 
parades, marches and similar events to a maximum of one per 
month and allocated the required parade permits on a first-come, 
first-served basis. It also prohibited marches of more than 250 per-
sons and prohibited marchers from wearing masks and disguises. A 
subsequent request by the KKK for parade permits on January 13 
and January 20 was rejected, based on the new amendment. The 
city council's response was that only one permit per month was 
allowed, and that this permit had already been issued to the Cham-
ber of Commerce for the month of January. 
The city council tried to regulate the speech of the KKK by 
amending its permit ordinance. The legislators knew that KKK ral-
lies, with attendant patently offensive messages, would occur again. 
Legislators wanted to act, not simply wait for the incident to recur. 
Current First Amendment doctrine, however, tied their hands. In-
stead, they had to resort to the blunt knife of overbroad, purportedly 
neutral time, place and manner restrictions. 
This is but one example of many where legislatures, bereft of the 
ability to regulate speech based on content, have had to resort to 
facially neutral time, place, and manner regulations. Courts, for the 
most part, as in this case, have understood that the underlying 
legislative motivation was to regulate content, and under current 
First Amendment doctrine have invalidated these ordinances.283 
Under our approach, however, the city council would not be 
compelled to resort to facially neutral time, place, and manner 
regulations to restrict overtly offensive, racially-charged speech. An 
ordinance narrowly regulating speech that advocates systemic racial 
discrimination is preferable because it would be less broad and less 
restrictive of speech. 
The message and the intent of the KKK rally, if not ostensibly 
clear, is readily discernable by examining the long segregationist 
history of the KKK. The Klan selected the location a!ld the day of 
its planned march to advocate for its objectives-reimposition of 
racial segregation and systemic, coherent discrimination. Such speech 
is within the relevant jus cogens category and accordingly can be 
regulated. 
283Id. at 749-52. 
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Our suggested approach would effectively deliver to legislatures a 
usable tool for narrow and precise content-based restrictions. A First 
Amendment interpretation guided by jus cogens would enable Pu-
laski, validly and successfully, to regulate Klan rallies. This would also 
allow a variety of other regulations: the Skokie city council could 
regulate the Nazis' march through a genocide survivor's neighbor-
hood,284 Forsyth County could regulate parades by the Nationalist 
Movement,285 and Arkansas could forestall attempts by the KKK to 
partake in a "Sponsor-A-Highway" program.286 
Uttering racial slurs alone, however, cannot provide a basis for 
regulation. For example, a judge who refers to Mrican-Americans, 
in camera, in racially offensive terms is absolutely detestable. 287 But 
such epithets do not fall within the category of systemic, coherent 
racial discrimination. The use of these words, without more, simply 
does not communicate an advocacy to impose or bring about a 
state-controlled or state-condoned system of racial segregation. 
The constricted reach of our approach might be disillusioning for 
some. But our approach is not, and ought not be, a fail-safe test to 
separate good ideas from detestable ones. We do not want the 
exchange of ideas to be unduly limited or restricted by attempts to 
differentiate what is noble from what is despicable. We simply con-
tend that some ideas are too false, too outrageous, too damaging to 
merit First Amendment protection. The supremacist's call for a 
segregated country based on apartheid is such an idea; the irrespon-
sible mumbling of non-coherent racial slurs by a judge in chambers 
is not. 
But what if it is suggested that Mark Twain's incomparable book, 
Tom Sawyer, should be regulated-taken off school library shelves-
because it portrays slavery and thus implicitly advocates slavery, or 
at least systemic racial discrimination?288 Even if one assumes that 
Twain's story implicitly falls under any of the jus cog ens categories, 
the case is easily decided when answering questions of "advocacy" 
284 Collin v. Smith, 447 F. Supp. 676 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (holding restrictions of racist speech 
on content-based grounds constitutionally problematic under existing First Amendment doc-
trine), afJ'd, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), stay denied, 436 U.S. 953, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 
(1978); see also Village of Skokie v. National Socialist Party of America, 373 N.E. 2d 21, 25 (Ill. 
1978) (holding that display of swastikas by peaceful demonstrators cannot be banned for the 
exclusive reason that the swastika might provoke others to violence). 
285 Forsyth County, Ga. v. The Nationalist Movement, 112 S. Ct. 2395 (1992). 
286 Knights ofKu Klux Klan v. Arkansas State Highway and Transp. Dep't, 807 F. Supp. 1427 
(W.D. Ark. 1992). 
287 See In re Stevens, 31 Cal. 3d 403 (1982). 
288 Over the years, there were more than a few attempts to remove Tom Sawyer from library 
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and "intent." First, in his book Mark Twain does not urge his readers 
to maintain slavery or perpetuate racial discrimination. The book is 
a work of description, not of advocacy. Secondly, Mark Twain had 
no discernable intent whatsoever to bring about slavery. Any at-
tempts to ban Tom Sawyer from school libraries premised upon jus 
cog ens-based speech regulations will be held to violate the First Amend-
ment.289 
This example demonstrates vividly that our suggested approach 
will not create vast new areas of content-based speech regulation; 
rather, outside the narrowly tailored confines of possible restrictions, 
our proposal will actually reinforce and strengthen free speech. 
Let us briefly focus again upon the questions of advocacy and 
intent. Our approach affords the same absolute First Amendment 
protection to Tom Sawyer as it would provide to a theatre play on 
Adolf Eichmann and the "final solution,"29o or a screening of Nazi 
film maker Leni Riefenstahl' s Third Reich Opuses.291 When a mes-
sage, even one falling within jus cogens categories, lacks either advo-
cacy or intent, it is protected speech. 
The situation is slightly more complex where the speaker solicits 
violence to achieve a certain goal against a certain group of people 
"by any means necessary. "292 One can argue that such a message-
wielding the capacity for violence to intimidate the population into 
granting one's demands-is a call for terrorism. But does "by any 
circulation. See, e.g., Expansion of Censorship in Schools Decried, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 2, 1993, at 2; 
Dennis McLellan, Banned Books Display Focus on the Perils of Censorship, L.A. TiMES, Oct. 29, 
1988, pt. IX, at 3; Mary Otto, School Content Challenges Rise: One Side Criticizes Censorship; the 
Other PraisesJudgrnent, DET. FREE PRESS, Sept. 2, 1993, at 2A; Religious Right Waging Campaign 
to Censor Books, Group Charges, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 2, 1993, at Nat'l-17;Jack Smith, Censo-
rious Right Has It All Wrong, LA TIMES, Nov. 1, 1993, at IE; Michael Tackett, Twain Country 
Dilemma: Read Racist Words or ban, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 14, 1992, at 22. 
289We do not advocate broad removal of books or other communicative materials from the 
collective knowledge. Assume, for example, that the book targeted for removal does express 
advocacy of conduct or practices that jus cogens forbids, and evinces an intent to bring about 
the prohibited conduct. The inquiry would then focus upon the advocative quality and intent 
of the actions of the person placing the book in popular circulation, e.g., the librarian or the 
teacher. Viewing the book as an artistic, philosophical, or historical work would insulate it 
from regulation. See infra notes 296, 297, 304 and accompanying text. 
290 See, e.g., the play by Heinar Kippardt, Bruder Eichmann (1983). 
291 For an autobiographical account of Frau Riefenstahl's Third Reich masterpieces, see 
LENI RIEFENSTAHL, A MEMOIR (1993). 
292 "Our objective is complete freedom, complete justice, complete equality, by any means 
necessary. That never changes. Complete and immediate recognition and respect as human 
beings, that doesn't change. That is what all of us want." Malcolm X, Address at the Audubon 
(New York, Dec. 20, 1964), in MALCOLM X SPEAKS 115, 116 (George Breitman ed., 1965). 
1995) MORE SPEECH, LESS NOISE 127 
means necessary" actually constitute advocacy of terrorism? The 
phrase is ambiguous. 
In cases of ambiguity, we summon the reasonable person stand-
ard. The question then becomes: does a reasonable person under-
stand this message to convey advocacy of terrorism? A reasonable 
person will take into account the entire content of the message as 
well as the context in which the words are stated in order to distill 
from these considerations additional details sufficient to answer the 
question: what is this message? If the answer remains ambiguous, 
the speech is protected and cannot be regulated. 
The requirement of intent is most serviceable in artistic, scientific 
or instructional contexts. A teacher of a social history class is not 
restricted from reading pro-slavery texts to a class when discussing 
the Civil War.293 But outside these instances, advocacy generally cor-
roborates intent.294 
Requiring the reasonable person to examine factual details and 
contextual circumstances is a complex endeavor. We are aware of 
this fact. Regulations of free speech based on content must be drawn 
as narrowly as possible. Restrictions must be grounded on clear and 
reasonable bases. Whenever any doubt persists, the balance must tip 
in favor of absolute speech protection. 
An example may be taken from current news. Gary Lauck, an 
American propagandist, referred to as the "Nazi from Nebraska,"295 
operates from a post office box in Lincoln, Nebraska to send out a 
steady stream of books, pamphlets, and stickers that are racially 
charged. The stickers, for example, display messages like "Fight 
crime ... deport niggers," "Don't buy Jewish!" or "We're back." He 
also sells tapes of Hitler's speeches. Could any of these activities be 
regulated by a content-based speech code? 
The initial inquiry is whether Lauck's actions fall within any of 
the jus cogens categories. The evidence is not entirely conclusive. 
The "Fight crime ... " sticker can be seen as advocating racial dis-
crimination: the message calls for systemic action and is a coherent 
policy with the purpose to inflict harm. The sticker 'We're back" 
293 A similar example is the inclusion of Nazi books in a political history course to aid in 
the study of this period. 
294For example, a person kidnapped and then forced to read a statement advocating 
terrorism, as well as someone being under the severe influence of alcohol or drugs, would 
clearly lack sufficient intent. For a discussion of the intent requirement, see supra notes 
273-76. 
295 See Karen Springer & Theresa Waldrop, A Farm Belt Fuhrer Stirs Up the Skinheads, 
NEWSWEEK, Nov. 15, 1993, at 38. 
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can be seen as Lauck's attempt to communicate the Nazis' return. 
The message that Nazis are resurrected as a political force irrevoca-
bly incorporates the message that genocide is back because Nazism 
is inherently and irreversibly linked to the most appalling and hor-
rifying genocide in the history of humankind. Thus, the sticker's 
central idea is within the parameters of the genocide category. 
The question remains, however, whether this message is advocat-
ing genocide. "We're back" is on its face a statement of fact, not of 
advocacy. One would have to look more closely at details to discern 
with less ambiguity whether the sticker can be understood by a 
reasonable person as advocating genocide. One would have to ex-
amine the contextual facts, such as who displays the sticker, when, 
how, and in what context, in order to further illuminate the two 
components of advocacy. These components include: the intent to 
advocate, and whether a reasonable person would consider the 
communication advocacy. 
The third sticker "Don't buy Jewish!" cannot, in our view, be 
subsumed under any jus cogens category without unduly straining its 
limits. The sticker does not advocate the extermination of a people. 
Nor does it advocate for state-supported, systemic, coherent, racial 
discrimination. It does not call for implementation of any illegal or 
terroristic actions. 296 
296 An interesting case in point is NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982), 
in which a boycott against white-owned businesses was launched by black citizens in an effort 
to secure compliance by civic and business leaders with demands for practices that accorded 
with principles of equality and justice. [d. at 889. The Court found no basis for monetary relief 
for the white merchants arising from losses incurred as a result of the boycott, or from 
non·violent picketing. [d. at 921. Persons who committed individual acts of violence or 
intimidation during the course of the boycott could be held liable for resulting damages. [d. 
at 926. 
One of the boycott organizers, Charles Evers, made a number of speeches to encourage 
continued participation. [d. at 898. He ostensibly stated that boycott violators "would be 
'disciplined'" and declared: "[ilf we catch any of you going into them racist stores, we're 
gonna break your damn neck." NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. at 902. The Court 
conceded that Evers' speeches were delivered in an impassioned context, and "might have 
been understood as inviting an unlawful form of discipline or, at least to create a fear of 
violence whether or not improper discipline was specifically intended." [d. at 927. Because no 
acts of violence occurred in the wake of Evers' exhortations, Evers did not transcend the 
bounds of Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
Whether our approach would yield a similar result depends upon an assessment of Evers' 
intent. Evers does not advocate state-sanctioned race discrimination. But his words might be 
construed as advocacy of terrorism, and might reasonably be so perceived by the listeners. 
Whether Evers' speeches would run afoul of a properly-drawn statute would depend upon 
whether his words connote an intent to provoke violence or a hyperbolic warning to his 
audience. 
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The sale of tapes containing infamous Nazi speeches advocating 
the extermination of the Jewish people is certainly within the geno-
cide category. It is likely that Lauck is communicating his message 
through the speeches of Hitler. Lauck's message is advocated with 
more zeal, more force, and more conviction than Lauck himself 
could do. 
The question then becomes whether the tapes do more than 
communicate the speeches, or whether they implicitly present a 
form of advocacy. To clarify this issue, one must use the reasonable 
person standard and ask whether someone sending out Hitler's 
speeches is pursuing more than the dissemination of the historical 
facts, and instead is encouraging genocide and Nazism. It is conceiv-
able that a reasonable person could assume that Lauck is using the 
tape sale as a thinly veiled advocacy and allow his action to be 
regulated. 
The outcome would be different, however, if the Hitler tapes were 
shown in a teaching context as part of a history or communications 
class. The communication would still fall under a jus cogens category 
and the speech contained on the tape would fulfill the requirement 
of being advocative. The intent of the teacher both to advocate for 
genocide and to ultimately bring about genocide, however, would 
be lacking. Such speech in a purely academic or teaching context 
could never be regulated, because the required two aspects of intent 
would be absent.297 
The result then is that some of Lauck's communication-the tape 
sale, at least one sticker, maybe another-can be regulated in ac-
cordance with our jus cogens proposal, while other parts of his 
message are protected speech. The reasonable person standard is a 
useful tool in cases in which the questions of our proposed approach 
do not yield simple, unambiguous answers. The Lauck example is a 
case in point. 
The standard is particularly useful in the area of symbolic speech, 
where revealing the underlying message sometimes requires a proc-
ess more complicated and more subtle. There is no need to open 
Pandora's box and determine which symbols are speech and which 
297 For all practical purposes, both aspects of intent will be absent. In very rare circum-
stances, however, the teacher might have the intent to advocate, even if the intent to bring 
about the advocated action is lacking. This would be the case if the teacher advocates as part 
of a simulation on propaganda and genocide, in order to get the message across that genocide 
is abhorrent and illegal. For an illustrative example, see The Wave, ABC-TV, October 4, 1981. 
But even such simulations, because of the absence of one decisive element of intent, cannot 
be restricted under our suggested approach. 
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are not. On the contrary, we categorize the content of the message 
and the intent of the actions by the reasonable person standard. 
If, for example, a Nazi movement would silently march through 
a predominantly Jewish town in full Nazi regalia, wearing armbands 
replete with the Nazi swastika, the judgment of the reasonable per-
son would determine whether this action amounted to symbolic 
advocacy of Nazi policy, including genocide and mass racial discrimi-
nation. In this case, we think it a straightforward process for a 
reasonable person to link swastikas and brown uniforms to Nazism, 
and Nazism to genocide. 
The situation would be somewhat less clear, however, if the march-
ers were wearing no swastikas, but just brown uniforms. The march-
ers could very well remove themselves from these narrow jus cogens 
categories by reducing the communicative component of their sym-
bolic action through foregoing display of the swastika-a highly 
communicative symbol. By doing so they would also substantially 
reduce the desired communicative impact attendant to their action. 
If the message becomes so attenuated that it becomes ambiguous 
to a reasonable person, then the statement would be outside the 
regulatory scope of our suggested jus cogens approach. Actions that 
do not communicate a clear message cannot be regulated. The 
reasonable person standard determines whether a symbolic action 
is ambiguous or intentional and advocative. 
In R.A. V. v. St. Paul,298 a group of young people assembled a cross 
made from broken chair legs and burned that cross in the yard of 
a black family. The teenagers were charged under St.Paul's Bias-Mo-
tivated Crime Ordinance. 
Upon reviewing this case, the Supreme Court assumed that the 
cross burning had a communicative component.299 The initial in-
quiry in this case, and in cases factually similar to R.A. v., should be 
whether the message communicated by crossburning falls within 
one of the jus cogens categories, such as systemic racial discrimina-
tion.30o Whenever the communicative content of a message is am-
biguous, the reasonable person standard provides additional insight 
298 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992). 
299 See id. at 2566-71 (Stevens, J. concurring) (arguing that type of communication ad-
dressed by St. Paul ordinance is wholly proscribable and could be regulated by narrower, 
properly-drawn statute). 
300 If the answer is not plain and clear, the reasonable person standard is activated. The 
question then becomes: does a reasonable person see the burning of a cross outside the house 
of a black family as an unambiguous message calling for systemic racial discrimination? 
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into determining whether the speech conveys a message within a jus 
cogens category.301 
Mter resolving this initial issue, the elements of advocacy and 
intent must be explored. A final example illuminates the problem 
in ambiguity of intent. Suppose that two white college students, after 
a heated discussion with a black colleague about the racial and cul-
tural origins of the composer Ludwig van Beethoven, affix a poster 
to that black student's dormitory room door depicting Beethoven 
as black. The white students contend that they meant to prove 
Beethoven's whiteness; the black student is certain that his col-
leagues intended to insult him.302 
Again, the reasonable person test might provide insight regarding 
communicative intent. Using our approach we are not confined to 
decide between the parties' two polar views on what actually was 
communicated. Instead, attention would shift to a reasonable per-
son witnessing the event. We then would ask whether such a bystand-
er would have unambiguously understood the caricature to call for 
systemic racial discrimination. It takes little imagination to see that 
the answer would be negative. Consequently, we do not consider 
such a caricature to be regulative speech, based on a jus cog ens 
approach.303 
301 One example of a highly ambiguous symbol is the Confederate flag, which white south-
erners perceive as emblematic of their Dixie culture and heritage. Mrican-Americans often 
perceive this flag as advocating a return to slavery. A recent example reveals this dual 
symbolism of the Confederate flag. A long-standing group, the Daughters of the Confederacy, 
requested the United States Senate's approval of a design patent for their use of an insignia 
that included the Confederate flag. The design patent had been renewed on previous occa-
sions, evoking little Senate attention. In February 1993, however, Senator Carol Moseley-Braun 
launched a campaign to deny renewal of the patent on grounds that the Confederate flag is 
a living symbol of slavery and racism to millions of Mrican-Americans. Senator Moseley-Braun 
prevailed, and the patent was denied. Jacob Weisberg, Making the Senate Floor a Focus for 
Matters of Conscience, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1993, at 3. The debate over the Confederate flag 
persists, as is evidenced by the recent controversy over whether the Confederate emblem 
should be removed from the Georgia state flag. An Mrican-American civil rights leader 
declared that "[t]he flag is the Confederate swastika," and "signifies racism, white supremacy 
and separation ... [and] shows the rest of the world the problems Georgia still has and the 
unfinished business of the civil-rights movement." Tom Watson, Old Fight Over Ga. Flag Moves 
to New Field, USA TODAY, Jan. 26, 1994, at 3A. A supporter of the Confederate symbol asserted 
that "[t]hese symbols serve as a memorial and reminder of the people who died fighting for 
independence ... . "Id; see also Jerry Schwartz, While Confederate Flag Waves, Protesters March, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1994, at B6, col. 3; Ronald Smothers, Board Bans Georgia Flag at Atlanta 
Stadium, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 1994, at AS, col. 4. 
302 See Lawrence, supra note 1, at 433. 
303 A similar example occurred recently at the University of Pennsylvania. There, a student 
was disciplined for shouting at a boisterous group of Mrican-American women who were 
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Thus far, we have explicated our approach with various examples 
of both actual and hypothetical cases. We now will scrutinize a 
hypothetical example and will demonstrate, simply by slightly alter-
ing the facts, how factual modifications can determine the result of 
our approach. Assume, for example, that the Supreme Court has 
adapted the jus cogens approach. Assume further that the Aryan 
Movement, a white supremacist organization, has devised an "action 
plan" for the coming year. They have conceived several actions, 
termed "manifestations," to disseminate the movement's message. 
Before they implement their plan, they consult with their legal 
counsel for advice. 
The first operation they plan is a rally in New Orleans calling for 
all American white people to stop interrelating with or marrying 
people of other races. Counsel, after examining the jus cogens cate-
gory of racial discrimination, advises the Aryan Movement that such 
a rally would not constitute advocacy of systemic, state-enforced 
racial discrimination, because they only are calling for people to 
voluntarily stop interrelating with other races. Counsel concludes 
that the courts might find this idea of voluntary segregation to be 
detestable, but, nevertheless, still protected by the First Amendment. 
The second manifestation is a march through a village wearing 
full Nazi regalia, including swastikas, and singing Nazi songs. The 
members of the Aryan Movement want to hold the rally in a pre-
dominantly Jewish town because the group's members want atten-
tion. If this march turns out to be illegal or restricted, they would 
accept marching in any town in the Midwest. 
Counsel first states that the jus cogens approach does not regulate 
or limit speech per se. This approach merely carves out a narrow, 
unprotected area of speech based on the speech content. Cities and 
states are free to decide whether, how much, and how they want to 
regulate such unprotected speech. 
A Nazi march with uniforms, symbols, and songs would fall within 
such an unprotected area. Nazi symbols have become inextricably 
linked with genocide. Under the reasonable person standard, such 
disturbing his study time. He referred to the women as "water buffaloes." Christopher 
Heredia, When ''Enlightened People" Make Racist Remarks, LA TIMES, May 27, 1993, at View-2E; 
Dale Russakoff, Penn Women Drop Racial Charge: Five Say "Water Buffalo" Is Slur; But Question 
Fairness of Hearing, WASH. POST, May 25, 1993, at A3; Dale Russakoff & Mary Jordan, At Penn, 
the Word Divides as Easily as the Sword, WASH. POST, May 15, 1993, at AI. At worst, use of this 
epithet is somewhat rude. In no way, however, can this comment be construed as advocating 
genocide, racial discrimination, or any other jus cogens-prohibited conduct. Thus, under our 
approach, no disciplinary action would be permitted and the student's speech would be 
protected. 
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actions would fall under a jus cogens category, regardless of geo-
graphic location. Cities everywhere are free to regulate such speech. 
The Aryan Movement cannot be sure anywhere in the United States 
that their planned march will not be regulated. 
The Aryan Movement also plans to call an open-air symposium 
on segregation, at which they will read aloud segregationist litera-
ture. The Movement organizers hope this manifestation will fall 
outside the category of regulated speech because they will not be 
advocating openly for segregation but will objectively discuss its pros 
and cons. Without the advocacy component the organizers assume 
that their message will not fall within the narrow category of speech 
vulnerable to regulation. 
Counsel, however, challenges their assumption that this "sympo-
sium" eludes the advocacy element.304 Counsel, instead, applies the 
reasonable person standard and concludes that a reasonable person 
might not accept the proposition that the Aryan Movement merely 
seeks to debate segregation, but instead conclude that the Move-
ment intends to advocate segregation under a thinly-veiled disguise. 
Counsel, therefore, would advise the organizers that this "sympo-
sium" may be regulated. 
CONCLUSION 
The past fifteen years have witnessed the persistence of intoler-
able, assaultive messages and ingenious strategies to combat trans-
mission of these messages.305 We do not embrace the particular 
approaches promulgated thus far for regulating speech content.306 
Rather, we urge that the time is ripe for reassessment of First Amend-
ment jurisprudence.307 It is no longer sufficient to rely upon the 
304 Recall that the reasonable person standard applies to resolve ambiguity concerning 
satisfaction of any of the three requisite elements: jus cogens categorization, advocacy, and 
intent. See supra text accompanying notes 272-78. 
305 See supra sources cited at notes 1, 71-75, and 77-79. See generally SUNSTEIN, supra note 
18; Fish, Fraught with Death, supra note 5; Fish, jerry Falwell's Mother, supra note 5. 
306The regulatory approaches primarily focus on protecting the audience. This raises 
difficulties of overbreadth-because too much speech might be suppressed, and vagueness-
because the speaker might know what speech would affront the listener. See supra text 
accompanying notes 11 0-114. 
307 The metaphor of a propitious moment for formulating a new constitutional perspective 
is attributable to Professor Ackerman, who writes of "constitutional moments," interludes of 
great change in American political history, each a fundamental alteration of constitutional 
course. Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE LJ. 1013 
(1984). He identifies three such moments: the period surrounding the founding of the 
Constitution, which worked changes in sovereignty; the post-Civil War period, which effected 
changes in the ideal of equality and national government; and the New Deal era, which 
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metaphorical marketplace of ideas to demonstrate conclusively that 
notions as heinous as genocide, terrorism, slavery, and aggressive 
warfare are spurious. If twentieth century history teaches us nothing 
else, it enlightens us to the fact that untold millions of persons can 
suffer terribly, and even lose their lives, while the marketplace de-
bates the ideologies that persecute them. 
The mere utterance of messages as damaging as those that advo-
cate genocide, terrorism, slavery or aggressive warfare is a public 
injury, for if heeded, these utterances imperil the liberty, equality, 
dignity, and right to life to which each person is constitutionally 
entitled. Thus, they pose the potential for abdication of basic socie-
tal values. 
Are explosive, outrageous, despicable words advocating genocide, 
terrorism, or slavery inconsequential as a motivating societal force?308 
resulted in the establishment of the legitimacy of the activist welfare state. In each case, states 
Professor Ackerman, the resulting transformation involved a change in the character of the 
Constitution. ld. at 1050-57; see also BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 
285-88 (1991); Transjormative Appointments, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1164 (1988). 
While gradual adaption is an important part of the story, the Constitution cannot 
be understood without recognizing that Americans have, time and again, successfully 
repudiated large chunks of their past, and transformed their higher law to express 
deep changes in their political identities. Perhaps these changes do not seem radi-
cal. ... But, when judged by any other standard, they were hardly incremental. If a 
label will clarifY matters, American history has been punctuated by successful exer-
cises in revolutionary reform, in which the protagonists struggled over basic ques-
tions of principle with ramifying implications to large areas of American life. 
Bruce A. Ackerman, Constitutional Politics, Constitutional Law, 99 YALE LJ. 453, 474 (1989). 
See generally BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAw (1984). 
308 See, e.g., Khalid Abdul Mohammad, Nation of Islam National Spokesman at Kean Col-
lege, NJ, Nov. 29, 1993, reprinted in N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1994, at II. 
We don't owe the white man nothin' in South Mrica .... [W]e kill everything white 
that ain't right ... in South Mrica. We kill the women, we kill the children, we kill 
the babies. We kill the blind, we kill the crippled ... we kill 'em all. ... Goddamit, 
and when you get through killing 'em all, go to the goddam graveyard and dig up 
the grave and kill 'em, goddam, again. 'Cause they didn't die hard enough. They 
didn't die hard enough. And if you've killed them all and you don't have the strength 
to dig 'em up, then take your gun and shoot in the goddam grave. Kill 'em again. 
Kill 'em again, 'cause they didn't die hard enough. 
ld. In this speech, Khalid Abdul Mohammad also advocated for the killing of gays, called the 
Pope "that cracker" and questioned his sexual identification, made demeaning references to 
black social commentators, and labeled Jews the "blood suckers of the black nation." ld. 
On February 2, 1994, the United States Senate, by a vote of 97-0, passed a resolution 
condemning this speech, calling it "false, anti-Semitic, racist, divisive, repugnant and a dis-
service to all Americans." 139 Congo Rec. S634 (Feb. 2, 1994); see also Kevin Merida, Failure 
to Repudiate Sen. Hollings Puzzles Black Lawmakers, WASH. POST, Feb. 5, 1994, at A7. 
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If so, then regulating this speech under well-defined, contained 
circumstances is similarly inconsequential. Yet if, as a society, we both 
revere and value speech as an actuating force, then collectively we 
must also respect its potential to effect potentially devastating con-
sequences. We argue in this Article that the sheer power of speech 
as a motivating force commands a new approach to First Amend-
ment analysis-one that takes account of content, in order to mani-
fest our respect for the power of speech, while tenaciously safeguard-
ing fundamental societal values. 
Restriction of speech that importunes on behalf of a substantive 
menace that is condemned by the community of nations under the 
auspices of jus cogens is a discretionary option available to the legis-
lature. We propose a test that in no way reconstructs the First 
Amendment; instead, our proposal measures the constitutionality of 
legislation enacted under the auspices of jus cogens prohibitions. We 
urge only that jus cogens be imported into constitutional analysis as 
an interpretive tool. 
We insist that the legislative prerogative to forbid speech that falls 
within the constricted categories of jus cogens comply with our pro-
posed formulation. A narrowly-drawn statute that fulfills our sug-
gested elemental requirements-intentional advocacy of conduct 
declared intolerable by jus cogens principles, coupled with rigorous 
rejection of regulation when any ambiguity inheres in the scrutiny 
of these elements-should survive First Amendment probing. 
